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Executive summary
In this safety assessment the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has evalu-
ated the safety of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant units 1 and 2 in connection with the 
periodic safety review. This safety assessment provides a summary of the reviews, inspec-
tions and continuous oversight carried out by STUK.
The issues addressed in the assessment and the related evaluation criteria are set forth in 
the nuclear energy and radiation safety legislation and the regulations issued thereunder. 
The provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act concerning the safe use of nuclear energy, secu-
rity and emergency preparedness arrangements, and waste management are specified in 
more detail in the Government Decrees and Regulatory Guides issued by STUK.
Based on the assessment, STUK consideres that the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant units 
1 and 2 meet the set safety requirements for operational nuclear power plants, the emer-
gency preparedness arrangements are sufficient and the necessary control to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons has been appropriately arranged. The physical protection 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is not yet completely in compliance with the require-
ments of Government Decree 734/2008, which came into force in December 2008. Further 
requirements concerning this issue based also on the principle of continuous improvement 
were included in the decision relating to the periodic safety review. 
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was assessed in compliance with the 
Government Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (733/2008), which came into 
force in 2008. The decree notes that existing nuclear power plants need not meet all the 
requirements set out for new plants. Most of the design bases pertaining to the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 nuclear power plant units were set in the 1970s. Substantial modernisations have 
been carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units since their commission-
ing to improve safety. This is in line with the principle of continuous improvement of safety 
provided in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.The safety of the plant will be further 
improved during the current operating licence period. Based on the periodic safety review, 
TVO has submitted to STUK action plans for the observed points requiring improvement. 
STUK included also some additional requirements in the decision relating to the peri-
odic safety review. Action plans and additional requirements were for example related to 
diversification of the safety related systems, development of the lifecycle management of 
electronic and I&C equipment qualified for demanding conditions and ensuring the compe-
tence of personnel.
As a summary of the review of the issues and documentation pertaining to the periodic 
safety review and the continuous oversight results, STUK notes that the safety of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 is sufficient and the licensee utilises the 
 necessary arrangements to continue the safe operation of the plants.
Safety assessment of Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2. Decision of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety  
Authority regarding the periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto NPP. STUK-B 111. Helsinki 2007. 90 pp.
Keywords: Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, nuclear safety, safety assessment, periodic safety review
4STUK-B 111
Contents
ExECUTIVE SUMMARy 3
1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 Safety-related regulations 8
1.2 Structure of the safety assessment 10
2 GENERAl SAFETy (GOVERNMENT DECREE 733/2008) 11
2.1 Section 3: Assessment and verification of safety 11
2.1.1 Transient and accident analyses 11
2.1.2 Strength analyses 12
2.1.3 Probabilistic risk analyses 13
2.2 Section 4: Safety classification 16
2.3 Section 5: Ageing management 16
2.4 Qualification of structures, systems and components 20
2.5 Section 6: Management of human factors 23
3 lIMITATION OF RADIATION ExPOSURE AND RElEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAlS 
(GOVERNMENT DECREE 733/2008) 26
3.1 Section 7: Radiation safety of nuclear power plant workers 27
3.2 Section 8: limit for normal operation 28
3.3 Section 9: limit for an anticipated operational occurrence 29
3.4 Section 10: limits for accident 30
4 NUClEAR SAFETy (GOVERNMENT DECREE 733/2008) 33
4.1 Section 11: Siting of a nuclear power plant 33
4.2 Section 12: Prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences 34
4.3 Section 13: Engineered barriers for preventing the dispersion of radioactive materials 35
4.3.1 Assuring the integrity of fuel 36
4.3.2 Ensuring the primary circuit integrity 37
4.3.3 Water chemistry of the primary circuit 38
4.3.4 Ensuring the integrity of containment building 40
4.4 Section 14: Safety functions and provisions for ensuring them 42
4.5 Section 15: Fuel handling and storage 45
4.6 Section 17: Protection against external events 46
4.7 Section 18: Protection against internal events 47
4.8 Section 19: Monitoring and control of a nuclear power plant 48
5 OPERATION OF ThE NUClEAR POWER PlANT (GOVERNMENT DECREE 733/2008) 51
5.1 Section 23, Operating 51
STUK-B 111
5
5.2 Section 24 Operational experience feedback and safety research 52
5.2.1 Operating experience from the current operating licence period 52
5.2.2 Operatingl experience feedback 54
5.2.3 Safety research 54
5.3 Section 25, Technical Specifications 54
5.4 Section 26, Condition monitoring and maintenance 55
5.4.1 Maintenance 55
5.4.2 In-service inspections 57
5.5 Section 27, Radiation monitoring and control of releases of radioactive materials 58
6 ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEl (GOVERNMENT DECREE 733/2008) 60
6.1 Section 28, Safety culture 60
6.2 Section 29, Safety and quality management 61
6.3 Section 30, lines of management, responsibilities and expertise 64
7 PhySICAl PROTECTION (GOVERNMENT DECREE 734/2008) 68
7.1 Regulations and the related requirements 68
7.2 Responsibility and control 69
7.3 Physical protection arrangements and the assessment 69
8 EMERGENCy RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS (GOVERNMENT DECREE 735/2008) 72
8.1 Regulations and the related requirements 72
8.2 Planning emergency response arrangements and the emergency response organisation 72
8.3 Preparedness 73
8.4 Maintenance of preparedness 73
8.5 Action in an emergency situation 74
8.6 Measures relating to rescue operations 74
8.7 Summary 75
9 NUClEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT 76
9.1 handling, storage and disposal of radioactive waste 76
9.2 Processing, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel 77
9.3 Decommissioning of plant units 78
10 NUClEAR MATERIAl SAFEGUARDS 79
11 OThER REQUIREMENTS 81
11.1 The licensee’s financial prerequisites to engage in operations 81
11.2 International treaties 81
11.3 Compliance with the conditions of the plant’s current operating licence 82
12 SUMMARy 84
12.1 Development areas relating to the safety of the nuclear power plant 85
12.2 Compliance with physical protection requirements 89
12.3 Conclusion 90
(continued)
6STUK-B 111
STUK-B 111
7
The Government has granted Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy (from 1 January 2008 Teollisuuden Voima Oyj) 
a licence for operating the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nucle-
ar power plant units to generate electricity and for 
utilising the interim storage for spent fuel, interim 
storage for intermediate-level waste and storage 
for low-level waste, located at the plant site and 
forming part of the operations in Olkiluoto, for 
intermediate storage of waste generated by the 
operation of the Olkiluoto power plant until 31 
December 2018. According to licence condition 2, 
the licensee must carry out a safety review cover-
ing the Olkiluoto NPP by the end of 2008.
According to section 7 e of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (990/1987), “the overall safety of the facility 
shall be assessed at regular intervals”. If the oper-
ating licence for the nuclear power plant has been 
granted for a period substantially longer than ten 
years, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) requires, in line with guideline yVl 1.1, 
the licensee to carry out a periodic safety review 
of the plant and seek the approval of STUK for it 
approximately ten years after the operating licence 
was granted or the previous periodic safety review 
was carried out. The equivalent safety reports as 
required for renewal of the operating licence are 
also submitted to STUK for the separate periodic 
safety review.
The periodic safety review is mainly based on 
the following documents referred to in section 36 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988):
1) the final safety analysis report;
2) a probabilistic risk analysis;
3) a classification document, which shows the clas-
sification of structures, systems and components 
important to the safety of the nuclear facility, 
on the basis of their significance with respect to 
safety;
4) a quality management programme for the opera-
tion of the nuclear facility;
1 Introduction
5) the Technical Specifications, which shall at least 
define limits for the process quantities that af-
fect the safety of the facility in various operating 
states, provide regulations on operating restric-
tions that result from component failures, and 
set forth requirements for the testing of compo-
nents important to safety;
6) a summary programme for periodic inspections;
7) plans for the arrangements for security and 
emergencies;
8) a description on how to arrange the safeguards 
that are necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons;
9) administrative rules for the nuclear facility;
10) a programme for radiation monitoring in the 
environment of the nuclear facility;
11) a description of how safety requirements are 
met; and
12) a programme for the management of ageing.
According to section 36 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, “When the application for an operating li-
cence is made for a nuclear facility that has already 
been in operation, the documents mentioned in sub-
section 1 need be submitted to STUK only to the 
extent that they have not been submitted before. In 
addition, the applicant must provide STUK with 
any other information considered necessary by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority.”
The documents referred to in section 36 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree must be continuously up-
dated, and the updated versions must be regularly 
submitted to STUK. According to Guide yVl 1.1, 
when applying for renewal of the operating licence 
(or in case of a periodic safety review), the docu-
ments may be submitted to STUK only insofar as 
they have been amended since the previous up-
dates. The licensee must also submit a periodic 
safety review of its own concerning the safety sta-
tus of the nuclear facility, potential areas of devel-
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opment and maintenance of the safety. According 
to Guide yVl 1.1, this review must include:
•	 a	 report	 on	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 requirements	 laid	
down in Government Decisions 395–397/1991 
[currently, Government Decrees 733–735/2008] 
and in the relevant YVL Guides
•	 a	summary	of	the	renewed	safety	analyses	and	
conclusions drawn from their results
•	 experience	 of	 the	 facility	 ageing	 and	 ageing	
management
•	 a	description	of	the	licensee’s	safety	culture	and	
safety management
•	 a report on the actions required in section 27 
of Government Decision 395/1991 [operating 
experience and safety research, section 24 of 
Government Decree 733/2008] and on the conse-
quent plant improvements
•	 a	 report	 on	 compliance	 with	 any	 terms	 of	 the	
operating licence
•	 a	 summary	 of	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 requirements	
laid down in section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has published the safety guide NS-G-2.10, “Periodic 
Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants”, 2003, con-
cerning periodic safety reviews. The guide lists the 
following 14 safety factors that are assessed in the 
safety review:
•	 plant	design
•	 physical	condition	of	the	nuclear	power	plant
•	 qualification	of	equipment	and	structures
•	 ageing	management
•	 deterministic	safety	analyses
•	 probabilistic	safety	analyses
•	 protection	 against	 external	 and	 internal	 haz-
ards
•	 plant	operating	experience	in	terms	of	safety
•	 operating	experience	obtained	from	other	plants	
and safety research findings
•	 organisation	and	administration
•	 plant	procedures
•	 factors	contributing	to	the	work	performance	of	
people
•	 emergency	planning
•	 radiological	impact	on	the	environment.
According to Guide yVl 1.1, In making its own 
periodic safety review, the licensee shall verify that 
the	safety	factors	proposed	in	the	IAEA’s	guide	[17]	
[NS-G-2.10, ”Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear 
Power Plants”, 2003] have been taken into account 
to a sufficient degree in the safety review and other 
licence application documents.
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) submitted the 
documentation related to the periodic safety review 
to STUK by letter 0-7/3/33 dated 30 December 2008 
(Record No. C213/55) and asked STUK to approve 
it as a safety review referred to in licence condi-
tion 2 and Guide yVl 1.1. The submitted reports 
include a summary memorandum and ten appen-
dices containing the documents required in Guide 
yVl 1.1. TVO updated and supplemented the doc-
umentation during the spring and summer 2009 in 
line with STUK’s requests for further clarifications 
(STUK decisions C213/57 dated 27 February 2009 
and C213/59 dated 1 April 2009 as well as further 
clarifications by TVO, submitted in letters C213/60, 
C213/61, C213/63 and 1/C42213/2009).
In compliance with Guide yVl 1.1, STUK 
makes an approval decision regarding the periodic 
safety review required of the licensee and appends 
its own safety assessment to it. The safety assess-
ment is a summary of the inspections carried out 
by STUK on matters and documents related to the 
periodic safety review as well as of the results of 
continuous regulatory oversight.
1.1 Safety-related regulations
Sections 5 to 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act contain 
the following safety provisions:
Section 5, The use of nuclear energy, taking into 
account its various effects, shall be in line with the 
overall good of society;
Section 6, The use of nuclear energy must be 
safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or damage 
to the environment or property;
Section 6 a, Nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of use of nuclear energy in 
Finland shall be handled, stored and permanently 
disposed	of	in	Finland	[…];	and
Section 7, Sufficient physical protection and 
emergency planning as well as other arrangements 
for limiting nuclear damage and for protecting 
nuclear energy against illegal activities shall be a 
prerequisite for the use of nuclear energy.
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This safety assessment covers all the aspects of the 
operation of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units that fall within STUK’s mandate. The 
issues to be addressed in the Safety Assessment 
and the related evaluation criteria are set out in 
the nuclear and radiation safety legislation and 
the regulations issued thereunder. In conjunc-
tion with the reform of the Nuclear Energy Act in 
2008, more detailed safety-related requirements 
were added to sections 7 a–p of the Act. The pro-
visions of the Nuclear Energy Act concerning the 
safe use of nuclear energy, physical protection and 
emergency preparedness arrangements, and waste 
management are specified in more detail in the 
Government Decrees applicable to each field of ac-
tivity and issued under section 7 q of the Nuclear 
Energy Act. The decrees concern:
•	 the	safety	of	nuclear	power	plants	(733/2008);
•	 physical	protection	regarding	the	use	of	nuclear	
energy	(734/2008);
•	 emergency	 planning	 for	 nuclear	 power	 plants	
(735/2008);
•	 safety	 of	 final	 disposal	 of	 nuclear	 waste	
(736/2008).
In the spring of 2006, the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy (formerly the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) initiated a project for revising the nu-
clear energy legislation in cooperation with STUK. 
The objective of and assignment for the project was 
to amend the nuclear energy legislation so that it 
fulfils the requirements laid down in the Finnish 
Constitution reformed in 2000. In particular, the 
regulation level of certain regulations relating to 
nuclear safety and the authorisation provisions of 
the Nuclear Energy Act were under consideration. 
The regulations relating to the export and import 
of nuclear products and goods and the decommis-
sioning of nuclear facilities were reviewed and sup-
plemented as required in the course of the project. 
The legislation was also technically updated in 
other relevant respects. The Government propos-
als to amend the Nuclear Energy Act, as well as 
the Government decrees on the amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and on the safety of a nu-
clear power plant, physical protection concerning 
the use of nuclear energy, emergency prepared-
ness arrangements at nuclear power plants and 
the safety of the disposal of nuclear waste, entered 
into force in 2008. The assessment regarding the 
periodic safety review of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units must be carried out on the basis of the cur-
rently valid legislation.
According to the transitional provision of sec-
tion 32 of the Government decree 733/2008, The 
following shall not be applicable to a nuclear power 
plant for which an operating licence was issued pri-
or to entry of this Decree: section 10(2-4), paragraph 
3 of section 13(3), section 14, section 17 and section 
19(3), unless their applicability is justified with re-
spect to the technical solutions of the nuclear power 
plant in question, under the principle laid down in 
section 7 of the Nuclear Eneregy Act. The fulfilment 
of these provisions is assessed in sections 3.4, 4.3.4, 
4.4, 4.6 and 4.8 of this safety review.
Pursuant to section 55, paragraph 2, point 3 of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK specifies the more 
detailed safety requirements concerning the imple-
mentation of safety level stipulated in the Nuclear 
Energy Act and publishes them in its regulatory 
database (yVl Guides). According to section 7 r of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, The safety requirements 
of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) are binding on the licensee, while preserv-
ing	 the	 licensee’s	 right	 to	 propose	 an	 alternative	
procedure or solution to that provided for in the 
regulations. If the licensee can convincingly demon-
strate that the proposed procedure or solution will 
implement safety standards in accordance with this 
Act, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) may approve procedure or solution by 
which the safety level set forth is achieved.
STUK continually evaluates the currency of 
nuclear safety regulations in relation to current 
international developments, particularly within 
the framework of the International Atomic Energy 
Association (IAEA) and the Western European 
Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA). The 
currency of the yVl guides is checked regularly 
at about five-year intervals. When updating the 
guides, STUK takes into account the advance-
ment of nuclear and radiation safety technology 
and research as well as operating experience from 
Finland and abroad in a manner referred to in sec-
tion 24 of the Government Decree 733/2008.
When preparing the yVl guides, one starting 
point is to attempt to continuously raise the level 
of safety. Consequently, when setting the safety 
10
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targets specified in the guides, the highest level 
internationally achieved is considered the model 
to be followed. In some regards, the targeted level 
is that which is considered achievable, at least in 
new nuclear power plants. For this reason, it is 
not possible, or even feasible, to consider the new 
yVl guides as binding on nuclear power plants in 
operation in all respects.
For the purpose of clarifying the scope of ap-
plicability, a decision concerning nuclear facilities 
in operation or under construction is prepared 
for each new or revised yVl guide, defining the 
applicability of the guide with regard to nuclear 
facilities in operation or under construction. The 
measures to be taken by, for example, the licensee 
due to a guide are specified in implementation 
decisions. A guide does not change the decisions 
issued by STUK prior to the guide entering into 
force unless it is separately announced by STUK. 
On the other hand, STUK requires that the need 
and opportunities for increasing the level of safety 
are re-assessed on the basis of new yVl guides. 
Measures to increase safety may be required on 
the basis of the assessment when deemed justified. 
The systematic preparation of implementation de-
cisions for yVl guides began in 2000.
The design bases concerning the structures, sys-
tems and components of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units were mostly established during the 1970s. 
Although the plant units have been considerably 
modernised since the commissioning and modifi-
cations were implemented in several systems to 
improve safety, the plant does not quite meet the 
requirements of the currently valid yVl guides in 
all respects. The deviations from the yVl guides 
are discussed under the respective sections of 
Government resolutions concerning the subject in 
question.
1.2 Structure of the safety assessment
In this safety assessment, the matters relating to 
nuclear safety are discussed in the same order as 
they are presented in Government Decree 733/2008. 
The matters pertaining to nuclear waste manage-
ment are presented in a separate chapter. In ad-
dition, matters relating to Government Decrees 
734/2008 (physical protection) and 735/2008 (emer-
gency planning) are also discussed, as well as com-
pliance with the terms of the plant’s current oper-
ating licence. This safety assessment also discusses 
those preconditions laid down in section 20 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act that have not been separately 
included in the current Government decrees but 
the assessment of which nevertheless falls within 
STUK’s mandate.
The relevant text from the Government decree 
is quoted at the beginning of each section in ital-
ics. Direct quotations from other regulations are 
likewise presented in italics. If necessary, a brief 
description of the practical applications of the 
requirements in the Government decrees and the 
more detailed criteria presented in the yVl guides 
is provided. Each section includes an evaluation of 
how the related requirements are implemented at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
Special attention will be paid to the question of 
whether	 “…the	 nuclear	 facility	 meets	 the	 safety	
requirements set, that the physical protection and 
emergency planning are sufficient, that the neces-
sary control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons has been arranged appropriately, and that 
the licensee of the nuclear facility has, as provided, 
arranged indemnification regarding liability in 
case of nuclear damage” (Nuclear Energy Act, sec-
tion 20, subsection 2, paragraph 1). A summary of 
the results of the review is presented at the end of 
the Safety Assessment.
STUK-B 111
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2 General safety 
(Government Decree 733/2008)
2.1 Section 3: Assessment and 
verification of safety
The safety of a nuclear power plant shall be as-
sessed when applying for a construction licence and 
operating licence, in connection with plant modifi-
cations, and at regular intervals during the opera-
tion of the plant.
Unless compliance with safety regulations can 
be directly verified on the basis of the nuclear 
power	plant’s	design	solution,	compliance	must	be	
demonstrated. Nuclear power plant safety and the 
technical solutions of its safety systems shall be 
substantiated by using experimental and calcula-
tional methods. These include analyses of opera-
tional occurrences and accidents, strength analyses, 
failure mode and effect analyses, and probabilistic 
risk assessments. Analyses shall be maintained and 
revised if necessary, taking into account operating 
experience, the results of experimental research and 
the advancement of calculating methods.
The calculation methods employed for demon-
strating compliance with safety regulations shall 
be reliable and well qualified for the purpose. They 
shall be applied so that the resulting system de-
sign bases meet the acceptance criteria with high 
certainty. Any uncertainty in the results shall be 
assessed and considered when defining safety mar-
gins.
2.1.1 Transient and accident analyses
Analyses are intended to prove the ability of the 
plant unit to safely overcome various transients 
and accidents. According to Guide yVl 2.2, the 
analyses shall focus on events that, by their nature 
and severity, cover various types of incidents and 
accidents as well as possible. The course of acci-
dents shall be analysed as a function of time, start-
ing from the initiating event and ending in a safe 
and stable state.
Accident analyses describing the operation of 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units, as well as the analysis 
methods, have been updated and developed through-
out the operation of the plant. TVO completely 
revised the accident analyses in conjunction with 
renewing its operating licence in 1995–1998 follow-
ing the power upgrades and modernisation work 
carried out. The analyses were at that time carried 
out for nuclear fuel that is no longer being used 
at the NPP units. Consequently, TVO updated the 
accident analyses in conjunction with the periodic 
safety review, and they are based on the new fuel 
to be introduced to the plant, SVEA-96 Optima 2. 
The plant modifications carried out after the re-
newal of the operating licence were also taken into 
account in the update. The updated analyses use 
50 MWd/kgU as the value for discharge burnup. 
The currently approved maximal bundle average of 
discharge burnup is 45 MWd/kgU.
The revised Guides yVl 2.2 and yVl 6.2 have 
entered into force since the operating licence was 
renewed. In these guides, the classification of initi-
ating events has been amended so that the postu-
lated accidents are divided into two categories on 
the basis of their frequency of occurrence. Guide 
yVl 6.2 sets specific acceptance criteria for events 
in both categories. The requirement regarding 
analyses of design extension conditions has been 
introduced as a new event category. When updat-
ing its analyses, TVO has taken into account the 
above regulatory amendments.
The calculation methods used for analysing the 
plant’s normal operating condition, transients and 
postulated accidents were developed by the suppli-
er of the plant unit. The methods have been quali-
fied to an extent corresponding to a good level from 
the international perspective. Due to uncertainty 
relating to the accuracy of calculation methods, it 
is essential that sufficiently large safety margins 
12
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be applied when assessing the fulfilment of the 
analysis acceptance criteria.
Chapter 9 of the Final Safety Analysis Report 
and its associated topical reports describe the analy-
ses carried out and the analysis methods used. 
The analyses are divided into categories containing 
physically similar events (for example, events as-
sociated with an increase in reactor pressure or loss 
of coolant). In conjunction with the periodic safety 
review, TVO updated the topical reports describing 
the analysis methods for all categories. At least the 
analyses of events used as a basis for dimensioning 
were updated for each category.
STUK has reviewed the updated analyses and 
the calculation methods used. Analyses regard-
ing the adequacy of the emergency cooling system 
were last updated in conjunction with the operat-
ing licence renewal. The analyses carried out at 
that time indicated that the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units have large safety margins in primary circuit 
leakage situations. The analyses have not been 
updated in this respect in conjunction with the 
periodic safety review. When renewing the operat-
ing licence, the assumption was made in analyses 
related to loss of coolant accidents that at least two 
emergency cooling system trains are always avail-
able in all situations to secure the cooling of the 
reactor. When reviewing the analyses updated in 
conjunction with the periodic safety review, STUK 
noticed that the above assumption is not in all sit-
uations compliant with Guide yVl 2.2. This is why 
TVO presented a plan where the analyses related 
to loss of coolant accidents are updated to comply 
with Guide yVl 2.2 by 31 December 2009.
The accident analyses assessing the operability 
of safety systems are discussed in more detail in 
section 4.3 in terms of reactor core and fuel, and in 
sections 3.3 and 3.4 in terms of radiation safety.
The conclusion is that the review of safety of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has, with regard to 
the analyses of transients and accidents, been im-
plemented in the manner referred to in section 3 of 
Government Decree 733/2008. TVO will submit the 
loss of coolant accident analyses to STUK for in-
spection in line with the schedule discussed above.
2.1.2 Strength analyses
As a rule, strength analyses are carried out for 
pressure equipment in Safety Class 1 and present-
ed in connection with the construction plans for 
such equipment. The purpose of these analyses is 
to demonstrate that the pressure component com-
plies with the approval limits set by the applicable 
standard regarding different failure mechanisms 
in loading situations used as the design basis. 
The original strength analyses for the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units are primarily based on ASME 
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, 
Division 1 which was also applied to the updates 
submitted for approval in conjunction with pow-
er upgrades and modernisation projects. The in-
creased loads resulting from higher flow rates due 
to power upgrades and increased bleed capacity 
were also taken into account in the updates.
Guide yVl 3.5 published in 2005 set out further 
requirements regarding ASME III, and the imple-
mentation decision of the guide required TVO to 
assess its compliance with them. STUK found the 
reports on quality management regarding strength 
engineering and fulfilment of the strength engi-
neering criteria for the new NPP to be acceptable. 
Quality management includes the qualification of 
calculation methods applied as well as ensuring 
the competence of the person carrying out the cal-
culation and the adequacy of the input data. In the 
implementation of Guide yVl 3.5, the requirement 
regarding fatigue analyses remained an open ques-
tion;	 it	 concerned	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 actual	
process conditions by applying fatigue test results 
representing them. Attempts have been made to 
describe this so-called ambient effect in fatigue 
analyses using safety coefficients required by the 
applicable standard, but the information currently 
available suggests that they are not sufficient for 
all transient situations.
STUK required that the question of taking the 
ambient effect into account in a more closely de-
fined manner should be investigated in conjunction 
with the periodic safety review as a pilot project. 
TVO implemented the requested pilot project us-
ing VTT for expert consultancy. The Fen method 
according to the US guideline NUREG 1.207, so far 
only intended for licensing new NPPs, was applied 
to the selected objects, the main feedwater pipeline 
and certain associated auxiliary systems. STUK 
took the view that the document complied with the 
requirements set for periodic safety reviews in the 
implementation stage of Guide yVl 3.5. however, 
the documentation shows that the realistic model-
ling of ambient effects leads, in conjunction with 
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a traditional pipeline fatigue analysis including 
several simplifications, to an outcome that does 
not comply with the approval limits of the ap-
plicable standard. In the periodic safety review 
submitted by TVO, a plan for updating the fatigue 
analyses to correspond to a service life of 60 years 
was presented. The ambient effects will be taken 
into account in conjunction with the update, but 
the analyses will also be further specified in other 
respects while ensuring that the approval limits 
are met. This specification work will make use 
of, among other things, the data on the actual 
progress of pressure and temperature transients, 
acquired through operating experience, as well as 
the actual material properties and geometry data 
established during manufacture and installation. 
TVO has collected this data during the current op-
erating licence period into a pipeline database.
The conclusion is that the review of the safety of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has, with regard 
to the strength analyses, been implemented in the 
manner referred to in section 3 of Government 
Decree 733/2008. The analysis of fatigue induced 
by ambient conditions, carried out in deviation to 
Guide yVl 3.5, can be deemed sufficient for the 
remaining term of the operating licence period 
provided that the actions for updating the fatigue 
analyses, presented by TVO in conjunction with 
the periodic safety review, are initiated on sched-
ule. STUK will monitor the work for updating the 
analyses in connection with its regulatory over-
sight.
2.1.3 Probabilistic risk analyses
In this connection, Probabilistic Risk Analyses 
(PRAs) refer to the probabilistic risk analyses 
complying with the requirements of section 3 of 
Government Decree 733/2008. PRAs are used for 
systematically analysing the occurrence of tran-
sients and the succession of safety functions re-
quired for stopping their progress, while taking 
into account the possibilities for faults and errors, 
as well as their probabilities, in each system. Event 
sequences describing accident propagation result-
ing in reactor core damage are analysed in the 
PRA, and the probability for their occurrence is es-
timated. The PRA can be used for identifying such 
dependencies between systems that may otherwise 
remain unnoticed.
The timing and probabilities of accident se-
quences resulting in reactor core damage are de-
fined	on	level	1	of	the	PRA;	the	quantity,	time	and	
probability of the release of radioactive material 
into the environment is estimated on level 2 of the 
PRA.
In the PRA, an initiating event is a single event 
that causes a transient and requires the start of 
the plant safety functions. The initiating event can 
be an internal or external event. Internal initiating 
events are transients arising from component fail-
ures, loss of off-site power and human errors made 
by plant personnel. The initiating events also in-
clude floods occurring inside the plant due to rup-
tures in piping or pressure vessels causing a tran-
sient and loss of components important to safety, 
as well as initiating events in the form of fires that 
result in plant operational transients. External ini-
tiating events include transients caused by, among 
other things exceptional weather conditions, seis-
mic phenomena and other factors stemming from 
the plant environment or human activity.
The PRA is used for plant safety management 
in the manner prescribed by yVl guides in, among 
other things, identifying the needs for plant modi-
fications, assessing the technical specifications and 
targeting the in-service inspections of pipelines in 
a risk-informed manner.
Level 1 PRA – Most significant 
initiating events
The initiating events most significant for core dam-
age frequency in the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units 
are loss of offsite power (47%), loss of feedwater 
(19%), loss of coolant accidents (11%) and loss of 
condensate system (10%). The initiating events 
may be caused by internal factors (such as fires 
and floods) or by external factors (such as weather 
phenomena or earthquakes). An initiating event 
may also occur when the plant is being brought to 
a scheduled shutdown for repairs or annual main-
tenance. The initiating events occurring in con-
junction with scheduled shutdowns contribute 12% 
to the core damage frequency. The initiating events 
occurring in conjunction with annual maintenance 
outages have little effect on the core damage fre-
quency (2%).
The most significant systems in loss of off-site 
power occurrences are the load reconnection sys-
tem (system ID 684), DC systems (672 and 679), re-
actor level measurement system (211), reactor pro-
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tection system (516) and connection of emergency 
power from the neighbouring NPP unit (662).
The contributing shares of initiating events of 
the core damage frequency are shown in Table 1. 
As a result of plant modifications and more de-
tailed analyses, the core damage frequency has 
decreased (1.4E-05 /a → 1.0E-05 /a) even though 
new risk factors have also been identified.
Level 1 PRA – Flood risks (internal flooding)
During the current operating licence period, TVO 
has developed and supplemented the analysis of 
flood risk at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units by, for 
example, modelling major flooding of seawater sys-
tems in the turbine hall and in the coolant water 
intake building. The most significant risk of flood-
ing is caused by major leaks in the seawater sys-
tem in case the seawater pumps are not stopped 
and the leak isolated quickly enough. During the 
current operating licence period, TVO implemented 
plant modifications that will ensure the quick de-
tection of floods and shutdown of seawater pumps. 
The required procedures were also produced. After 
the plant modifications, the flood risks contribute 
about 0.6% to the core damage frequency.
Level 1 PRA – Fire risks
The work for updating the fire risk analysis for the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units began during the cur-
rent operating licence period. TVO has drawn up a 
plan for updating the analysis. The plan pays spe-
cial attention to the assessment of fire frequencies 
and risk analyses regarding the spread of fire in 
spaces accommodating cables and electrical equip-
ment where two parallel safety systems have been 
located.
In cable spaces, the risk of fire spreading will be 
mitigated by the modifications in progress where 
the	 nozzles	 of	 the	 sprinkler	 system	 are	 replaced	
with	new,	faster	operating	nozzles.	The	efficiency	of	
the fire extinguishing system will also be improved 
by	revising	the	layout	of	the	nozzles.
Level 1 PRA – Weather phenomena 
and other external events
The analyses indicate that the most significant 
external events include a storm with a simultane-
ous loss of off-site power, mussels breaking off the 
internal walls of the seawater tunnels, deposits of 
algae (blockage of seawater intake channels) as 
well as simultaneous high levels of seawater and 
ambient temperature.
The risks resulting from oil spillage accidents 
occurring at sea have not been assessed in conjunc-
tion with the PRA for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units. Although there is little ship traffic near the 
plant, the PRA must include quantitative analy-
ses that can be used as the basis for assessing the 
risk caused by oil and the adequacy of prepared-
ness measures. TVO shall produce a plan for sup-
plementing the PRA with an assessment of risk 
caused by oil spillage accidents.
During the operating licence period, a new po-
tential risk to safety was identified: the impulse 
lines,	 important	 to	 safety,	may	 freeze	 if	 the	 ven-
tilation intake air heating fails when the outside 
temperature	is	well	below	freezing	point.	The	risk	
of	impulse	lines	freezing	was	substantially	reduced	
through modifications to the plant and procedures.
Level 1 PRA – Earthquakes
Earthquakes were not taken into account in the 
original design of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. 
The earthquake risk analysis later carried out for 
the plant revealed certain flaws in the design – 
these were eliminated through plant modifications. 
Table 1. Contributing shares of initiating events to the core damage frequency of 1.01E-05 /a (2008).
Internal Seismic Fires Floods Weather Missiles Total
LOCAs (pipe ruptures) 11.0% 11.0%
Loss of feedwater 8.7% 1.1% 3.7% 0.6% 4.5% 0.0% 18.6%
Loss of offsite power 39.1% 0.3% 0.0% 7.0% 0.1% 46.6%
Loss of condensate system 9.9% 9.9%
Valve 314 remaining open* 0.4% 0.4%
Shutdown 11.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.8%
Outage 1.7% 0.1% 1.8%
Total 82.5% 1.5% 3.8% 0.6% 11.5% 0.2% 100.0%
*) if relief valve 314 remains open, the primary circuit coolant is lost.
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For example, certain safety critical electrical equip-
ment was not sufficiently supported to withstand 
earthquake-induced loads. In addition, an earth-
quake may cause malfunctions in the control sys-
tem relays that result in protection functions being 
unnecessarily activated. Examples of these include 
the unnecessary opening of pressure relief valves 
in the primary circuit and an unnecessary isolation 
of the containment that stops cooling of the reactor. 
The most significant plant modification during the 
current operating licence period was that the main 
control room was provided with capabilities to can-
cel unnecessary protection functions activated as 
a result of earthquakes. As a result of the plant 
modifications carried out, the risk caused by earth-
quakes is no longer significant.
Level 2 PRA
The level 2 PRA for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units has been updated twice (in 2001 and 2003) 
during the current operating licence period. A new 
update of the level 2 PRA was scheduled to be 
released in conjunction with the other reports con-
cerning the periodic safety review, but TVO was 
unable to complete it in time. however, since the 
current analyses are free of any essential flaws, the 
situation can be deemed satisfactory. The analysis 
covers the external and internal initiating events 
during both power operation and refuelling out-
ages.
During the current operating licence period, 
TVO has, in the context of management of severe 
accidents, provided all working shifts with training 
on the flooding of the lower drywell and reinforced 
the access opening of the lower drywell for the 
eventuality of a steam explosion. These modifica-
tion needs were identified in the level 2 PRA, and 
they have significantly reduced the frequency of 
major releases. In addition, modifications reduc-
ing the probability of severe accidents have been 
carried out, such as reducing the risk of dropping 
heavy loads during lifts taking place above the fuel 
pools or the reactor.
The most significant transient situation result-
ing in a major release (> 100 TBq Cesium-137) 
is one where the primary circuit pressure is suc-
cessfully reduced but residual heat removal fails. 
Transients of this type account for 79% of accidents 
resulting in major releases. The second most sig-
nificant sequence of events resulting in a major 
release is one where both the reduction of primary 
circuit pressure and residual heat removal fail. 
Transients of this type account for 13% of accidents 
resulting in major releases. The transient is most 
probably initiated by a loss of off-site power after 
which the connection of emergency generators fails 
as a result of a common cause failure in the DC 
battery banks.
The most significant event in accidents result-
ing in major releases is the loss of off-site power 
during power operation or a scheduled shutdown 
(approx. 85%).
Summary
PRA has been used for systematically identifying 
and eliminating risk factors during the current 
operating licence period. In order to ensure the 
availability of offsite power, a gas turbine plant has 
been built at the Olkiluoto plant site in conjunc-
tion with the Olkiluoto 3 plant project, and it also 
secures the power supply to the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units. In spite of this, the loss of off-site power 
remains the most significant initiating event from 
the perspective of risk. STUK required TVO to sub-
mit, in conjunction with the periodic safety review, 
a report of possibilities for reducing the risk caused 
by the loss of off-site power, as well as an action 
plan required for reducing this risk. In its reply, 
TVO presented the most significant risk factors, 
but not a plan for reducing them. In its decision 
C30-7/106 dated 30 April 2009, STUK required 
TVO to submit a plan regarding the diversification 
of systems that are important in situations of loss 
of off-site power, and TVO submitted this plan to 
STUK in September 2009.
The initiating events occurring in conjunction 
with scheduled shutdowns contribute significantly 
to the core damage frequency. This is why STUK 
required TVO to submit, in conjunction with the 
periodic safety review, a report of factors affecting 
the risk associated with shutdowns, as well as an 
action plan required for reducing this risk. In its 
reply, TVO presented that the shutdown analysis 
will be updated by the end of 2010, and the actions 
possibly required for reducing the risk will be as-
sessed after this update.
The risk caused by oil spillage accidents has 
so far not been evaluated in conjunction with the 
PRA. TVO shall present a plan for assessing oil-
related risks.
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The open issues discussed above are part of 
the normal risk analysis updating process that 
includes the identification, assessment and pos-
sible elimination of risk factors. The conclusion is 
that TVO has justified the plant safety and safety 
engineering solutions in accordance with the re-
quirements concerning probabilistic safety analy-
ses presented in section 3 of Government Decree 
733/2008.
2.2 Section 4: Safety classification
The safety functions of a nuclear power plant shall 
be defined and the related systems, structures and 
components classified on the basis of their safety 
significance.
Systems, structures and components important 
to safety shall be designed, manufactured, installed 
and used so that their quality level, and the assess-
ments, inspections and tests, including environmen-
tal qualification, required to verify their quality 
level, are sufficient considering the safety signifi-
cance of the item in question.
Detailed requirements relating to section 4 of 
the decree are set out in Guide yVl 2.1.
The purpose of safety classification is to ensure 
that the quality level complied with in the design, 
manufacture, installation, commissioning and op-
eration of systems, structures and components im-
portant to safety, as well as required assessments, 
inspections and tests, are in correct proportion to 
the safety significance of the item. STUK uses the 
safety classification when defining its regulatory 
control activities.
The systems, structures and components have 
been classified into four safety classes: Safety 
Classes 1–4, as well as Class EyT (non-nuclear 
classification). The subjects most critical to safety 
are in Safety Class 1. Safety classification of the 
most important systems, structures and compo-
nents at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units is shown 
in the classification document, while the detailed 
component-specific classification is shown in the 
plant database. The safety classification is present-
ed separately for mechanical and electrical compo-
nents. The document regarding the classification 
of electrical components specifies the functions 
implemented by each system and the safety class 
of these functions, as well as the components or 
equipment groups participating in each function. 
The safety class (SC) of a component is determined 
on the basis of the SC of the most demanding of the 
functions that it participates in or that its failure 
can inhibit.
In 2005, TVO initiated a development pro-
gramme for the classification document of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. The primary objective 
of the programme is to further specify the compo-
nent classification and classification information 
contained in the plant database. The table of con-
tents of the classification document has been to-
tally revised, and the contents have been updated 
to better correspond to the requirements of Guide 
yVl 2.1. The work for further developing the clas-
sification document continues, and TVO intends to, 
among other things, supplement the component lo-
cation-specific safety classification contained in the 
classification document and in the plant database 
before the automation renewal to be carried out at 
the plant unit. In conjunction with the classifica-
tion document development project, TVO has an-
nounced the principal for supplementing the safety 
classification with component location-based safety 
classification in conjunction with major modifica-
tions.
The challenging task in planning automation 
renewal is that of documenting the defence in 
depth approach implemented at the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units. The objective is to identify and 
differentiate, in line with the defence in depth ap-
proach, the functions belonging to functional levels 
backing each other up as well as the I&C systems 
and components implementing them, and to ensure 
that the functional safety classification supports 
the defence in depth design approach.
The conclusion is that the safety classification 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has, in gen-
eral, been implemented in the manner referred to 
in section 4 of Government Decree 733/2008. TVO’s 
classification document development project will 
continue, and STUK will monitor its progress.
2.3 Section 5: Ageing management
The design and construction of a nuclear power 
plant shall include provision for the ageing of 
systems, structures and components important to 
safety. The condition of systems, structures and 
components shall be monitored to ensure that they 
retain their operability and conformity in design 
basis conditions. Their replacement by new or simi-
lar technology, as well as repairs and modifica-
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tions, shall be carried out in a systematic manner.
According to Guide yVl 1.1, a nuclear pow-
er plant shall have an ageing management pro-
gramme comprising the design and qualification 
of components and structures, their operation and 
operating experience, in-service inspections and 
periodic tests, and maintenance. The programme 
shall identify all significant ageing and wear mech-
anisms, and potential degradation owing to ageing. 
The periodic safety review shall assess the expe-
rience of the facility ageing and ageing manage-
ment.
The ageing management related activities at 
the Olkiluoto NPP were prompted when intergran-
ular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) was de-
tected in the pipelines of auxiliary reactor systems 
after just a few years of service. This problem, com-
mon in boiling water reactors, was not sufficiently 
foreseen during the design stage even though the 
material specifications had been made more strin-
gent. It was brought under control by introducing 
an extensive programme of early replacement of 
pipeline materials. The practice of maintaining 
the plants in an as new condition through actions 
eliminating the ageing effects of critical plant com-
ponents was gradually established as a service life 
management strategy at TVO, and in 1991 TVO set 
up a Service life Team to identify the future needs 
of major repairs, modifications, replacements and 
maintenance operations at the plant. Utilising the 
team’s recommendations, an extensive modernisa-
tion project, planned using in-house resources, was 
implemented at the plant during 1994–1998. It in-
volved a power upgrade of 16% for both plant units, 
and with regard to ageing management it created 
the right conditions for the current operating li-
cence, which is valid until 2018. In conjunction 
with the modernisation project, the electrical and 
I&C systems were upgraded, and the systematic 
maintenance of design basis data was initiated.
During the same years, systematic mainte-
nance planning (maintenance analysis process) 
was started at the plant. For that purpose, the 
plant was divided into component responsibil-
ity areas consisting of components of a similar 
type and/or installed in the same location. TVO 
appointed persons responsible for each area. A 
four-grade maintenance classification was speci-
fied for the components as the basis for mainte-
nance operations that were decided on the basis of, 
among other things, the ageing phenomena in the 
components. A summary report is produced every 
year for the observations and actions in different 
component responsibility areas, and the report is 
sent to STUK for information.
Extensive modification works have continued at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units during the current 
operating licence period. The general objective has 
been to improve the operability, reliability and per-
formance of plant components as well as to ensure 
the availability of product support and spare parts 
from equipment suppliers. Examples of this work 
were the VT/KP, REMES, TARMO and KUIVAIN 
projects, where the reheaters, 6.6 kV switchgear, 
I&C equipment of the turbine plant and the reac-
tor steam driers were replaced, respectively. 
According to current procedures, the matters 
related to ageing management are processed at 
TVO by the Plant Meeting, Technical Meeting and 
Annual Maintenance Team. In the line organisa-
tion, the responsibility for preventive maintenance, 
also with regard to ageing, lies with different 
persons who work at the Power Plant Technology 
Department and are responsible for different ar-
eas of technology and equipment, respectively. In 
practice, the most significant role is that of the 
teams, some of which are defined in the organi-
sation manual. The expert teams, established in 
different areas of technology, deal with matters 
related to ageing and report them to the IKÄ Team 
controlling these activities, as well as to the line 
organisation. An extensive network of plant suppli-
ers, equipment manufacturers, research institutes 
and other utility companies is also available for 
support. In conjunction with its inspection of the 
periodic inspection programme, STUK has recom-
mended that attention should be paid to the status 
and processes of the teams.
Olkiluoto’s ageing management programme 
covers all systems at the plant. When determining 
the monitoring procedures, the factors taken into 
account include the requirements of yVl guides, 
safety class, maintenance class, PRA, known age-
ing phenomena, operating experience, replaceabil-
ity, repairability and study results. The monitoring 
procedures include leak tests and monitoring dur-
ing operation as well as periodic inspections and 
tests and preventive maintenance programmes. 
The contents of these activities regarding each 
area of technology are shown in operation and 
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maintenance manuals. The monitoring procedures 
are annually reported to STUK through separate 
procedures in compliance with yVl guides.
During the current operating licence period, 
STUK has assessed the ageing management pro-
gramme of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in 
several periodic inspections conducted at the plant 
site. They have dealt with the implementation of 
this programme and its targeting of individual 
plant components in different areas of technology. 
The technical observations have mainly concen-
trated on identifying ageing phenomena. This is 
particularly true in the areas of electrical and 
automation engineering. The assessment of the 
entire programme, carried out in 2005, highlighted 
the fact that in spite of its extent and good results, 
the ageing management programme appeared to 
consist of separate routines that had not been 
described as a single entity as required by the 
yVl guides and applicable international guide-
lines. Consequently, TVO supplemented its proce-
dures and produced a report of its activities as part 
of the periodic safety review.
Mechanical engineering
STUK’s detailed requirements relating to the 
ageing of mechanical equipment are specified in 
Guides yVl 3.0, yVl 3.5, yVl 3.8 and yVl 3.9.
The mechanical components monitoring proce-
dures at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units include 
temperature, pressure, flow rate and vibration 
measurements, water sampling for chemical analy-
ses as well as a monitoring programme for the re-
actor pressure vessel. Periodic tests are carried out 
for valves and their actuators, safety valves, pumps 
and heat exchangers. The pressure equipment 
monitoring procedures, important from the point 
of service life, include periodic inspections, particu-
larly inspections using non-destructive methods 
and erosion corrosion inspections carried out in 
line with Guide yVl 3.8, as well as the moni-
toring of pressure and temperature transients. 
Non-destructive inspection programmes have been 
extended because of IGSCC and thermally-induced 
fatigue, and this programme is currently being 
revised to make it risk-informed. The foreseeable 
damage mechanisms are systematically analysed, 
and the inspection methods are qualified in compli-
ance with Guide yVl 3.8. The results of pressure 
and temperature transient monitoring have been 
compiled into a database that will be used as the 
basis for updating the fatigue analyses during the 
current operating licence period to correspond to a 
service life of 60 years so that the impact of the op-
erating environment is taken into account. The re-
sults of these monitoring procedures are discussed 
in sections 2.1.2, 4.3.2 and 5.4.2. The safety-critical 
monitoring procedures and actions due to ageing 
take place under the control of STUK. The alloca-
tion of responsibilities and division or inspection 
areas regarding pressure equipment is discussed 
in Appendix 1 to Guide yVl 3.0. The programmes 
for and results of periodic inspections are submit-
ted annually to STUK for approval.
The reactor pressure vessels of the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units are, generally speaking, in good 
condition. The fault indications of pipeline fittings 
and the presence of IGSCC are discussed in sec-
tion 4.3.2. Austenitic stainless steel materials and 
predominantly nickel-based alloys have also been 
used in the interior parts of the pressure vessel 
and for welding them. Irradiation-Assisted Stress 
Corrosion Cracking (IASCC) may also cause age-
ing in these conditions. TVO has systematically 
analysed the factors affecting cracking, and the 
major actions resulting from this work are the 
replacement of moderator vessel covers in 1992 
and 1994. The major actions during the current 
operating licence period include the replacement of 
steam dryers during 2005–2006 in order to reduce 
the humidity content and the resulting disper-
sion of radioactivity, as well as the replacement of 
feedwater manifolds displaying thermally-induced 
cracking in 2004–2005 to cope with the flow rates 
increased by the power upgrade. The mixing of hot 
reflux water and cold feedwater, taking place at the 
feedwater fitting, is also suspected to be the reason 
behind the small cracks found in the lifting lugs of 
the moderator vessel cover.
The most significant project initiated with re-
spect to functional equipment is the replacement of 
inner isolation valves in the main steam line to cor-
respond to the increased flow rate of steam brought 
about by the power upgrade. One of the valves cur-
rently in use closed in 2006 at the Olkiluoto 1 NPP 
unit as a result of a higher than normal flow rate 
after the other isolation valve had closed by itself 
after the permanent magnet keeping it open had 
grown weaker. The decision has also been taken 
to replace the low-pressure turbines and main 
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seawater pumps, and the replacement or complete 
overhaul of emergency diesel generators is under 
consideration. Cracks have been discovered in the 
attachment grooves and stems of the blade sec-
tions of low-pressure turbines. They have most 
likely been caused by stress-induced corrosion and 
blade vibration. In its inspection of the periodic 
inspection programme, STUK has required TVO 
to ensure that the cracks will not cause a risk of 
missiles.
The erosion corrosion present in the turbine 
plant pipelines of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units 
has been controlled through annual inspections 
and, from the 1980s onwards, through extensive 
material selection operations where carbon steel 
was replaced with austenitic stainless steel. The 
most important areas for material replacement 
were the extraction steam lines, several pressure 
vessels and heat exchangers linked to the low-
pressure preheater.
Electrical and I&C systems
STUK’s detailed requirements concerning electri-
cal and I&C systems regarding the monitoring and 
reporting of ageing are specified in Guides yVl 5.2 
and yVl 5.5.
The electrical and I&C systems of the Olki-
luoto 1 and 2 NPP units have their own ageing 
management programme with related procedures. 
The procedures for ageing management of electri-
cal and I&C systems present the key methods that 
TVO deems sufficient for managing the impacts 
resulting from the ageing of electrical and I&C sys-
tems in its nuclear facilities.
The ageing management of electrical and I&C 
systems is based on monitoring their condition. 
Condition monitoring is performed in order to en-
sure that the condition of electrical and I&C equip-
ment and cables complies with the requirements 
and that they are capable of operating in the 
planned situations. In conjunction with the power 
upgrade, the TVO Service life Team updated the 
ageing	 forecasts;	 for	 example,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
containment cabling. The most important electrical 
and I&C systems are located in separate electri-
cal and I&C facilities outside the containment and 
process facilities. The equipment located in the con-
tainment and required for the detection or control 
of accidents is qualified to withstand the conditions 
during operation and accidents. Its condition is 
regularly monitored. The ageing of cables located 
inside the containment is monitored through sam-
pling carried out at five-year intervals. So far, no 
such ageing has been observed in the cables that 
would indicate a need to replace them. It is expected 
that the electrical and I&C systems will be replaced 
at least once during the service life of the plant.
The follow-up of feedback information from 
repairs and replacements of electrical and I&C sys-
tems is one source of information utilised for the 
monitoring and management of ageing. The actual 
condition and operation in compliance with the 
design basis of electrical and I&C systems, equip-
ment and cables is also monitored through periodic 
inspections and condition monitoring as well as 
through the periodic inspections under the preven-
tive maintenance programme. The major modifica-
tion works regarding the electrical systems carried 
out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units during the 
current operating licence period included the basic 
overhaul of a 400 kV switchgear (OlA), upgrades 
of 6.6 kV equipment (system 642), drawing of cable 
connections for the new gas turbine plant, replace-
ment of RPM control equipment of the diesel gen-
erators, replacements of aged contactor output con-
tacts (system 662), the commissioning of new UPS 
equipment (system 664) as well as the commission-
ing of new rectifiers (systems 672, 673, 677, 678 
and 679). Significant modification work planned for 
the electrical equipment includes the replacement 
of low-voltage switchgear, improvement of the ov-
ervoltage protection of electrical drives of reactor 
coolant pumps, as well as the possible replacement 
of these electrical drives over the longer term and 
the replacement of cabling inside the containment.
Certain I&C systems of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units have been replaced during the current 
operating licence period. These include the compu-
terised metering system, the control and position 
indication systems of reactor control and shutdown 
elements, the process measurement data logging 
system as well as the process automation system of 
the turbine plant. The computer system for process 
control and certain other monitoring systems have 
been upgraded. One reason for these upgrades was 
outdated technology. In order to ensure the oper-
ability and operational reliability of the protection 
I&C, TVO has joined other nuclear power compa-
nies in initiating actions for ensuring the future 
supply of spare parts.
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Replacements related to the changes in design 
requirements were carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units in conjunction with the moderni-
sation work during the previous operating licence 
period. The most recent of these was that ATWS 
(Anticipated Transient Without Scram) situations 
are now taken into account as supplementary func-
tions to the reactor protection system.
The preliminary planning for the project aimed 
at upgrading the reactor and protection automa-
tion has been initiated, and gradual modernisation 
of protection automation is expected to start dur-
ing 2015–2016. The analogue technology currently 
in use will be largely replaced with programma-
ble equipment. A task significant for safety, to be 
carried out during the current operating licence 
period, will be the design and implementation of 
I&C systems diversification. In its decision C30-
10/42, 39, 40, 41, 43, STUK required that TVO 
must submit a principal plan for the diversification 
of programmable equipment by February 2010 at 
the latest.
Operating experience shows that the ageing 
phenomena in electrical equipment and cables can 
be adequately managed through enhanced mainte-
nance of problem areas and through basic improve-
ments of replaceable components. The fact that 
equipment technologies also become outdated will 
be taken into account regarding I&C systems.
Construction engineering
STUK’s detailed requirements relating to the age-
ing of concrete and steel structures are specified in 
Guides yVl 4.1 and yVl 4.2.
The state of repair of buildings in the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units is monitored through periodic 
inspections. TVO has produced separate preven-
tive maintenance procedures for certain building 
elements, such as the seawater channels and doors. 
The areas monitored for ageing in the contain-
ment include the deformations and long-term du-
rability of concrete structures, the ambient condi-
tions for steel structures and expansion joints. The 
conditions for structures susceptible to corrosion 
are monitored through temperature and humidity 
measurements. The condition of penetrations, the 
partition floor, gasket face plate and pool struc-
tures is monitored through leak tests and leak 
detection. The cracks in concrete are monitored 
by taking measurements. STUK’s requirements 
relating to the periodic inspections as well as to the 
repairs and modifications of buildings are specified 
in Guides yVl 4.1 and yVl 4.2. STUK also moni-
tors these activities during periodic inspections.
The significant modifications carried out due to 
ageing for the buildings in the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units during the current operating licence pe-
riod included the following: repair of a leak in the 
condensate pool lining of the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit 
in 2006, replacement of expansion joint gaskets in 
the containment partition floor during 2005–2006, 
reopening of the expansion joint between the con-
tainment and reactor building of the Olkiluoto 2 
NPP unit after it had come into contact with the 
concrete as a result of concrete creep and relaxa-
tion of pre-stressed steel reinforcements, as well 
as the cathode protection of seawater structures 
against chloride-induced corrosion.
Summary
STUK’s assessment is that ageing management in 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units is appropriately 
organised. The ageing management of plant units 
is one of the focal areas for TVO. The goal is to keep 
the plants up-to-date and in good condition at all 
times, with respect to both safety and production 
capability. The early detection of dominant ageing 
phenomena and plant components allows making 
long-term predictions regarding the significant im-
provements and maintenance operations that will 
be required. 
The conclusion is that ageing management at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been imple-
mented in the manner referred to in section 5 of 
Government Decree 733/2008. however, certain 
plant events have come to light in recent years 
where the ageing of equipment or structures has 
been the cause or a contributing factor. STUK will 
monitor the trend regarding the factors behind 
the events during the remaining term of the op-
erating licence in conjunction with its regulatory 
oversight.
2.4 Qualification of structures, 
systems and components
According to the IAEA guide NS-G-2.10 “Periodic 
Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants”, a nuclear 
power plant shall have systematic procedures for 
qualifying equipment and structures important 
to safety and for maintaining the documentation 
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demonstrating qualification. The qualification is to 
ensure that equipment and structures are capable 
of performing their functions in design basis op-
erating conditions and accidents with a sufficient 
margin while taking into account the loads and en-
vironmental conditions arising during them. Most 
essential in connection with periodic safety reviews 
is to review those factors that may have changed 
the qualification requirements since the previous 
safety review or may do so during the subsequent 
review period.
Mechanical components
The design parameters for the original mechanical 
equipment of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units were 
presented in the plan specification. The equipment 
was qualified through testing and inspections and 
in some cases by calculations. As a rule, the ambi-
ent conditions were taken into account by choosing 
materials suitable for these conditions. 
TVO updated the loading specifications of me-
chanical components in conjunction with the mod-
ernisation and power upgrade of the plant units 
during 1995–1998, and they are still up-to-date. 
The power upgrade increased the primary circuit 
flow rates and required an increase in the capacity 
of the relief system. These effects were taken into 
account by updating the stress analyses of Safety 
Class 1 pressure equipment and by submitting 
them to STUK for approval. The plan is to update 
the fatigue analyses of these components before 
the expiry of the current operating licence to cor-
respond to the service life of 60 years.
During the current operating licence period, 
TVO has carried out component-specific qualifica-
tion tests for the new inner isolation valves in the 
main steam lines. Model tests have been carried 
out as part of the plans for replacing seawater 
pumps. The changes caused by the dose of fast neu-
trons in the materials of the reactor pressure ves-
sel and the moderator vessel are monitored with 
the help of sample pieces located in the reactor. 
Samples are taken out of the reactor for inspection 
in accordance with a schedule based on the pro-
jected service life.
Electrical and I&C systems and components
According to the guides yVl 5.2 and yVl 5.5 con-
cerning electrical and I&C systems and compo-
nents, the systems, equipment and cables at a nu-
clear facility shall be qualified for their intended 
use. Qualification verifies the conformity of the 
systems and their components with the require-
ments so that their ability to fulfil their intended 
purpose in all planned operational conditions is 
ensured. The applicability of qualification of equip-
ment and cables must be assessed in compliance 
with the yVl guides, decrees and internationally 
accepted standards. Since the components must 
be able to fulfil their intended purpose throughout 
their entire service life, the monitoring of equip-
ment ageing can also be deemed to be part of the 
continuous qualification process.
Demanding qualification requirements regard-
ing ambient conditions mainly apply to compo-
nents and cables located inside the containment 
since the conditions in accident situations outside 
the containment will be less severe. The electrical 
and I&C systems located in the containment build-
ings of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units are divided 
into three environment classes on the basis of the 
qualification requirements regarding ambient con-
ditions applicable to each class. The environment 
classification was made on a function-specific basis 
so that all components required for carrying out a 
certain function belong to the environment class 
specified for that function. In addition, a functional 
seismic classification of electrical and I&C systems 
has	been	made	for	the	plant	units;	it	is	presented	
in the common classification document for the 
plant units.
Earthquakes were not taken into account in the 
original design work for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units, which is why the electrical and I&C systems 
of plant units do not, as a rule, comply with the 
current requirements regarding earthquake resist-
ance. however, according to the plant’s seismic risk 
analysis, the risks arising from earthquakes are 
relatively minor. The seismic classification in ac-
cordance with Guide yVl 2.6, demonstrating that 
the plant’s earthquake resistance is not impaired, 
is to be applied in connection with major modifica-
tions being performed at the plant units. TVO has 
carried out modifications at both plant units in or-
der to improve the earthquake resistance of safety-
classified electrical cabinets and battery banks by 
upgrading their mechanical supports.
The details of qualification tests carried out for 
electrical and I&C equipment regarding ambient 
conditions are presented in many different docu-
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ments forming part of the plant documentation. 
The ambient conditions-related qualifications of 
components and cables related to later modification 
and modernisation operations at the plant units 
have been assessed in conjunction with processing 
the applicability assessments regarding the modi-
fication operations.
Since the beginning of 1997, STUK has re-
quired that the environmental qualification of 
electrical and I&C components must also include 
the demonstration of electromagnetic compatibil-
ity. All electrical equipment currently in use at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has not been tested 
for compliance with the EMC (Electromagnetic 
Compatibility) requirements. The requirements are 
nowadays taken into account when modernising 
and replacing equipment at the plant units. TVO is 
now applying procedures that ensure that the ad-
equate electromagnetic compatibility of electrical 
and I&C equipment is installed. The procedures 
are based on the EMC measurements and analyses 
carried out in Olkiluoto during 2003 and 2004. The 
measurements carried out indicated that there was 
no need for improvements as the components cur-
rently in use are electromagnetically compatible 
with each other.
The design work and approval procedures re-
garding the electromagnetic compatibility of elec-
trical and I&C systems and components are based 
on procedures that take into account, among oth-
ers, the following requirements: the intended op-
erating conditions, storage, transportation, seismic 
conditions, radiation and EMC. The original ver-
sions of procedures were produced by the plant 
supplier, but TVO has supplemented and updated 
their contents – for example, with regard to EMC. 
The type tests of equipment and cables include, 
among other things, ageing by radiation and heat. 
The procedures have been updated with regard 
to testing temperature requirements, taking into 
account the effects of modernisation and power 
upgrading work completed in 1998 as well as the 
study carried out regarding the radiation doses 
inside the containment in accident situations.
Service life management at the Olkiluoto NPP 
is discussed in section 2.3 of the safety assessment. 
The remaining service life must, in particular, be 
known for the components qualified for accident 
conditions. The remaining service life of cables will 
be ensured by tests performed on samples. As to 
the replaced components, the remaining qualifica-
tion life is under control, provided that the con-
struction of components a well as the environmen-
tal conditions and functional requirements have 
remained within the original limits. As to the other 
components, the validity of the qualification cannot 
usually be as clearly verified, which requires con-
tinuous development of the qualification methods.
In conjunction with processing the periodic 
safety review, STUK required TVO to present a 
plan regarding the development of their qualifica-
tion procedure to make it more systematic, taking 
into account the traceability of the qualification of 
the most safety-important systems, structures and 
components to the original qualification require-
ments, the possible changes in loads, as well as 
changes in operational and environmental condi-
tions occurring during the service life of the plant, 
updates to the safety analyses, and the changing 
of qualification requirements due to the advance-
ment of technology, monitoring of the validity of 
qualification as well as monitoring of the remain-
ing service life.
TVO submitted the requested plan regarding 
the development of qualification maintenance to 
STUK at the end of April 2009. TVO has estab-
lished a working group to develop the manage-
ment of service life with regard to electrical and 
I&C equipment qualified for demanding conditions 
(such as loss of coolant accidents). In accordance 
with the action plan submitted to STUK, the work-
ing group will begin its work with the components 
located inside the containment, after which it will 
be extended to components outside the contain-
ment. The plans to be completed by the end of 2009 
regarding how the component requirements that 
have changed during the service life of the plant 
units are to be specified in the design bases and 
how the qualified service lives of components re-
quired for different functions are established using 
the different sources available to TVO. In addition, 
TVO will produce a plan for future component 
qualifications. The studies regarding tools suit-
able for service life management and the required 
information, as well as the need for and possible 
methods of individual monitoring and the plan for 
further actions and their timing will be completed 
by the end of 2010. In addition to actual electrical 
and I&C equipment, there are other components 
(such as pneumatic actuators) that have operation-
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al requirements in special conditions, such as dur-
ing or after transients and accidents. In its studies 
set out in the action plan, TVO must also explain 
how such components are to be listed and handled 
regarding qualification maintenance. These reports 
must be sent to STUK for information in accord-
ance with their planned schedule of completion. 
The plant supplier’s report referred to in the action 
plan must also be submitted in the first delivery of 
documents.
The Guidelines yVl 5.2 and yVl 5.5 regard-
ing electrical and I&C systems, which entered into 
force in 2004 and in 2003, respectively, require sys-
tem modifications and new systems to be qualified. 
To this end, the licensee shall draw up a special 
qualification plan to demonstrate the suitability 
of Safety Class 2 and 3 electrical power and I&C 
systems, components and cables for their intended 
use. A system’s safety significance and the reliabil-
ity requirements placed on it shall be considered 
in the drawing up of the qualification plan. In its 
guidelines, TVO has set out the requirements for 
qualification plans and their results data.
TVO has developed the software qualification 
procedure, associated with systems qualification, 
in a separate project entitled KETTU3. The pro-
cedure is based on international standards on 
software quality management and nuclear technol-
ogy, such as ISO 15504, IEC 62138 and IEC 61508. 
Among other things, the procedure includes an 
analysis of the fault mechanisms of the object to 
be qualified, as well as an analysis of their critical-
ity and an assessment of the SIl (Safety Integrity 
level). The qualification may concern application 
software or basic equipment software (firmware). 
Qualification procedures for software in Safety 
Class 2 equipment have been studied in a project 
for the SAFIR 2010 research programme which 
TVO participated in.
TVO has presented plans for systems qualifica-
tion in conjunction with the preliminary inspection 
materials for new system modifications. In ad-
dition, equipment qualification proceedings have 
been described in the suitability assessments of 
components. The qualification of components be-
longing to Safety Class 2 and to the so-called es-
sential accident instrumentation requires a type 
approval in compliance with nuclear qualification 
standards. TVO has taken these requirements into 
account in its new equipment purchases.
Summary
STUK’s assessment is that no such issues are 
known that may have impaired the qualification 
since the previous safety review or may do so dur-
ing the subsequent review period.
The conclusion is that the qualification proce-
dures at the Olkiluoto NPP, with the development 
measures presented in TVO’s action plan, are 
sufficient for the periodic safety review. In addi-
tion to actual electrical and I&C equipment, there 
are other components (such as pneumatic actua-
tors) that have operational requirements in special 
conditions, such as those created during or after 
transients and accidents. In its studies, TVO must 
also explain how such components are to be listed 
and handled regarding qualification maintenance. 
The reports set out in the action plan must be sent 
to STUK for information in accordance with their 
planned schedule of completion. The plant suppli-
er’s report referred to in the action plan must also 
be submitted in the first delivery of documents. 
STUK will monitor the development of qualifica-
tion procedures by inspecting the reports submit-
ted by TVO, and also in the course of its periodic 
inspection programme.
2.5 Section 6: Management 
of human factors
Special attention shall be paid to the avoidance, 
detection and correction of any human error during 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
The possibility of human error shall be taken into 
account in the design of the nuclear power plant 
and in the planning of its operation and mainte-
nance, so that human error and deviations from 
normal plant operations due to human error do not 
endanger plant safety. The impacts of human er-
ror shall be reduced by using various safety design 
methods, including defence-in-depth, redundancy, 
diversity and separation.
The protection systems of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units have been designed on the basis of the 
so-called 30-minute rule. In practice, this means 
that in transient or accident situations, the operat-
ing personnel do not have to take any controlling 
action within the first 30 minutes because plant 
automation takes care of bringing the plant to a 
safe state. This prevents any human errors made 
under time pressure and stress.
human errors cannot be completely avoided, 
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but the possibilities for errors can be reduced by 
appropriate planning, instructions and procedures 
for which continuous training is in progress at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. TVO’s practices for 
the avoidance of human errors include assignment 
kick-off meetings, verification of work carried out 
by another person, the STAA (Stop, Think, Act, 
Assess) approach and assignment sign-off meet-
ings. In order to put the methods into practice, 
the human Performance 2012 programme was de-
vised in 2008, and its implementation has started 
with the training of contact persons. The kick-off 
meeting practice is quite widespread: a total of 
307 kick-off meetings were held in 2007, and the 
Maintenance Department had held some 250 kick-
off meetings by September 2008. When starting 
the plant after outage, tests and inspections are 
carried out for safety-critical systems, and also for 
the purpose of detecting any errors.
In order to minimise the possibility of human 
error, it is essential that efficient event report-
ing and processing practices are in place regard-
ing both actual errors and close calls so that the 
experience thus gained is utilised as thoroughly 
as possible. It is important that plant operating 
experience is systematically studied in order to 
avoid human errors and procedures or the plants 
are developed as required for avoiding the repeti-
tion of similar mistakes. The operating experience 
feedback activities of TVO are discussed in more 
detail in section 5.2.2. TVO has been able to use 
the services of an expert in behavioural sciences 
since 2004, and this expertise is utilised for analys-
ing operating events.
Ensuring competence is one element of human 
factors management. The Olkiluoto NPP has good 
facilities for providing the training necessary for 
avoiding human errors. They have a simulator for 
training operators to cope with transient and acci-
dent situations. The expertise present in TVO’s or-
ganisation is discussed in more detail in section 6.3.
In its periodic safety assessment, TVO states 
that the influence of human factors during the op-
erating phase can be divided into three categories: 
management of plant modifications, maintenance 
operations and plant operation. The importance of 
accurately documenting and maintaining the de-
sign bases as well as only carrying out one modifi-
cation at at time is highlighted in safe modification 
work of high quality. In addition, the modification 
work planning at TVO includes inspections carried 
out by several independent parties. In conjunction 
with the inspection of safety management carried 
out in 2007 as part of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, TVO stated that minor flaws in documen-
tation regarding original installations still surface 
every year in connection with modification works. 
This opinion was also reinforced by the events in 
2008 and 2009 where the underlying reasons were 
either poor planning or implementation of modi-
fication work which in part was due to a failure 
to fully comprehend the design bases and their 
incomplete documentation. Following the events, 
TVO has promised to assess its modification work 
process during 2009. The company seeks to take 
human factors into account when implementing 
modification operations by providing precise proce-
dures and by carrying out independent inspections 
and ensuring operability after the work has been 
completed. TVO also seeks long-term co-operation 
with its subcontractors so that they can be trained 
in and familiarised with TVO’s special require-
ments.
The company strives to reduce the occurrences 
of human error in maintenance operations by us-
ing the work order system to limit any actions to 
a certain number of trains, in addition to which si-
multaneous work in several trains has to an extent 
been prevented by limiting the availability of keys, 
for example. In the inspection of safety manage-
ment carried out by STUK in 2009 as part of the 
periodic inspection programme, TVO presented 
results of the assessment of safety culture, carried 
out in 2008. In its report, the team responsible 
for the assessment stated, among other things, 
that up-to-date maintenance procedures of a good 
standard are not available for all components, 
which is why the team recommended that TVO 
should investigate how comprehensive and up-to-
date the maintenance procedures are – particu-
larly those for safety-critical components. STUK 
stated in the inspection protocol that in the next 
inspection covering this subject, TVO must present 
a progress report regarding the recommendations 
and development issues raised in the assessment 
of safety culture. Maintenance activities are de-
scribed in more detail in section 5.4.1.
TVO is constantly seeking to develop its con-
trol room operations, and the operating personnel 
always participate in this development work. The 
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control room personnel submitted an initiative 
for moving to a system of 12-hour working shifts, 
and TVO took this system up following STUK’s 
approval at the beginning of 2006. Before adopt-
ing the new shift rotation, TVO commissioned the 
Finnish Institute of Occupational health to carry 
out a study regarding states of mental alertness.
Fatigue has been identified as a significant hu-
man risk factor. STUK investigated fatigue man-
agement at TVO in its inspection of human re-
sources, carried out as part of the periodic inspec-
tion programme in2008. The results of the inspec-
tion led to the conclusion that TVO has procedures 
in place for determining the basic parameters 
of working hours and that the management and 
operating personnel have been trained in fatigue 
management. For certain annual maintenance op-
erations, TVO has adopted a working shifts regime 
that makes it easier to control the length of work-
ing days of individual employees. however, during 
the inspection STUK made the request that the 
importance of the state of alertness in safety-
critical jobs must be communicated to all levels 
of personnel participating in annual maintenance 
operations. TVO has submitted its communications 
plan to STUK for information.
In conjunction with the probabilistic risk analy-
sis, TVO has strived to systematically identify 
potential human errors and to reduce their prob-
ability. The work for identifying these errors has 
not	been	limited	to	operating	experience;	 instead,	
the goal has been to comprehensively study the key 
systems and safety functions so that even fewer 
common human errors could be prevented. During 
the current operating licence period, the method of 
analysing major operations during annual mainte-
nance outages and their timing at different stages 
of the outage has been further specified. human 
activities have a specially pronounced significance 
during annual maintenance outages when a very 
large number of different maintenance, testing and 
operating activities take place at the plant.
The conclusion is that the management of hu-
man factors at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units 
has been implemented in the manner referred to 
in section 6 of Government Decree 733/2008. TVO 
is further committed to continuously developing 
its operations regarding the management of hu-
man factors. STUK oversees the implementation 
of actions both through its periodic inspection pro-
gramme and other control activities.
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3 Limitation of radiation exposure and 
releases of radioactive materials 
(Government Decree 733/2008)
Pursuant to section 2 of the Radiation Act 
(592/1991), The use of radiation and practices in-
volving exposure to radiation shall, in order to be 
acceptable, meet the following criteria:
1) the benefits derived from the practice shall ex-
ceed the detriment it causes (principle of justifi-
cation);
2) the practice shall be so arranged that the result-
ing radiation exposure hazardous to health is 
kept as low as reasonably achievable (principle 
of optimization);
3) no person shall be exposed to radiation exceed-
ing the maximum values prescribed by Decree 
(principle of limitation).
According to section 7 c of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, Releases of radioactive materials caused by 
the use of nuclear energy shall be limited in com-
pliance with the principle laid down in paragraph 
2, section 2 of the Radiation Act (592/1991). The 
maximum values of radiation exposure caused by 
a nuclear facility or any other use of nuclear energy 
on any member of the public will be provided for by 
Government decree.
Limits on releases of radioactive materials from 
a nuclear facility, in order that they do not exceed 
the maximum values for radiation exposure pro-
vided by Government decree, shall be confirmed 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK). Supervision of releases of radioactive ma-
terials shall be arranged so that compliance with 
limits as referred to in this section can be reliably 
established.
According to section 7 d of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, The design of a nuclear facility shall provide 
for the possibility of operational occurrences and 
accidents. The probability of an accident must be 
lower, the more severe the consequences of such an 
accident would prove for people, the environment or 
property.
The primary objective shall be the prevention of 
accidents. Any practical measures required shall be 
taken to manage accidents and mitigate the conse-
quences thereof.
Maximum values for radiation exposure, to be 
used as a basis for safety design in case of opera-
tional occurrences and accidents, will be provided 
by Government decree.
The	 principles	 of	 justification,	 optimization	
and limitation recommended by the International 
Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) are 
used	 in	 radiation	 protection.	 The	 optimization	
principle is commonly known as the As low As 
Reasonably Achievable (AlARA) principle. ICRP 
has recently revised the basic philosophy relat-
ed to radiation protection. The revision will not, 
however, require any substantial changes to the 
existing European Basic Safety Standards or na-
tional radiation protection regulations regarding 
NPPs. For example, the dose limits prescribed in 
the Radiation Decree (1512/1991) will remain un-
changed.
The radiation safety of the Olkiluoto Nuclear 
Power Plant workers and the population in the 
plant vicinity is discussed in more detail in sec-
tions 3.1–3.4. The control of radioactive releases 
and the monitoring of radioactive substances and 
radiation in the environment are discussed in sec-
tion 5.5.
Detailed requirements relating to sections 7–10 
of Government Decree 733/2008 are set out in 
Guides yVl 7.1 and yVl 7.9. In addition, the de-
tailed requirements regarding the limitation of radi-
ation exposure of employees and the general public 
are specified in Guides yVl 7.2, yVl 7.3, yVl 7.6, 
yVl 7.7, yVl 7.10, yVl 7.11 and yVl 7.18.
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3.1 Section 7: Radiation safety of 
nuclear power plant workers
Occupational radiation exposure of nuclear power 
plant workers shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable. Furthermore, the design and operation 
of nuclear power plants shall be implemented so 
that the radiation exposure of workers can be re-
stricted in compliance with the provisions of the 
Radiation Act (592/1991) and Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991).
The regulations governing the radiation expo-
sure of employees are the Radiation Act 592/1991, 
the Radiation Decree 1512/1991, and the Series 7 
yVl guides and certain ST guides issued by STUK. 
Section 3 of the Radiation Decree stipulates that 
the effective dose caused to a worker by radiation 
work shall not exceed an average of 20 millisiev-
erts (mSv) per year reckoned over a period of five 
years, nor 50 mSv in any single year.
TVO’s AlARA programme contains a compi-
lation of all major objectives and procedures re-
garding the radiation protection and reduction of 
doses of employees. The AlARA programme is an 
procedure set included in TVO’s radiation protec-
tion manual, and it is regularly updated. The most 
recent update was completed in 2006. The AlARA 
programme includes the goal that no employee at 
the Olkiluoto NPP should receive a radiation dose 
exceeding 10 mSv per year, nor should the dose 
caused by internal contamination exceed 0.5 mSv 
per year. These dose limits are tight, even on the 
international scale, and setting them is part of 
the process for fulfilling the requirement of Guide 
yVl 7.9 stating that the radiation dose should be 
kept small. In conjunction with the operational 
events occurring at the Olkiluoto plant units after 
the 2009 annual maintenance, STUK made the re-
quest that TVO should supplement the procedures 
concerning radiation protection so that they also 
take into account repair work that causes exposure 
to radiation and may have to be carried out during 
power operation. Planning the work is easier when 
general procedures are in place regarding the limi-
tation of radiation doses and the necessary limita-
tions to power operation.
STUK has inspected radiation protection meas-
ures during annual maintenance operations and 
found that there is a need to further ensure the 
careful implementation of all operational routines. 
In the coming years, it will also be necessary to as-
sess whether the current level of permanent staff-
ing is sufficient in this regard. 
The highest individual radiation dose received 
by any employee at the Olkiluoto NPP in 2008 was 
8.1 mSv. The collective radiation dose of all employ-
ees in 2008 was 935.8 mmanSv. In 2008, a total of 
2,116 persons were under dosimetric surveillance. 
During the past five years (2004–2008) the highest 
radiation dose received by a Finnish nuclear power 
plant worker, 62.3 mSv, was accumulated while 
working at Swedish nuclear power plants and at 
the two nuclear power plants in Finland. The high-
est radiation dose accumulated during 2004–2008 
while working exclusively at the Olkiluoto Nuclear 
Power Plant was 40.3 mSv.
In international comparison (e.g. the ISOE 
dose database of the NEA, the Nuclear Energy 
Association of OECD countries), the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units have been among the best boiling 
water plants when comparing both individual and 
collective radiation doses. The plant has managed 
to efficiently implement radiation protection and 
plan it well. The long-term planning of annual 
maintenance operations has made it possible to 
keep their duration short, which usually reduces 
the amount of work carried out and hence also the 
exposure to radiation.
TVO has commissioned an independent assess-
ment for its periodic safety review, comparing the 
operating experience of radiation protection in 
Olkiluoto plant units and in equivalent Swedish 
BWRs. The results indicate that the standard of ra-
diation protection is the same in all the plant units 
surveyed. however, some procedural differences do 
exist. For example, the Swedish plants have car-
ried out more system decontamination (cleaning) 
operations than Olkiluoto. The report states that 
the decontamination of components works well in 
Olkiluoto. Regarding radiation sources, the prima-
ry coolant in Olkiluoto has, from time to time, con-
tained more antimony than in the Swedish plants. 
As a result, TVO will replace antimony-containing 
components in the primary circuit with new ones 
with a low antimony content.
The reduction in moisture content of primary 
steam with the equipment upgrades during 2005–
2007 (new steam dryers) substantially reduced the 
radiation dose rates at the turbine plant. If this 
situation is maintained, the radiation dose rates 
from the main steam line can be expected to fur-
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ther fall during annual maintenance operations. 
The risk-informed procedure will be deployed to 
target material inspections in pipelines from 2010 
onwards. This will also contribute towards reduc-
ing the amount of work carried out in most active 
areas, thus reducing the radiation exposure of 
employees.
The approval of the dosimetric service is valid 
until 1 April 2011. The annually conducted qual-
ity control tests targeted at the dosimetric service 
have indicated that the measurement accuracy 
has remained in accordance with the accuracy re-
quirements set out in international standards. 
The monitoring of occupational exposure at the 
Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant and the reporting 
of measurement data to the Dose Register main-
tained by STUK has been developed during the 
operation of the plant in accordance with Guides 
yVl 7.9 and yVl 7.10. The way in which employ-
ees’ radiation doses were reported to the Dose 
Register was revised in 2008. TVO had been esti-
mating the radiation doses using the dose reading 
obtained from the electronic meters backing up the 
official metering, although there were no grounds 
for doing so. The radiation doses entered using the 
anomalous procedure have been corrected in the 
Dose Register. STUK has audited the dose moni-
toring at the plant and the operations of Doseco Oy, 
the company responsible for implementing it.
TVO has modernised and extended the real-
time monitoring system of employees’ radiation 
doses in 2009. STUK has processed the respective 
system and equipment documentation. STUK has 
received the report on the transient situations in 
the system during the 2008 annual maintenance, 
and the corrective actions for eliminating the tran-
sients have been taken.
TVO also revised the access arrangements for 
annual maintenance personnel in 2009. STUK car-
ried out a commissioning inspection for the modi-
fications in the controlled area and the associated 
contamination control.
The conclusion is that employees’ radiation pro-
tection and dose monitoring at the Olkiluoto NPP 
has been implemented in the manner referred to in 
section 7 of Government Decree 733/2008. STUK 
will assess the resources available for radiation 
protection and the procedures deployed in annual 
maintenance operations during the next annual 
maintenance operations and in the course of the 
periodic inspection programme.
3.2 Section 8: Limit for normal operation
The limit for the annual dose of an individual in 
the population, arising from the normal operation 
of a nuclear power plant, is 0.1 millisievert (mSv). 
Based on this limit, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) shall confirm release lim-
its for radioactive materials during the normal op-
eration of a nuclear power plant.
The prescription concerning individual protec-
tion contained in section 8 of the decree must be 
implemented together with the AlARA require-
ment concerning the limitation of radiation expo-
sure. Guide yVl 7.1 prescribes that the releases 
of radioactive materials and the radiation levels 
in the environment must further be limited by 
applying the best available technology (the BAT 
requirement). Detailed requirements concerning 
the calculation methods used for assessing the ra-
diation exposure of the population are specified in 
Guides yVl 7.2 and yVl 7.3.
The Olkiluoto NPP deploys efficient systems 
for processing liquid and gaseous effluents so that 
releases into the environment during normal op-
erations are very small. The impact of radioactive 
releases on the radiation exposure of people living 
in the vicinity of the plant is so small that it can 
only be estimated using computational methods. As 
an example, the computational radiation exposure 
to the population of approximately 500,000 living 
within a radius of 100 km from the plant is theo-
retically of the order of less than 0.01 manSv, which 
is about one hundred thousandth of the radiation 
exposure	 caused	 to	 population	 of	 this	 size	 during	
the same time by naturally occurring background 
radiation and medical use of radiation sources. The 
increase in long-term background contamination 
of long-lived radioactive substances caused by ef-
fluents is non-existent, which is why the effluents 
will not increase the doses received from the plant 
surroundings even in the long run. 
STUK has approved the effluent monitoring 
procedure included in the Olkiluoto operational pro-
cedures and the method used for calculating the ra-
diation dose of the population. TVO has revised its 
calculation methods concerning the radiation expo-
sure of the surrounding population arising from the 
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normal operation of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power 
Plant during the current operating licence period. 
TVO annually submits a summary of radioactive 
releases and computationally calculated doses to 
STUK, and also reports the results of radioactivity 
measurements carried out in the surrounding envi-
ronment. STUK verifies the reliability of TVO’s ac-
tivities through regular on-site inspections. Section 
5.5 discusses the monitoring of radioactive releases 
in more detail.
The release limits for radioactive materials for 
the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant are defined in 
the Technical Specifications concerning the opera-
tion of the plant units, as approved by STUK. limits 
have been separately defined for atmospheric noble 
gas and iodine releases, and, on the other hand, for 
water releases into the sea. A separate nuclide-spe-
cific release limit has been defined for radioactive 
tritium in water releases. The purpose of the release 
limits is to retain the individual annual radiation 
exposure in the surrounding population of the plant 
units clearly below the threshold value of 0.1 mSv 
set out in section 8 of the Government decree. The 
licensee shall continuously monitor the releases 
and radioactive substances present in the environ-
ment, reporting any abnormal conditions to STUK 
without delay.
When calculating the radiation dose of an in-
dividual of the population caused by releases of 
radioactive materials, the analysis is based on the 
average radiation exposure of the most exposed 
group. This group represents a hypothetical group 
of individuals in the population who, based on their 
residence and life style, are estimated to receive the 
highest radiation exposure arising from releases ac-
cording to calculations.
The highest theoretical dose commitment re-
ceived by an individual of the population most 
exposed to radiation in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto 
Nuclear Power Plant, calculated from the releases 
in 2008, was, as reported by TVO, 0.00026 mSv (in 
Finland, the average annual individual dose result-
ing from natural radiation is above 1 mSv). The 
comparative calculation performed by STUK result-
ed in a value lower than that reported by TVO. The 
calculated radiation dose has remained within this 
order of magnitude during the past few years since 
the implementation of the measures for reducing ra-
dioactive water releases into the sea at the Olkiluoto 
plant. The radioactive releases from the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units have been clearly below the release 
limits set out in the Technical Specifications.
In 2007 STUK requested a report from TVO on 
the implementation of Guide yVl 7.1 concerning the 
availability of practical solutions for further reduc-
ing the radioactive releases from the Olkiluoto NPP. 
The plant had earlier carried out improvements 
on water treatment and purification of discharge 
waters, and no new solutions have been presented 
now. TVO has commissioned an independent assess-
ment for the periodic safety review, comparing the 
emissions and operating experience in the Olkiluoto 
plant units and in equivalent Swedish BWRs. The 
results indicate that the standard of radiation pro-
tection is also in this respect the same in all the 
plant units surveyed.
The oxygen in reactor water is activated by the 
neutron radiation as it passes through the reactor 
core, producing the short-lived but strongly radiat-
ing nitrogen-16 isotope. In boiling water reactors, 
this activity is in part transported by steam to the 
turbines, which increases the radiation levels in 
the building and its surroundings. This radiation 
can be clearly detected within the Olkiluoto power 
plant site. When the reactors operate at full power, 
this increases the radiation level at the power plant 
site between turbine plants by about 1 μSv/h, and 
this is taken into account so that the dose received 
will not exceed the dose corresponding to radiation 
work. A few hundred metres away from the turbine 
buildings the radiation level no longer differs from 
that caused by naturally occurring background ra-
diation.
The conclusion to the above is that the operation 
of the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant has not result-
ed in such radioactive releases or radiation exposure 
that the limit of 0.1 mSv set out in section 8 of the 
Government Decree 733/2008 has been exceeded. It 
can be expected that the calculated dose to an indi-
vidual in the most exposed group of the population 
arising from annual normal radioactive releases of 
the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant will remain low 
and well below limit set out in section 8.
3.3 Section 9: Limit for an anticipated 
operational occurrence
The limit for the annual dose of an individual in 
the population arising as the result of an antici-
pated operational occurrence is 0.1 mSv.
The term “anticipated operational occurrence” 
30
STUK-B 111
(or transient) refers to a deviation less serious than 
an accident from normal operational conditions 
and which can be expected to occur once or several 
times during any period of one hundred operat-
ing years. The detailed requirements concerning 
the analyses of anticipated operating transients 
are specified in Guide yVl 2.2. If an operational 
transient could cause a release of radioactive sub-
stances, the radiation doses caused by the releases 
must be identified. Detailed requirements concern-
ing the calculation methods used for assessing the 
radiation exposure of the population are specified 
in Guides yVl 7.2 and yVl 7.3.
The descriptions of the analyses concerning 
anticipated operating transients are presented in 
the safety analysis report for the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 NPP units. These analyses regarding plant be-
haviour are discussed in section 2.1.1. of the safety 
assessment. The results of analyses indicate that 
the anticipated operational transients will not cause 
damage to the fuel.
The operational transients are not expected to 
cause significant releases of radioactive substances 
because the fuel will not be damaged and any re-
leases into the environment would only consist of 
the radioactive substances normally present in the 
primary circuit water or purification systems. The 
plant systems are capable of efficiently containing 
these radioactive substances. The radiation doses 
to an individual in the population arising from an-
ticipated operational transients are therefore not 
assessed by means of calculations.
No such operating transients have occurred at 
the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in which in-
creases in radioactive releases compared with the 
normal conditions had occurred.
The conclusion to the above is that the an-
ticipated operating transients of the Olkiluoto 
Nuclear Power Plant do not result in a release as 
a consequence of which the radiation doses of an 
individual in the population would exceed the limit 
value of 0.1 mSv set out in section 9 of Government 
Decree 733/2008.
3.4 Section 10: Limits for accident
A postulated accident and a design extension condi-
tion shall not result in such high releases of radioac-
tive materials that extensive measures should have 
to be taken in the vicinity of the facility in order to 
limit the radiation exposure of the population.
The limit for the annual dose of an individual in 
the population arising as the result of an accident 
is:
•	 1	mSv	for	Class	1	postulated	accidents;
•	 5	mSv	for	Class	2	postulated	accidents;	and
•	 20	mSv	for	a	design	extension	condition.
The limit for the release of radioactive materials 
arising from a severe accident is a release which 
causes neither acute harmful health effects to the 
population in the vicinity of the nuclear power 
plant nor any long-term restrictions on the use of 
extensive areas of land and water.
The requirement applied to long-term effects will be 
satisfied if there is only an extremely small possibil-
ity that, as the result of a severe accident, atmos-
pheric release of cesium-137 will exceed the limit of 
100 terabecquerel (TBq).
The provisions concerning the application of 
section 10 of the decree to the existing nuclear 
power plants are set out in section 32. The detailed 
requirements regarding analyses on postulated ac-
cidents and severe accidents are specified in Guides 
yVl 2.2, yVl 2.8, yVl 7.2 and yVl 7.3. STUK has 
set out the requirements regarding analyses on 
design extension conditions for new nuclear power 
plants in its decision y255/3 dated 8 April 2009.
The accident analyses and their calculation 
methods are subject to continuous updating and 
development throughout the operating life of the 
nuclear power plant. The Safety Analysis Report 
concerning the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in-
cludes descriptions of the accident analyses of 
plant units (discussed in more detail in section 
2.1.1 of the safety assessment). The methods of 
analysis for radiation exposure employed by TVO 
have been developed over several years and are 
in accordance with the requirements specified in 
Guides yVl 7.2 and 7.3. The methods contain 
unlikely assumptions that, in reality, result in 
overestimating the radiation doses calculated as a 
consequential effect. Safety-enhancing measures 
are taken as required on the basis of the analyses.
According to the definition in Government 
Decree 733/2008, Class 1 postulated accidents can 
be assumed to occur less frequently than once dur-
ing any period of one hundred operating years, but 
at least once during any period of one thousand 
operating years. Of the postulated Class 1 accidents 
analysed for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units, the 
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most significant releases are caused by a fire involv-
ing solid waste, ion exchange resin, in the waste 
building of the plant unit. It is estimated to cause a 
maximum dose of 0.024 mSv to individuals outside 
the	plant	area;	this	value	is	clearly	below	the	1	mSv	
limit set out in the decree.
Postulated accidents in Class 2 are assumed to 
occur less frequently than once during any period 
of one thousand operating years. Of the postulated 
Class 2 accidents, the most significant releases 
are caused at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units by 
a scenario where a transfer vessel full of fuel is 
dropped in the reactor building and one where a 
fuel channel in the reactor becomes totally blocked. 
The dropping of a transfer vessel is estimated to 
result in mechanical damage to the cladding of fuel 
bundles so that 3% of the noble gases, iodine and 
cesium are released. Most of the released iodine and 
cesium is estimated to be filtered before release into 
the environment occurs. The accident is estimated 
to cause a maximum dose of 2.2 mSv to an indi-
vidual of the population outside the plant area. The 
complete blockage of a fuel channel is estimated to 
result in the partial meltdown of one fuel bundle. 
The assumption is made in the analysis that all 
of the noble gases are released from the damaged 
bundles to the primary circuit and that about 30% 
of the iodine and 25% of the cesium is released. It is 
assumed that the containment function will operate 
as planned, but that a part of the released radioac-
tive substances will nevertheless escape from the 
containment via the main steam lines before their 
isolation valves close. Most of the iodine and cesium 
escaping outside the containment is estimated to be 
caught in the turbine systems before release into 
the environment occurs. The accident is estimated 
to cause a maximum dose of 2.0 mSv to an indi-
vidual of the population outside the plant area. The 
estimated doses resulting from both accidents are 
below the 5 mSv limit set out in the decree.
The term “design extension condition” refers 
to a situation caused by a rare external event, 
or a situation where the initiating event of an 
anticipated operational occurrence or Class 1 pos-
tulated accident involves a common-cause failure 
in the safety systems, or a complex combination 
of failures, and which the facility is required to 
withstand without severe fuel damage. No such 
scenario has been identified regarding the design 
extension conditions of postulated accidents that 
would result in fuel damage at the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 NPP units. Therefore, the releases caused by the 
design extension conditions of postulated accidents 
are assumed be of the same order of magnitude as 
those resulting from a loss of reactor coolant ac-
cident	 analysed	 as	 a	 postulated	 accident;	 that	 is	
estimated to cause a maximum dose of 0.00021 mSv 
to individuals outside the plant area (conservative 
scenario). This is well below the 20 mSv limit set out 
in the decree.
At the time the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units 
were built, it was considered sufficient to have a 
level of safety that is achieved by designing the 
plants in such a manner that they can cope with the 
anticipated operational transients and postulated 
accidents without extensive damage to fuel in the 
reactor. The requirement to also limit releases in 
cases of severe accidents where the reactor core 
totally or partially melts down was only introduced 
after the plants had been built. It has been neces-
sary to upgrade the plant units by changing the way 
certain systems are used and by installing some to-
tally new systems, equipment and structures. TVO 
implemented the most significant plant modifica-
tions in 1988 and 1989 when, among other things, 
new blowdown lines fitted with filters were installed 
in both plant units for blowing out steam and non-
condensed gases from the containment, thus pre-
venting	 its	 uncontrolled	 overpressurization.	 Plant	
modifications improving the management of severe 
accidents have also been carried out during the cur-
rent operating licence period and are discussed in 
more detail in section 4.3.4.
The progress of a severe accident in a situation 
where the accident management systems operate 
as planned has been considered in the accident 
analyses presented in the Final Safety Analysis 
Report. These analyses describe the operation of 
the containment in different accident situations. 
The analyses regarding radioactive releases have 
been made for six scenarios of severe accidents used 
as the design basis. An accident where the reactor 
feedwater line ruptures and the plant loses electri-
cal power is assumed to result in core damage in the 
shortest time of all these scenarios. In turn, total 
loss of electrical power can be considered as the 
most probable scenario resulting in core damage. 
When the containment remains leak proof, the pres-
sure inside it increases until the blowout of steam 
and non-condensed gases begins. The blowout is led 
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through a filter that efficiently captures all other ra-
dioactive substances except noble gases and organic 
iodine. As a result, the long-term effects of the re-
lease will be limited and the releases of cesium-137 
isotope will be well below the set limit of 100 TBq. 
The release will not cause any acute harmful health 
effects either, although the results of calculations 
carried out using the most conservative assump-
tions indicate that the effective radiation doses near 
the plant site are considerable, although below the 
dose of 0.5 Sv which will cause immediate health 
effects. Most of this radiation dose will be caused by 
the external dose from noble gas emissions.
The reliability of accident management systems 
has been analysed in the probabilistic risk analysis 
carried out by TVO. For the analysis, the mecha-
nisms that can potentially result in damage to the 
containment were established, and the extent of the 
damage caused by each mechanism was estimated. 
The analysis contains both an estimate of the prob-
ability of the above mechanisms and the extent of 
leaks caused by the possible damage. The releases 
caused by the failure of containment isolation and 
their probability have also been estimated. The 
probabilistic risk analysis is discussed in more de-
tail in section 2.1.3.
The results of the probabilistic risk analysis 
indicate that the frequency of an accident where 
a considerable part of the reactor core melts down 
and the integrity of the containment is lost so that 
the resulting cesium release exceeds the limit of 
100 TBq is small but nevertheless above the design 
target set for new reactors in Guide yVl 2.8. The 
results of the analysis indicate that the biggest 
risk is caused by situations where an early filtered 
emission takes place at the upper drywell of the con-
tainment, an early emission results from damage to 
the drywell, or the flooding of the lower drywell is 
delayed.
The conclusion to the above is that postulated 
accidents of Class 1 or 2 or design extension condi-
tions at the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant do not 
result in a release as a consequence of which the 
radiation doses of an individual in the population 
would exceed the limit values set out in section 
10 of Government Decree 733/2008. The release 
caused by a severe accident does not exceed the 
limit set for it in section 10 either, and the prob-
ability that the limit for cesium-137 releases is 
exceeded is extremely small, as prescribed in the 
section of the decree.
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4 Nuclear safety 
(Government Decree 733/2008)
4.1 Section 11: Siting of 
a nuclear power plant
The safety impact of local conditions, as well as 
the security and emergency preparedness arrange-
ments, shall be considered when selecting the site 
of a nuclear power plant. The site shall be such that 
the impediments and threats posed by the facility to 
its environment remain extremely minor and heat 
removal from the plant to the environment can be 
reliably implemented.
Detailed requirements relating to section 11 
of the decree are set out in Guides yVl 1.10 and 
yVl 7.4.
The normal operation of or anticipated opera-
tional transients in a nuclear power plant do not 
pose any limitations to land use outside the plant 
area. This matter is discussed in more detail in 
section 5.5. however, plans must be drawn up re-
garding land use and protection of the population 
in the surroundings of the nuclear power plant for 
preparedness for a potential severe accident. This 
means, among other things, that there must be no 
facilities or population centres in the plant’s vicin-
ity where any necessary protective measures, such 
as sheltering indoors or evacuation, would be dif-
ficult to implement. Further, activities that might 
externally	cause	a	hazardous	situation	in	a	nuclear	
power plant must not take place in its vicinity.
The emergency preparedness arrangements at 
nuclear power plants and co-operation with public 
authorities are also discussed in Chapter 8 of this 
Appendix, as well as in Chapter 9 of Appendix 2.
The general principle regarding the location 
of a nuclear power plant is that it should be in 
a sparsely populated area, well away from any 
major population centres. When this is the case, 
the emergency preparedness arrangements are 
targeted at a small group of people, making them 
easier to implement. The major population centres 
nearest to the Olkiluoto NPP are the centre of 
Eurajoki municipality some 16 kilometres from the 
plant, and the City of Rauma, which has its city 
centre about 13 kilometres away. These population 
centres are clearly outside Olkiluoto’s emergency 
planning	 zone	 and	 are	 not	 considered	within	 the	
immediate vicinity of the power plant.
Further, there are no industrial plants, ware-
houses, transport routes or other activities in the 
vicinity	of	Olkiluoto	that	might	cause	a	hazardous	
situation in the plant. The Olkiluoto power plant 
site has its own harbour, and the Tankokari indus-
trial harbour is located some 3 kilometres from the 
plant in the northern part of the Olkiluoto island. 
The nearest harbour with plenty of traffic is the 
Rauma deep harbour some 13 kilometres away. 
That harbour is also the location of the nearest 
railway terminal. highway 8 is some 14 kilometres 
away. The nearest airport is in Pori, approximately 
32 kilometres from the Olkiluoto NPP, and the 
nearest flight routes are about ten kilometres from 
the power plant.
The nearest major industrial plants are the 
Rauma pulp mill, the Rauma paper mill belong-
ing to UPM, and the Rauma shipyard belonging 
to STx Europe (formerly Aker yards) (at distances 
ranging from 12 to 14 kilometres). The Raikka Oy 
explosives factory manufactures explosive charges, 
detonators and pyrotechnical products in Eurajoki 
and is about 11 kilometres from the power plant.
The current local detailed plan defines the 
current power plant site of Olkiluoto as an area 
for blocks of industrial and warehouse buildings. 
There are no permanent dwellings or holiday 
homes in the area, nor does any traffic route run 
through it. There is an accommodation village for 
employees at the power plant site, but most of the 
accommodation, about 75%, is located in the new 
accommodation village at a distance of about 3 km 
from the power plant.
The Satakunta regional plan, confirmed in 1999 
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by the Ministry of Environment, is in force in 
Eurajoki.	The	plan	 includes	a	protective	 zone	 ex-
tending 5–7 km from the Olkiluoto power plant. 
There are three permanent dwellings and some 30 
holiday houses on the Olkiluoto island. The entire 
protective	 zone	 contains	 33	 permanent	 dwellings	
and about 550 holiday homes. About 40% of the 
holiday homes are on the mainland, in the villages 
of Ilavainen and Orjasaari, while the rest are on 
nearby islands. The vicinity of Olkiluoto can be 
considered to be sparsely populated in the manner 
referred to in Guide yVl 1.10.
The	 emergency	 planning	 zone	 extending	 to	
some 20 kilometres from the Olkiluoto NPP has 
a rescue plan prepared by the Satakunta Rescue 
Services in compliance with the Rescue Act for 
the eventuality of a radiation accident occurring 
at the nuclear power plant of Teollisuuden Voima 
Oyj (covering the surroundings of the plant). The 
adequacy of the plan and the related training 
are monitored by the Provincial State Office. The 
emergency	 planning	 zone	 includes	 the	 following	
municipalities: Eurajoki, Rauma and luvia. The 
emergency	planning	zone	has	about	46,000	inhab-
itants. About 500,000 persons live within a one-
hundred-kilometre radius of the plant.
Alerting the population and providing it with 
protection instructions is described in the res-
cue plan for surrounding areas, and these ac-
tions are the responsibility of Satakunta Rescue 
Services and the Rescue Management Team of the 
Rauma operational area, which will be assisted 
by the Rauma Police Station of Satakunta Police 
Department and the Archipelago Sea Coastguard. 
The actions concern the isolation of the danger 
zone,	sheltering	indoors,	the	use,	storage	and	dis-
tribution of iodine tablets, as well as evacuation of 
the population from the power plant’s protective 
zone.	 The	 rescue	 plan	 sets	 out	 the	 evacuation-
related arrangements for transportation, accom-
modation, catering and healthcare. In an accident 
situation, the licensee must participate in alert-
ing the population under immediate threat. This 
includes people living in the new accommodation 
village. The challenges associated with the rescue 
arrangements include the rescue operations for 
holiday dwellers in the archipelago and sparsely 
populated coastal areas, as well as those for the 
construction site and the accommodation village 
during the construction phase.
About 60% of the approximately 550 holiday 
homes	in	the	protective	zone	of	the	power	plant	are	
located on islands. The conditions in the archipela-
go may slow down the process of warning and pos-
sibly evacuating holidaymakers. In addition, the 
coastline	of	the	emergency	planning	zone	is	rather	
fragmented, particularly north of the power plant 
site, which makes alerting the people living in 
sparsely populated areas more difficult. The vessels 
of the coastguard can be used for alerting people in 
the archipelago and fragmented coastal areas. The 
development of alerting and rescue arrangements 
is part of the co-operation with public authorities 
and, in the future, the alerting procedures can also 
be developed by using the possibilities of modern 
communications technology. however, STUK is of 
the opinion that the alerting and rescue arrange-
ments regarding the population living in the plant 
surroundings can nevertheless be implemented in 
the manner required by relevant regulations. 
STUK’s assessment is that emergency planning 
at the Olkiluoto NPP is up-to-date and adequate, 
and that TVO is further developing its prepared-
ness for emergency situations, particularly with 
respect to the extensive construction site of the 
Olkiluoto 3 NPP unit and the accommodation vil-
lage. The impacts of the plant on its environment 
during normal operation are described in section 
5.5, while the impacts of transient and accident sit-
uations are described in sections 3.3 and 3.4. The 
impacts of weather phenomena on the safety of the 
Olkiluoto NPP and on the availability of cooling 
water are discussed in sections 2.1.3 and 4.6. The 
physical protection arrangements are described in 
Chapter 7.
The conclusion is that the siting of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant complies with the requirements 
of section 11 of Government Decree 733/2008.
4.2 Section 12: Prevention of accidents 
and mitigation of consequences
In order to prevent operational occurrences and ac-
cidents, and to mitigate the consequences thereof, 
the operational principle of defence-indepth shall 
be implemented in the manner laid down in this 
section.
Proven or otherwise carefully examined high-
quality technology shall be employed in the design, 
construction and operation of a nuclear power 
plant. When arranging the operations of the li-
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censee’s	 organisation,	 the	 aim	 shall	 be	 to	 ensure	
reliable prevention of operational occurrences and 
accidents (prevention).
A nuclear power plant shall encompass systems 
that facilitate the quick and reliable detection of 
operational occurrences and accidents and prevent 
the aggravation of any event. Accidents leading to 
extensive releases of radioactive materials must be 
highly unlikely (control of operational occurrences 
and accidents).
Effective technical and administrative meas-
ures shall be taken to mitigate the consequences 
of	any	accident.	Counter-measures	for	bringing	an	
accident under control and preventing radiation 
hazards shall be planned in advance (mitigation of 
consequences).
The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units have operated 
reliably, and the number of safety-significant tran-
sients has remained small. The plant units have 
constantly utilised the experience and knowledge ob-
tained by the plant supplier in the design, construc-
tion and operation of Swedish plants. The solutions 
implemented by TVO have largely been similar to 
those carried out in corresponding Swedish plants. 
This has made it possible to use the Swedish plants 
as reference even after the construction phase of 
the plant. When making plant modifications, TVO 
strives to first implement the modifications in one 
unit and then gather operating experience before 
implementing the modifications in the other plant 
unit. TVO seeks to prevent human errors and the 
resulting transients and accidents in planning the 
modifications and in plant operation and mainte-
nance by keeping documents and procedures up-to-
date, by administrative measures and by training.
The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units have meas-
uring systems monitoring the state of the proc-
ess in place for detecting transient and accident 
situations. If the value of a process parameter 
important to safety significantly deviates from 
its normal value, the reactor protection system 
quickly initiates the safety functions required for 
controlling the situation. The main functions are 
reactor shutdown, starting of the emergency cool-
ing system and the residual heat removal, as well 
as isolation of the containment in order to prevent 
the spread of radioactivity. The reactor protection 
system is implemented as four redundant trains 
in order to improve its reliability. The required 
function is initiated if two of the four trains are 
operable. The reactor protection system is based 
on conventional relay technology. TVO has started 
the planning process for modernising the reactor 
protection system.
Major releases of radioactive substances into 
the environment may occur mainly in severe acci-
dents. The provisions made for severe accidents are 
discussed in more detail in section 4.3.4.
The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units have systems 
in place to implement safety functions for the pur-
pose of mitigating the consequences of postulated 
accident situations. The plant unit operators have 
been provided with procedures for emergency and 
transient situations. Emergency preparedness ar-
rangements are discussed in more detail in section 
8 of the safety assessment.
The conclusion is that the prevention of ac-
cidents and mitigation of their consequences at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been imple-
mented in the manner referred to in section 12 of 
Government Decree 733/2008.
4.3 Section 13: Engineered barriers 
for preventing the dispersion 
of radioactive materials
In order to prevent the dispersion of radioactive 
materials, the structural defence-in-depth safety 
principle shall be implemented in the manner laid 
down in this section.
Dispersion of radioactive materials from the fuel 
of the nuclear reactor into the environment shall be 
prevented by means of successive barriers which are 
the fuel and its cladding, the reactor cooling circuit 
(primary circuit) and the containment building.
The fuel and reactor, the primary circuit of a 
nuclear power plant and the secondary circuit of a 
pressurised water reactor power plant, their water 
chemistry, the containment building and safety 
functions shall be designed so as to meet the follow-
ing safety objectives:
1) In order to assure the integrity of fuel
•	 the	probability	of	 fuel	 failure	shall	be	low	dur-
ing normal operational conditions and antici-
pated operational occurrences;
•	 during	postulated	accidents,	the	rate	of	fuel	fail-
ures shall remain low and fuel coolability shall 
not be endangered; and
•	 the	possibility	 of	 a	 criticality	accident	 shall	 be	
extremely low.
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2) In order to ensure primary and secondary circuit 
integrity,
•	 the	primary	circuit	shall	be	designed	and	manu-
factured in compliance with high quality stand-
ards so that the probability of hazardous faults 
in structures and that of mechanisms threaten-
ing their integrity remains extremely low and 
any faults which occur can be detected reliably 
through inspections;
•	 the	 primary	 circuit	 shall,	 with	 sufficient	 mar-
gins, withstand the stresses arising in normal 
operational conditions, anticipated operational 
occurrences, postulated accidents and design 
extension conditions;
•	 the	 primary	 circuit	 and	 systems	 immediately	
connected to it, and components important to the 
safety of the secondary circuit of a pressurised 
water reactor, shall be reliably protected dur-
ing anticipated operational occurrences and all 
accident scenarios, in order to prevent damage 
caused by over-pressurisation; and
•	 in	order	to	detect	 leakages,	 the	 facility	shall	be	
equipped with sufficient monitoring systems.
3) In order to ensure containment building integ-
rity,
•	 the	 containment	 building	 shall	 be	 designed	 so	
as to maintain its integrity during anticipated 
operational occurrences and, with a high degree 
of certainty, during all accident scenarios;
•	 pressure,	radiation	and	temperature	loads,	com-
bustible gases, impacts of missiles and shortterm 
high energy phenomena resulting of an accident 
shall be considered in the design of the contain-
ment building; and
•	 the	possibility	of	 fracturing	of	the	reactor	pres-
sure vessel in a severe accident so that the leak-
tightness of the containment building would 
be endangered shall be extremely small. The 
nuclear power plant shall be equipped with sys-
tems that ensure the stabilisation and cooling of 
molten core material generated during a severe 
accident. Direct interaction of molten core mate-
rial with the load bearing containment structure 
shall be reliably prevented.
4.3.1 Assuring the integrity of fuel
The fuel cladding in the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units is made of Zircaloy. The fuel suppliers have 
extensive experience, spanning several decades, of 
the	use	of	this	zirconium	alloy	as	the	cladding	ma-
terial for fuel rods.
In order to ensure the correct properties of fuel, 
maximum limits have been set for different param-
eters, including fuel burnup and the quantity of fis-
sion gases released from fuel pellets inside the rod. 
The limits have been set in such a manner that 
their fulfilment can be already demonstrated dur-
ing the design phase through the measurements 
and computational analyses carried out by the fuel 
supplier.
Maintenance of fuel integrity during power lev-
el changes associated with the normal operation of 
the reactor is ensured by limitations regarding the 
rate at which reactor power can be adjusted. These 
are primarily based on research work carried out 
using test reactors and on operational experience 
gained in similar Swedish reactors and elsewhere. 
In addition, limits have been set during normal 
operation for the linear power of fuel rods and the 
so-called dryout factor describing the ratio of fuel 
bundle power to coolant flow.
The number of fuel damage occurrences dur-
ing normal operation has remained small at the 
Olkiluoto plant units, which is an indication of 
compatibility between the design limits and the 
manner in which the reactor is operated.
The maintenance of fuel integrity during an-
ticipated operational transients and postulated ac-
cident situations is demonstrated using computa-
tional analyses and the safety-critical limit values 
for normal operation (mainly the linear loading of 
rods and the dryout factor) derived from them. In 
conjunction with the periodic safety review, TVO 
has revised the analyses for operational transient 
and accident situations at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units taking into account the plant modifica-
tions carried out during the operating licence pe-
riod and the development of programs used for the 
calculations. The safety margin required during 
normal operation in relation to substantial impair-
ment of fuel cooling (dryout margin) is currently 
determined for each refuelling period by analysing 
the most limiting initial events. The events to be 
analysed are the unnecessary closure of turbine 
control valves, loss of offsite power and failure in 
switching to house load operation, as well as the 
unnecessary triggering of reactor protection sys-
tem condition xT6 (shutdown of primary coolant 
pumps).
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Of the events included in the analyses regard-
ing Class 2 accidents, those where an anticipated 
operational transient is associated with a failure 
of reactor scram were revised in conjunction with 
the periodic safety review. The analyses indicate 
that the probability of fuel damage in these events 
is small.
In addition to the analyses supporting fuel lay-
out design, the behaviour of fuel material is moni-
tored through on-site investigations in accordance 
with the spent fuel inspection programme. These 
investigations have confirmed the opinion that 
the fuel complies with the safety criteria set out in 
Guide yVl 6.2 up to the maximum burnup values 
currently in use.
The aim is to minimise the probability of a criti-
cality accident during outages and reloading by 
imposing technical and administrative restraints. 
The prevention of inadvertent criticality has also 
been taken into account in the fuel storage and 
handling systems of the plant that are discussed in 
more detail in section 4.5.
The conclusion is that the integrity of fuel at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been ensured in 
the manner referred to in section 13 of Government 
Decree 733/2008.
4.3.2 Ensuring the primary circuit integrity
The primary circuits of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units include the reactor pressure vessel and its 
associated internal main cooling pumps and heat 
exchangers as well as the pipelines and fittings as-
sociated with the reactor pressure vessel up to the 
outer containment isolation valves. These compo-
nents were designed and manufactured in accord-
ance with the requirements of standards applicable 
to Safety Class 1 pressure vessels. The main stand-
ard applied was the US standard ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Code. 
When selecting materials, provisions were 
made for possible ageing phenomena occurring 
in primary circuit conditions in accordance with 
the best knowledge available at the time. The 
reactor pressure vessel is manufactured of low-
alloy MnMoNi steel and clad, with the exception 
of pump chambers, with austenitic stainless steel 
welded on the inside. The coolant pump heat ex-
changers and main steam lines of the reactor are 
made of carbon steel. Other components are made 
of austenitic stainless steel. The risk of brittle frac-
ture of the reactor pressure vessel is considerably 
smaller than in pressurised water reactor plants 
because the greater distance between the reactor 
core and pressure vessel wall reduces the dose of 
fast neutrons hitting the wall. In spite of their low 
degree of alloying, carbon steel components are 
not exposed to general corrosion eroding the wall 
thinner, because the operating temperature is low 
and the steam is dry. In these conditions the ero-
sion	rate	of	 the	main	steam	lines	 is	 low;	 this	has	
also been confirmed with measurements after the 
power upgrade.
In strength dimensioning, the loads caused by 
temperature differences of joining water flows, 
typical of BWRs, were minimised. In the feedwater 
fitting, this is done by utilising the ejector principle 
that causes a backflow from the reactor through 
the slot between the fitting and the manifold. TVO 
monitors the functioning of the ejector principle 
by continuous temperature measurements at the 
feedwater fitting. After commissioning, it has been 
discovered that loads are also caused by the addi-
tions of feedwater required for reactor start-ups 
and shutdowns. The adjustment of feedwater at 
low flow rates has been made more accurate to re-
duce these loads.
The strength analyses appended to the original 
structural plans indicated that the safety margins 
were sufficient in all load situations belonging to 
the design bases, including anticipated operational 
transients and postulated accidents. The updates 
of strength analyses and the current situation 
are discussed in section 2.1.2. The analysed dam-
age mechanisms included brittle fracture of the 
reactor pressure vessel and the fatigue of most 
heavily loaded points in the primary circuit under 
the strain of pressure and temperature transients 
foreseen for the entire duration of the service life. 
Provisions have been made for ruptures of the 
reactor coolant pipe by providing anti-rupture sup-
ports and by carrying out the necessary dynamic 
analyses. The so-called leak before rupture criteri-
on has not been applied. however, the containment 
has a leak detection system that complies with the 
current requirements – it allows small leaks to be 
reliably detected. The provisions made for pipeline 
ruptures are discussed in section 4.7.
The work for ensuring the integrity of the pri-
mary circuit has continued during the operation of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in the form of TVO 
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procedures being part of the ageing management 
programme. These procedures are discussed in sec-
tion 2.3. The most significant modifications have 
been associated with intergranular stress corro-
sion cracking (IGSCC). Occurrences of IGSCC were 
observed after a few years of operation in the base 
material	transition	zone	next	to	the	welds	in	pipes	
manufactured from austenitic stainless steel. This 
has been a common problem in BWR plants since 
the 1980s. One prerequisite for IGSCC is that ma-
terial	sensitizes	as	a	result	of	the	carbon,	present	
as an impurity, and the detrimental thermal effect 
of welding. The additional requirement of carbon 
content below 0.05% set in the original design 
work did not prove a sufficient measure. Other pre-
requisites include the high tensile stress caused by 
residual welding stresses and the aggressive ambi-
ent conditions where the oxygen dissolved in the 
coolant as a result of radiolysis is a contributing 
factor in BWR plants. In order to eliminate IGSCC, 
pipeline sections of over 200 metres in length have, 
since 1987, been replaced in both plant units with 
pipes made of low-carbon Nuclear Grade steel.
An increasing number of indications of the 
presence of IGSCC in predominantly nickel-based 
alloys has been observed during the current op-
erating licence period. These materials have been 
used in the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in the 
safe-end pieces of reactor pressure vessel fittings 
and their weld joints as well as in the weld joints 
of consoles supporting the interior parts. A fault 
indication of about 12 mm in length and 9 mm in 
depth was found in the weld between the reactor 
pressure vessel and the feedwater pipeline of the 
Olkiluoto 2 NPP unit in 2003. The weld material is 
Inconel 182, and one of the suspected causes of the 
fault is a hot crack occurring during manufacture. 
TVO will monitor the magnitude of the fault with 
more frequent inspections, and preparations have 
been made for the repair work that may prove nec-
essary. Faults under similar monitoring, suspected 
to be caused by IGSCC, have also been found in the 
welds of fittings in the shutdown cooling system 
and the reactor core spray system. In its assess-
ments, STUK has requested that attention also be 
paid to thermal embrittlement that reduces the 
ductility of material and may be present in the dis-
similar material joint of the feedwater fitting.
In the course of thermal fatigue monitoring dur-
ing the current operating licence period, tempera-
ture measurements have revealed isolation valves 
through which water may leak into an area un-
der lower pressure but higher temperature, caus-
ing harmful thermal stratification. The branching 
points susceptible to thermal mixing phenomena 
are included in periodic inspection programmes. 
The branching point of the main and auxiliary 
feedwater systems at the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit was 
replaced because of a fault indication presumably 
caused my a manufacturing fault. The accumula-
tion of pressure and temperature transient occur-
rences have developed steadily during the current 
operating licence period, and it can be assumed 
that most of these will, at the end of the current 
operating licence period, be well below the number 
originally foreseen for 40 years of operation. 
Accident and reliability analyses indicate that 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 -NPP units, the control of 
primary circuit pressure is implemented so that the 
primary circuit pressure remains, by a sufficient 
margin, below the acceptance criteria during antic-
ipated operational transients, postulated accidents 
and design extension conditions.
In situations leading to an increase in primary 
circuit pressure, the primary circuit and systems 
directly connected to it are protected from over-
pressure by safety valves. These valves included in 
the overpressure protection system (system 314) of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units blow directly into 
the condensate pool in the containment where the 
steam condenses into water. The overpressure pro-
tection system implements the diversity principle, 
i.e. it contains two types of valves with different 
operating principles. In addition to the overpres-
sure protection system, the reactor protection and 
trip system also participate in limiting the primary 
circuit pressure.
The conclusion is that the integrity of primary 
circuits at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has 
been ensured in the manner referred to in section 
13 of Government Decree 733/2008.
4.3.3 Water chemistry of the primary circuit
The water chemistry of reactor circuits at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units is referred to as 
Normal Water Chemistry (NWC), based on the 
Water Chemistry Guidelines issued by the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI). The parameters 
describing water chemical conditions are divided 
into control parameters and supplementary pa-
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rameters. The control parameters affect corrosion 
and the condition of fuel, and they are measured 
and monitored in order to maintain the operability 
of the plant and to secure its operation. The control 
parameters include conductivity, corrosion-induc-
ing anions, ph, oxygen and impurities. The sup-
plementary parameters provide additional infor-
mation on the system status. The supplementary 
parameters include metal concentrations. Trigger 
levels have been defined for the control parameters 
with associated time limits for restoring normal 
conditions. In addition to the limit values associ-
ated with the trigger levels, target levels are also 
specified	 for	 the	 control	 parameters;	 these	 levels	
are normally achieved – or at least they should 
be achieved. The supplementary parameters only 
have target values specified for them.
The control parameters, with their respective 
limit values and trigger levels for the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units, are specified in the Technical 
Specifications and Chemical Procedures. The sup-
plementary parameters and their target values 
are only specified in the Chemical Procedures. TVO 
monitors the chemical parameters using both con-
tinuous measurements and laboratory analyses. 
The chemical laboratory uses an information sys-
tem where the analysis results are recorded and 
which can be used for monitoring compliance with 
the set limit values and for studying the long-term 
trends of chemical parameters.
During the current operating licence period, 
the water chemistry at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units has largely remained within the target val-
ues. The condensation of sulphates, anions causing 
stress-induced corrosion, was regularly above the 
target value for reactor coolant during the early 
years of the operating licence period. The sulphate 
in the reactor coolant originates from the sulphate 
released from the ion-exchange resins of the con-
densate cleaning filters. TVO managed to reduce 
the sulphate condensations in the early 2000s by 
choosing different filter masses, using inert mass 
and by limiting the times when the filter masses 
were used. Neither plant unit had any occur-
rences of exceeding the target value during 2002 
or 2003, but the running times of filters had to be 
limited. Temperature is one factor contributing to 
the decomposition of condensate filters. In order 
to reduce its detrimental effects, the temperature 
of water entering the condensate cleaning filters 
was reduced by changing the location of the con-
densate system pre-heater. The modification took 
place at the Olkiluoto 2 NPP unit in 2003 and at 
the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit in 2004. After the plant 
modifications, the sulphate content of reactor cool-
ant has been in keeping with the target value, 
with the exception of some isolated deviations. The 
deviations were caused by an increase in conden-
sate temperature, which in turn was caused by the 
warm cooling water in late summer. After the plant 
modifications, it has been possible to use the filters 
up to the pressure differential limit, with the ex-
ception of the situations in late summer where the 
filter masses had to be changed before their capac-
ity was exhausted.
The concentration of chlorides – another anion 
causing stress corrosion – in reactor coolant has, 
during the current operating licence period, been 
in line with the target value set by TVO, with the 
exception of the turbine condenser leak occurring 
at the Olkiluoto 2 NPP unit in 2004. The leak al-
lowed sea water to enter the reactor circuit, result-
ing in a temporary increase in the chloride con-
centration above the target limit, but the chloride 
concentration did not exceed the action-triggering 
limit specified in the Technical Specifications.
The chemistry index, describing the effective-
ness of measures for maintaining the water chem-
istry conditions of the reactor circuit and affected 
by the chloride and sulphate content or reactor 
coolant and the iron content of feedwater during 
power operation, has constantly been close to the 
best possible value at both plant units ever since 
the sulphate content of the reactor coolant has 
been in line with the target value.
The iron content of feedwater is a water chem-
istry parameter that is essential from the point of 
fuel cladding. Iron may cause additional deposits 
on the fuel. The iron content of feedwater at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has, during the cur-
rent operating licence period, been in line with the 
target value set by TVO, with the exception of a 
few isolated deviations. Investigations into irradi-
ated fuel bundles have not revealed any significant 
changes in the quantity or composition of solid de-
posits accumulated on bundle surfaces.
During the current operating period, there have 
been five occurrences of a leaking fuel bundle at 
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the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit and six at the Olkiluoto 
2 NPP unit. The leaks have been minor – the io-
dine-131 activity content of reactor coolant has 
been less then one per cent of the limit set out in 
the Technical Specifications for taking action. The 
leaky bundles have been removed during the next 
refuelling outage following detection of the leak. 
A fuel leak is often created when a small loose 
part, such as a metallic chip carried by the reac-
tor coolant, gets stuck to the fuel assembly. The 
coolant flow may make the loose part vibrate and 
break the fuel cladding. loose parts may enter the 
reactor in work carried out during outages, when 
the reactor and primary circuit are open. TVO 
has investigated the needs for developing working 
methods in order to prevent loose parts getting 
into the reactor. As a result, the licensee improved, 
for example, procedures and the work order and 
procurement procedures. In addition, information 
on dangers related to loose parts is given in induc-
tion training and at various meetings to both inter-
nal and contractor personnel. Personnel are also 
reminded of the need for a careful and attentive at-
titude when working with open components. These 
actions were deployed for the first time during the 
annual maintenance outages of 2006. Since then, 
the plant units have had one fuel leak.
In conclusion, it can be stated that during 
the current operating licence period, the water 
chemistry at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has 
remained good. The sulphate content in rector cool-
ant, which at the beginning of the current operat-
ing licence period was above the target value, has 
also been in line with the target value after the 
modification to the condensate purification system, 
save a few isolated deviations. During the current 
operating period, there have been a total of 11 oc-
currences of a leaking fuel bundle at the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units. however, the leaks have been 
small and the leaked radioactive substances have 
been treated in the plant’s internal systems. The 
leaking bundles have been removed during the 
next refuelling outage following the leak. The wa-
ter chemistry of reactor coolant has remained good 
from the point of fuel cladding.
The conclusion is that the water chemistry at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been imple-
mented in the manner referred to in section 13 of 
Government Decree 733/2008.
4.3.4 Ensuring the integrity of 
containment building
The containment buildings of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units are of steel reinforced concrete construc-
tion. In addition, the external walls of the contain-
ment are prestressed structures. The containment 
integrity has been ensured by installing a sealing 
plate of steel inside the containment. All parts of 
the sealing plate are protected against jet forces 
and missiles possibly occurring during accidents. 
In order to minimise the potential releases caused 
by leaks in penetration seals, the containment 
building is located inside the reactor building. The 
reactor building is equipped with air conditioning 
that allows the reactor building to be underpressu-
rised in relation to its surroundings and to collect 
and filter any radioactive substances possibly leak-
ing from the containment building.
The design requirements for the containment 
building with regard to the anticipated operation-
al transients and postulated accidents have not 
changed since the Olkiluoto plant was built. The an-
ticipated operational transients and postulated ac-
cidents have been taken into account in the design 
of the containment buildings of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 NPP units by dimensioning the structures on the 
basis of loads resulting from a sudden and complete 
rupture of the largest pipe in the primary circuit. 
The functioning of the containment in a situation 
where a pipe rupture occurs in the primary circuit 
is based on the pressure reduction principle where 
the increase in containment pressure is limited by 
directing the steam discharged from the ruptured 
pipe to the condensation pool located at the lower 
part of the containment. The functionality of pres-
sure reduction requires that the wet well and dry 
well of the containment have been isolated from 
each other in a leak proof manner.
The containment spraying system starts auto-
matically in an accident situation. The residual heat 
released from the reactor core during an accident is 
transferred to the final heat sink, the sea, through 
the containment spraying system, the component 
cooling system and the seawater circuit.
In postulated accidents, part of the fuel clad-
ding material may become oxidised, which releases 
hydrogen into the containment. hydrogen may also 
be generated over longer periods in the water pools 
through radiolysis. In order to eliminate the fire and 
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explosion risk caused by hydrogen, the Olkiluoto 
containments have an inert nitrogen atmosphere 
during normal power operation, except for short 
periods during start-up and shutdown. The con-
tainment building is also equipped with a separate 
hydrogen removal system that allows for the con-
trolled burning of hydrogen released in an accident 
back into water.
So far, the ageing effects on the containment 
building and its systems have been relatively minor. 
TVO has replaced the expansion joint gaskets in 
the containment partition floor during 2005–2006. 
At that time, the construction and material of the 
gaskets was also altered so that they can withstand 
larger movements and higher temperatures. In the 
same connection, the rubber bellow of the expan-
sion joint of the transport shaft was replaced for one 
with better material properties. These modifications 
enhance the functionality of the pressure reduction 
principle. The periodic leakage tests on the contain-
ment buildings have not indicated any increase in 
leaks that would be a sign of deterioration in the 
materials of the containment penetration seals.
Severe accidents were not taken into account 
in the original design work for the containments of 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. TVO has made modi-
fications at the plant units to improve the possi-
bilities for controlling severe accidents. Most of the 
modifications were made prior to 1998 when the 
operating licence for the plant units was renewed. 
In its statement of 1998 regarding the operating 
licence, STUK stated that there are still needs 
for research and development associated with the 
consequences of severe accidents and preparations 
made for them. Of these, steam explosions and 
the behaviour of iodine in the containment were 
deemed key issues for the Olkiluoto plant units.
The control of severe accidents at the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units is based on primary circuit pres-
sure reduction, flooding of the lower dry well of the 
containment building, cooling of core melt in the 
lower dry well, controlled reduction of containment 
pressure as well as the detention of radionuclides. 
The reduction of primary circuit pressure pre-
vents the high-pressure eruption of core melt from 
the pressure vessel. The pressure reduction is ac-
complished by a forced blowout from the primary 
circuit relief system valves. A modification was 
made to the system in 1999 to allow keeping two 
valves	open	with	pressurized	nitrogen	through	ac-
tions taken from outside the containment building. 
The modification ensures that the reactor pressure 
remains low even in accident situations associated 
with a long-lasting loss of electrical power.
In a severe accident, the lower part of the con-
tainment below the pressure vessel (lower dry 
well) is flooded in order to protect the contain-
ment penetrations there from the thermal effects 
of core melt. The flooding has to take place early 
enough during the course of the accident so that 
the core melt possibly penetrating the pressure 
vessel drops into a deep pool of water. When the 
melt drops into the pool of water, a steam explosion 
may occur, resulting in a quickly travelling, strong 
pressure wave in the pool. For the eventuality of a 
steam explosion, during 2001–2002 TVO reinforced 
the lower personnel airlocks of the containment 
buildings of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units so that 
they can withstand higher pressures and pressure 
shocks.
TVO has commissioned a new study for its peri-
odic safety review where the pressure and impulse 
loads generated by a steam explosion occurring 
in the lower dry well are estimated. In case of a 
severe accident at the Olkiluoto 1 or 2 NPP unit, 
the pressure vessel is most likely to rupture at 
the instrumentation tube penetrating the bottom 
of the pressure vessel. The mass flow of core melt 
discharging through the instrumentation tube is so 
small that calculations indicate it to be incapable 
of causing a steam explosion. In calculations re-
garding the pressure shock caused by a steam ex-
plosion, the shock has only exceeded the strength 
of the lower personnel airlocks of the containment 
buildings of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units when 
unlikely assumptions regarding the discharge of 
core melt have been used. STUK has commis-
sioned comparison analyses using a more detailed 
calculation program. The results of these calcula-
tions are consistent with TVO’s analyses: the core 
melt discharged through the instrumentation tube 
cools down as it travels through the pool of water 
and cannot create a steam explosion. Most of the 
results of comparison analyses calculated using 
the same parameters have shown smaller loading 
values than the results shown in TVO’s study.
The core material discharged from the reactor 
pressure vessels of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units 
is cooled down in the flooded lower dry wells of the 
containment buildings. As it drops through the wa-
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ter, the core melt cools down and disintegrates into 
particles. The coolability of core material in particle 
form has been empirically tested in Finland as part 
of the SAFIR research programme. The test results 
indicate that the heap of particles can be cooled 
under the pressure prevailing during an accident 
situation. Coolability may be compromised if plenty 
of fine-grained material collects on top of the heap 
of particles – for example, as a result of a steam 
explosion. A steam explosion of these proportions 
is unlikely due to the most probable mechanism 
of pressure vessel failure at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units. STUK has commissioned comparison 
analyses with the same results: the heap of parti-
cles most probably forming in an accident situation 
can be cooled. however, there are situations where 
coolability is jeopardised. TVO has commissioned 
an independent assessment regarding the cool-
ability tests conducted by VTT. The assessment 
considered the test results to be conservative with 
regard to the geometry of the heap of particles. The 
assessment recommended that further investiga-
tions should be carried out regarding the particle 
size	distribution	and	shape	of	the	particle	heap.	A	
new test programme is starting in 2009 with re-
gard to the latter.
The lower part of the containment below the 
pressure vessel can be flooded with water in order 
to protect the penetrations from the thermal effects 
of core melt. Some penetrations of the containment 
are also structurally protected from the direct ef-
fects of core melt. In order to ensure the cooling of 
reactor remnants, the plant is also equipped with 
an external water filling system that allows bring-
ing the water level in the containment building up 
to the top edge of the reactor core.
The	small	size	of	the	containment	buildings	of	
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units is one of the most 
significant flaws regarding the control of severe 
accidents. Pressure in the building increases dur-
ing an accident as a result of the release of hydro-
gen, steam and other gases. The containment is 
equipped with a pressure reduction system that 
allows gases increasing its pressure to be removed 
through a purpose-built filter.
Iodine is mainly present in the containment 
building in the form of aerosols that are effec-
tively captured in the condensation pool of the 
containment and in the filter of the relief train. 
In acidic conditions, iodine may also form organic 
compounds that are not readily captured in the 
containment or the relief line filter. Increasing the 
ph of water pools in the containment increases the 
absorption of iodine and reduces the formation of 
organic iodine compounds. In 2001, TVO installed 
a lye container in the fire water pumping station 
of the plant that allows the ph of water pools to be 
increased. The lye injection system was expanded 
in 2007–2008 when the fire water pumping station 
was upgraded.
TVO has supplemented the containment sam-
pling system with a facility for taking a sample of 
the containment atmosphere during a severe ac-
cident. Sampling allows the composition of gases in 
the containment atmosphere and its organic iodine 
content to be established.
The conclusion is that the integrity of the con-
tainment building at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units has been ensured in the manner referred to 
in section 13 of Government Decree 733/2008.
4.4 Section 14: Safety functions and 
provisions for ensuring them
In ensuring safety functions, inherent safety fea-
tures attainable by design shall be primarily uti-
lised. In particular, the combined effect of a nuclear 
reactor’s	 physical	 feedbacks	 shall	 be	 such	 that	 it	
mitigates the increase in reactor power.
If inherent safety features cannot be made use of 
in ensuring a safety function, priority shall be given 
to systems and components which do not require an 
off-site power supply or which, in consequence of a 
loss of power supply, will settle in a state preferable 
from the safety point of view.
In order to prevent accidents and mitigate the 
consequences thereof, a nuclear power plant shall 
be provided with systems for shutting down the 
reactor and maintaining it in a sub-critical state, 
for removing decay heat generated in the reactor, 
and for retaining radioactive materials within the 
plant. Principles ensuring the implementation of 
these safety functions even in the event of a mal-
function must be applied in designing the systems 
in question. Such principles are redundancy, sepa-
ration and diversity. The most important systems 
necessary for transferring to, and remaining in, a 
controlled state must be capable of fulfilling their 
function even if any individual system component 
is inoperable and even if any other component of the 
same system or of a supporting or auxiliary system 
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necessary for its operation is simultaneously out of 
use due to required repair or maintenance..
Common-cause	 failures	 in	 safety	 systems	 shall	
only have minor impacts on plant safety.
A nuclear power plant shall have on-site and 
offsite electrical power supply systems. The execu-
tion of safety functions shall be possible by using 
either of the two electrical power supply systems.
The plant shall be provided with systems, struc-
tures and components for controlling and monitor-
ing severe accidents. These shall be independent of 
the systems designed for operational conditions and 
postulated accidents. Systems necessary for ensur-
ing the integrity of the containment building in a 
severe accident shall be capable of performing their 
safety functions, even in the case of a single failure.
The plant shall be designed so that it can be brought 
into a safe state after a severe accident.
The most important safety functions of a nucle-
ar power plant are: 1) reactor shutdown, 2) residual 
heat removal from the reactor to the ultimate heat 
sink, and 3) the functioning of the containment 
building. These functions shall be operable in nor-
mal operational conditions, anticipated operational 
transients and postulated accidents.
Inherent reactor-physical feedbacks are made 
use of in the reactor design of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 NPP units and in their fuel loading plans so that 
each physical feedback separately, and thus their 
combined effect collectively, mitigates the increase 
of reactor power in transient and accident condi-
tions. This is demonstrated both analytically and 
empirically in the start-up of the plant following 
refuelling outages.
Control rods are the primary means of shutting 
down the reactor and keeping it in a shutdown 
state at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. Control 
rods may be moved by either driving them by 
means of electric motors or by pushing them down 
into the reactor by means of nitrogen tanks form-
ing part of the reactor trip system. The fuel loading 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units is designed to 
enable reactor scram during normal operation, an-
ticipated operational transients and postulated ac-
cidents by means of control rods even in the event 
of a malfunction of the most effective control rod 
group. In addition to the control rods, the reactors 
can be shut down using the boron system equipped 
with an emergency diesel power supply.
Residual heat is removed from the reactor using 
either the shutdown cooling system or by blowing 
steam from the reactor through the pressure con-
trol system into the condensate pool located in the 
containment. The auxiliary and emergency feed-
water systems maintain a sufficient flow of cool-
ant in the reactor. The heat energy can be further 
transferred from the condensate pool to the sea 
via the secondary cooling system and the seawater 
systems, both consisting of four redundant trains. 
These systems require active equipment that re-
ceive their driving power from diesel-backed power 
supply sources.
The residual heat removal systems of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units were not designed in 
compliance with the diversity principle. There are 
no alternative systems for back-up in situations 
where the ultimate heat sink is lost or where a 
common mode failure occurs in the systems used 
for removal of residual heat. TVO has investigated 
the possibilities for devising a method for removal 
of residual heat that would be seawater-independ-
ent, but in its report submitted for the periodic 
safety review the company states that it does not 
consider the investigated system technically feasi-
ble as such. however, STUK considers it important 
that application of the diversity principle is sys-
tematically assessed at the plant and developed in 
line with the principles set out in section 7 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act. Instead of looking at the di-
versification of an individual function, TVO should 
consider the plant as a whole. By the end of 2010, 
TVO must send to STUK, for its approval, a report 
regarding the adequacy of the diversification at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units, accompanied with an 
action plan for developing the same.
In an accident situation, the containment build-
ing must be sealed and leak proof so as to prevent 
any releases of radioactive substances into the 
environment. As a rule, the pipelines penetrating 
containment walls have two isolation valves, one 
outside the containment and one on the inside. In 
an accident situation, the reactor protection system 
closes the isolation valves when necessary.
The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units have offsite 
power supply systems connected to both the 400 
kV and 110 kV grids. If connections to both power 
transfer networks are lost, both plant units have 
four emergency diesel sets for on-site power sup-
ply. The safety functions can be executed by using 
either of the two electrical power supply systems. 
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In addition, the plant units also have a new gas 
turbine plant, completed in 2008, at their disposal. 
It can operate virtually independently of other 
sources of AC power designed for different opera-
tional conditions and postulated accidents.
In 2008, one significant event related to electri-
cal systems occurred at the Olkiluoto 1 NPP unit 
during start-up after annual maintenance. A mal-
function occurred in the exciter system of the main 
generator when the plant power was at 60%. This 
resulted in the generator exciter current reach-
ing its maximum value. The large exciter current 
increased the voltage at the generator and in the 
on-site power network, first to 125% of nominal 
voltage and then to 150% when the connection to 
the national grid was cut. This major overvoltage 
condition lasted for 150 milliseconds until the 
protective relays opened the generator switch. The 
power supply was restored to the on-site power 
network after a downtime of two seconds when the 
supply switching system automatically switched 
the plant supply to the 110 kV grid.
The overvoltage transient resulted in all six re-
actor coolant pumps stopping when the frequency 
converters driving the pump motors supplied an 
overvoltage. The frequency converters are fitted 
with a generator acting as a flywheel motor that 
is designed to generate electricity for the pump 
motors in a power cut situation so that they can 
be slowed down to minimum speed in a controlled 
manner through a shutdown ramp. This function 
did not operate because the overvoltage protection 
switching off the frequency converters had been 
triggered. The purpose of the reactor coolant pump 
shutdown ramp is to reduce the flow of coolant in 
the reactor core gradually so that the sufficient 
cooling of fuel is not endangered. If the flow of cool-
ant stops abruptly, there is a risk of deterioration 
of cooling (heat transfer crisis). When the event 
started at 60% reactor power, the reactor coolant 
pumps were running at minimum speed so there 
was no risk of loss of fuel cooling ability. The analy-
ses made after the event indicate that a similar 
pump stoppage occurring at full power would have 
resulted in a heat transfer crisis in parts of the fuel 
with possible fuel damage.
After the event, modifications were carried out 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units to the trigger-
ing conditions of overvoltage protection relays and 
the opening conditions of power supply switches 
in order to protect the reactor coolant pumps from 
overvoltage. The modifications had the desired ef-
fect of reducing the risk of reactor coolant pumps 
stopping as a result of overvoltage. however, the 
repairs carried out are not yet sufficient from the 
deterministic point of view. The current arrange-
ments mean that the controlled shutdown of reac-
tor coolant pumps (a Safety Class 2 function) is 
protected by equipment in Safety Classes 4 and 
EyT. For this reason, STUK submitted in its deci-
sions C542/35 dated 8 June 2008 and C30-7/106 
dated 30 April 2009 that TVO must produce a plan 
regarding the necessary modifications to be carried 
out in the long run in order to improve the over-
voltage resistance of reactor coolant pumps. TVO 
delivered the plan to STUK in September 2009.
Severe accidents were not taken into account 
in the original design work for the containments of 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. TVO has made modi-
fications at the plant units to improve the possibili-
ties for controlling severe accidents. The key safety 
functions in place regarding severe accidents at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units are primary circuit 
pressure reduction, cooling of core melt in the low-
er dry well, and the controlled reduction of contain-
ment pressure. During severe accidents, the same 
relief system is used for reducing the pressure as 
is used for protecting the reactor coolant circuit 
against overpressure and for reducing pressure 
during postulated accidents. The requirement set 
out in section 14 of Government Decree 733/2008 
regarding the independence of systems deployed in 
severe accidents is not met in this respect.
The cooling of core melt in the lower dry well of 
the containment requires that the well is flooded. 
The flooding is effected through the containment 
spraying system by manually opening the valves 
in the pipelines leading from the condensation pool 
to the lower dry well. The requirements set out in 
the Government decree are met because the action 
only utilises passive components of the spraying 
system and the system is single-failure tolerant.
During severe accidents, the filtered venting 
system is used for the controlled reduction of con-
tainment pressure. There are two redundant lines 
leading	 to	 the	 filter;	 the	 isolation	 valves	 of	 these	
lines are opened manually. Therefore, the filtered 
venting function of the containment building com-
plies with the requirement set out in section 14 of 
Government Decree 733/2008 regarding the inde-
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pendence and fault tolerance of systems deployed 
in severe accidents. The management of severe 
accidents at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units and 
the modifications carried out during the current 
operating licence period are described in more de-
tail in section 4.3.4.
The conclusion is that the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units can be deemed to comply with the re-
quirements set out in 14 of Government Decree 
733/2008 regarding the measures to ensure safety 
functions when section 32 of the decree, applica-
ble to plants in operation, is taken into account. 
however, the application of the diversity principle 
at the plant units must be systematically assessed 
and developed in line with the principles set out in 
section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. TVO has also 
submitted a plan for improving the overvoltage 
tolerance of the electrical drives of reactor coolant 
pumps. STUK will oversee the implementation of 
these requirements and plans.
4.5 Section 15: Fuel handling and storage
In the handling and storing of nuclear fuel, ad-
equate cooling and radiation protection shall be 
ensured. Damage to fuel cladding during handling 
and storage must be prevented with a high degree 
of certainty. The possibility of a criticality accident 
shall be extremely low. Fuel storage conditions 
shall be maintained such that the leaktightness 
or mechanical endurance of a fuel assembly is not 
substantially degraded during the planned storage 
period.
In addition, section 114 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree states that The Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) shall see to it that nuclear 
fuel is designed, fabricated, stored, handled and 
used pursuant to the relevant instructions and 
regulations. Nuclear fuel cannot be placed in the 
reactor until STUK has accepted the fuel for use.
The general design bases for nuclear fuel have 
been defined in the Guides yVl 1.0 and yVl 6.2. 
The design objective is that the probability of fuel 
failure is low during normal operational condi-
tions and anticipated operational transients, and 
that during a postulated accident the rate of fuel 
failures remains low and the fuel remains in a cool-
able state. The measures for ensuring the integrity 
of fuel during the operation of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 NPP units is discussed in more detail in section 
4.3.1.
Detailed requirements for the design, qual-
ity management and control, handling, storage 
and transport of fuel are specified in the Guides 
yVl 6.2, yVl 6.3, yVl 6.4, yVl 6.5, yVl 6.7 and 
yVl 6.8. The following companies have supplied 
and produced fuel for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units: Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB, AREVA 
NP Gmbh, GNF ENUSA Nuclear Fuel S.A., 
Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas llC and ENUSA 
Industrias	 Avazadas	 S.A.	 STUK	 has	 granted	
TVO permissions to use fuel types ATRIUM 10B, 
ATRIUM 10xM, GE12, GE14, SVEA-96 Optima 
and SVEA-96 Optima2. The preliminary inspection 
procedures prescribed in the yVl guides have pri-
marily been observed in the licensing process.
According to the requirements set out in STUK’s 
Guide yVl 6.3, the manufacture of nuclear fuel or 
control rods must not commence before STUK 
has approved the respective preliminary inspec-
tion material. In its decision 9/C43261/2009 dated 
8 October 2009, STUK pointed out a deviation 
regarding the submission of preliminary inspec-
tion materials. TVO had submitted, contrary to 
the requirements of Guide yVl 6.3, preliminary 
inspection materials for approval by STUK at 
the stage the manufacture of fuel was already in 
progress. The decision set out the requirement 
that TVO must take the actions required in its 
operations management system and its associated 
procedures for bringing the activities to compliance 
with the requirements. The decision also requires 
that a report of the reasons for the situation and a 
summary of corrective actions with the respective 
time schedule are to be delivered to STUK by 15 
January 2010.
TVO and the consultants hired by it oversee the 
manufacture of fuel at the fuel factory. The purpose 
of STUK’s regulatory control is to ensure that the 
activities of the licensee are adequate. TVO per-
forms an acceptance inspection for each fuel batch 
arriving at the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in 
which the fuel bundles and channels are inspected 
in compliance with the procedures. The quality as-
surance operations concerning the procurement of 
nuclear fuel are also described in section 6.2.
The criticality safety of the fuel racks in the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units as well as those in the 
intermediate fuel storage is based on the use of so-
called compact racks. Compact racks have neutron-
absorbing elements fitted between the fuel bundles 
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so that a decrease in the density of water between 
the bundles will not compromise the criticality 
safety of fuel. The analyses take into account the 
impact of water density and temperature on the 
stockpile growth factor as one uncertainty factor to 
be considered.
The criticality safety of fuel storage racks is en-
sured through criticality safety analyses performed 
in conjunction with the fuel licensing procedure. 
The purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate 
that all fuel racks used at the plant site comply 
with the criticality requirement set out in Guide 
yVl 6.8, even allowing for the uncertainties as-
sociated with the calculation system, the storage 
conditions and the storage history of the fuel. The 
acceptance criteria for analysis results is that the 
the safety requirement is met even if the rack is 
filled up with as much reactive fuel as is possible.
In order to verify criticality safety during re-
fuelling operations, TVO submits to STUK, for 
its approval, a reactor refuelling application in 
compliance with Guide yVl 1.13, showing, among 
other things, the layout of fuel rods in the reactor 
(loading pattern) and the analyses to be performed 
during the refuelling operation for the purpose of 
demonstrating criticality safety. These analyses 
take into account the possibility of individual hu-
man errors (incorrect placement of a bundle or con-
trol rod into the reactor). In addition, the neutron 
flux of the reactor core is monitored during the 
refuelling operation with the neutron flux moni-
toring system (SIRM) prescribed in the Technical 
Specifications.
The conclusion is that fuel management at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been organised in 
the manner referred to in section 15 of Government 
Decree 733/2008 and in section 114 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. STUK has required TVO to take 
corrective actions regarding the submission of 
preliminary inspection materials of nuclear fuel 
in compliance with the requirements of Guide 
yVl 6.3. The handling, storage and final disposal 
of spent fuel is also discussed in section 9.2.
4.6 Section 17: Protection 
against external events
The design of a nuclear power plant shall take ac-
count of external events that may challenge safety 
functions. Systems, structures and components are 
to be designed, located and protected so that the im-
pacts of external events on plant safety remain mi-
nor. External events to be accounted for include at 
least exceptional weather conditions, seismic events 
and other factors resulting from the environment or 
human activity. Design must also take account of 
illegal activities undertaken to damage the plant, 
and a large airliner crash.
Detailed requirements relating to section 17 of 
the decree are set out in Guides yVl 1.0, yVl 2.6, 
yVl 4.1 and yVl 4.2, among others.
The loads exerted and conditions caused by 
natural phenomena have been taken into account 
in the design of the structures of the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units as prescribed by Finnish building 
regulations. The most important natural phenom-
ena, as well as their combinations, have also been 
considered in the functional design of systems. The 
safety margins used in the original design are not 
as wide as those currently required when design-
ing new nuclear power plants.
TVO has studied the risks arising from external 
events as part of the probabilistic risk analysis. 
The events analysed include, among others, harsh 
weather conditions, high seawater temperature, 
exceptionally high seawater level, and phenomena 
causing a clogging risk in the seawater systems, 
such	as	frazil	ice,	mussels	and	algae.	The	analyses	
indicate that the most significant external events 
include a storm with a simultaneous loss of offsite 
power, mussels breaking off the internal walls of 
the seawater channels, deposits of algae (blockage 
of seawater intake channels) as well as simultane-
ous high levels of seawater and ambient tempera-
ture.
During the operating licence period, a new 
potential risk to safety was identified: the im-
pulse	 lines,	 important	 to	safety,	may	 freeze	 if	 the	
ventilation intake air heating fails during win-
ter	 conditions.	The	 risk	 of	 impulse	 lines	 freezing	
was substantially reduced through modifications 
carried out by TVO to the plant and procedures. 
Provisions have been made at the Olkiluoto NPP 
for the eventuality of seawater systems becoming 
blocked. They consist of alternative water supply 
arrangements. The plant also seeks to prevent the 
formation	 of	 frazil	 ice	 as	 a	 result	 of	 supercooled	
seawater	 suddenly	 freezing	 by	 channeling	 warm	
condensate water into the seawater intake open-
ing. In its decision C551/276 dated 26 August 2009, 
STUK requested TVO to assess, by 30 November 
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2009, the sufficiency of warm water pumped from 
the Olkiluoto 2 NPP unit to the Olkiluoto 1 NPP 
unit in a situation involving a longer outage at the 
Olkiluoto 2 NPP unit. 
There is little ship traffic in the vicinity of the 
plant, and the risks resulting from oil spillage 
accidents have not been assessed in conjunction 
with the PRA for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. 
TVO has drawn up a plan for enhancing the oil 
spillage combating arrangements, and in 2009 the 
company procured new oil booms and agreed with 
the Satakunta Emergency Response Centre on in-
forming	the	Olkiluoto	NPP	of	hazardous	situations	
regarding oil spillages.
There are no industrial plants in the vicinity of 
the NPP that would pose a risk to its safety.
The aircraft crashes considered in the plant 
design are less severe than those required for new 
nuclear power plants.
The loads resulting from earthquakes were not 
separately analysed in the original design work for 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. Certain safety-
critical electrical equipment was not sufficiently 
supported to withstand earthquake-induced loads. 
Many electrical components, among others, have 
since been better supported. An earthquake may 
also cause malfunctions in the control system re-
lays that result in protection functions being un-
necessarily activated. Examples of these include 
the unnecessary opening of pressure relief valves 
in the primary circuit and an unnecessary isolation 
of the containment that stops cooling of the reactor. 
The most significant plant modification during the 
current operating licence period was that the main 
control room was provided with capabilities to 
cancel unnecessary protection functions activated 
as a result of earthquakes. As a result of the plant 
modifications carried out, the risk caused by earth-
quakes is no longer significant.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the plant 
and procedure modifications implemented during 
the current operating licence period reduce the 
risk imposed on the plant by natural phenomena 
and other external events. The Olkiluoto NPP is 
sufficiently protected against external events in 
the manner referred to in section 17 of Government 
Decree 733/2008. however, TVO still needs to 
present a plan for assessing risks related to oil 
spillage.
4.7 Section 18: Protection 
against internal events
The design of a nuclear power plant shall take ac-
count of any internal events that may challenge 
safety functions. Systems, structures and compo-
nents shall be designed, located and protected so 
that the probability of internal events remains low 
and impacts on plant safety minor. Internal events 
to be considered include at least fire, flood, explo-
sion, pipe breaks, container breakages, missiles, 
falling of heavy objects and component failures.
Detailed requirements relating to section 18 of 
the decree are set out in Guides yVl 1.0, yVl 4.1, 
yVl 4.2 and yVl 4.3, among others.
Provisions have been made in the design of 
structures and systems of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
NPP units for the possibility of fires and the re-
sulting accident risks. however, the fire compart-
mentalisation does not comply with the relevant 
requirements of Guide yVl 4.3. As a result of 
the deficiencies in the original design, it has been 
important to develop fire detection and fire extin-
guishing systems and structural fire protection.
TVO has upgraded sprinkler systems in many 
parts of the plant, including the turbine hall and 
cable tunnels. The fire detection system has been 
renewed and made location-based, as a result of 
which fires can be detected, located and automati-
cally extinguished faster than previously. A new 
fire station has been commissioned, and operative 
fire protection equipment has been renewed.
STUK’s assessment is that fire safety at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units has been improved 
during the current operating licence period. Due to 
deficiencies in the compartmentalisation of safety 
systems and insufficient structural fire resistance, 
which are due to the basic design of the plant, the 
fire safety is not capable of fulfilling all of the re-
quirements laid down in the Guide yVl 4.3. To this 
end, the fire safety of cable rooms in particular will 
be	 improved	 with	 the	 help	 of	 fast-acting	 nozzles	
having an improved layout in order to mitigate the 
risks caused by the flaws in compartmentalisa-
tion.
The risks associated with internal flood events 
at the plant have been assessed in flood analyses. 
The occurrence of a major leak in the cooling water 
intake building or turbine building was found to 
be such a major risk that TVO made modifications 
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to the plant in order to prevent such a flood. These 
modifications will ensure that a flood is detected 
early and the seawater pumps stopped.
Provisions were made for the eventuality of 
dropping heavy loads the basic design work for the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units. In the outage risk 
analysis, the consequences of dropping heavy loads 
and possible initial event risks associated with 
them were analysed. The risk of dropping loads has 
little effect on the outage risk.
The conclusion is that the Olkiluoto NPP is 
protected against internal events in the manner 
referred to in section 18 of Government Decree 
733/2008. The requirements of section 14 of 
Government Decree 733/2008 regarding compart-
mentalisation are met when section 32, applicable 
to plants in operation, is taken into account. The 
fire safety of the plant will be further improved in 
order to mitigate the risks caused by the flaws in 
compartmentalisation.
4.8 Section 19: Monitoring and control 
of a nuclear power plant
The control room of a nuclear power plant shall 
contain equipment that provides information on the 
operational state of the nuclear reactor and any de-
viations from normal operation. Furthermore, a nu-
clear power plant shall contain automatic systems 
that actuate safety functions whenever required 
and control and supervise their functioning during 
operational occurrences and accidents.
These automatic systems shall be capable of 
maintaining the plant in a controlled state long 
enough to provide the operators with sufficient time 
to consider and implement the correct actions.
The nuclear power plant shall have an emer-
gency control post independent of the control room, 
and the necessary local control systems for shutting 
down and cooling the nuclear reactor, and for re-
moving residual heat from the nuclear reactor and 
spent fuel stored at the plant.
According to TVO, the duties and role of the 
control room have remained unchanged during 
the current operating licence period, although the 
control room has become a so-called hybrid control 
room that also has control interfaces based on 
display and data bus technology in addition to the 
conventional hard-wired control interface. This de-
velopment was contributed to by the I&C systems 
modernisation work undertaken during the latter 
half of the 1990s and the gradual development of 
data logging, processing and interface systems as-
sociated with the process control computer system. 
A substantial change took place in 2005 and 2006 
when the display-based control of components was 
introduced in conjunction with the process automa-
tion system of the new turbine plant. Until then, 
the process equipment had almost exclusively been 
controlled by hard-wired connections from the con-
trol room to the respective control units of the proc-
ess automation system. The ceilings of the main 
control rooms have also been upgraded during the 
current operating licence period taking into ac-
count the requirements regarding earthquakes. At 
the same time, the floors and most of the furniture 
in the control rooms were also upgraded.
The observance of standards and internation-
ally recognised best practices regarding control 
room designs has led to the development of par-
ticular human-Machine Interface (hMI, hFE) en-
gineering. This is associated with the development 
of design processes for both control rooms and for 
interfaces in general. In 2000, TVO drew up a gen-
eral plan entitled “Valvomon visio” regarding the 
development of control rooms at the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 NPP units. This plan, together with the de-
sign basis of the control rooms, have been further 
specified and developed during the past decade.
In conjunction with the preliminary safety re-
view, STUK found that the procedures associated 
with the planning and implementation of control 
room modification work should be further specified 
and updated with regard to the design/planning 
process and procedures for organisation. In April 
2009, TVO submitted a plan to STUK with a view 
to improving the procedures.
There have not been any significant changes 
during the current operating licence period in 
functions of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units as-
sociated with actuation, control and supervision of 
safety functions. The reactor water level measure-
ment system consists of four redundant trains, the 
operation of any two of them being sufficient to 
implement the safety function. Each train is based 
on pressure differential measurements. STUK has 
required that the diversity principle should be ap-
plied to the design of reactor water level measure-
ments in compliance with the principles of section 
7 of the Nuclear Energy Act. The requirement of 
section 14 of Government Decree 733/2008 can be 
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deemed to be met when section 32, applicable to 
plants in operation, is taken into account. During 
the current operating licence period, TVO has, in 
its reports submitted to STUK, discussed the pos-
sibilities for backing up the currently used level 
measurement system by a measurement facility 
utilising some other principle for implementing the 
protection function. On the basis of these studies, 
STUK required, in its related decision, that the 
main alternative set out in TVO’s plan is put into 
operation starting from the annual maintenance in 
2012. STUK further required TVO to analyse, by 
the end of 2010, the reactor water level measure-
ment diversification needs related to the flashing 
of the water surface.
In conjunction with the periodic safety review, 
STUK required TVO to submit a report regarding 
the risks associated with the current shutdown 
and start-up procedures with regard to reactor 
water level swelling and entry of water into the 
steam pipes. STUK further required an analysis 
regarding the need for modifying the plant or the 
shutdown and start-up procedures so that the risks 
caused by the swelling phenomenon are minimised. 
The risk of water level swelling is not only associ-
ated with scheduled start-ups and shutdowns but 
also with repairs carried out at reduced power. It is 
also possible in these situations that the unneces-
sary opening of the bypass valve occurs so quickly 
that flash boiling cannot be prevented by operator 
actions.
Should water rise into the steam pipes, it might 
endanger the integrity of the reactor coolant circuit 
and the containment building. The rising of water 
into the steam pipes is currently prevented so that 
when the water level is high, the steam pipe is au-
tomatically closed, stopping the rise in the water 
level. however, the protection required for prevent-
ing the phenomenon (a signal of a high water level 
in the reactor) was not designed in compliance with 
the diversity principle, as already discussed above. 
The report submitted by TVO states that analyses 
indicate that water will not rise into the steam 
pipes if the isolation valve closing command comes 
following a high reactor water level as planned. 
If this signal is absent, water will rise up to the 
steam pipes. In its report, TVO did not consider 
it necessary to change the shutdown and start-up 
procedures of the plant, nor did it see any need for 
plant modifications.
STUK takes the view that with respect to the 
water level swelling phenomenon, the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units do not comply with the level 
of safety required of new reactors in Government 
Decree 733/2008 because ensuring the primary 
circuit and containment integrity is not diversified 
regarding the scram and isolation signal of a high 
water level in the reactor. TVO must, pursuant to 
the principle of continuous improvement set out 
in section 7 of the Nuclear Energy Act, implement 
the plant modifications for improving the safety 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in a situation 
where the turbine bypass valves suddenly and 
unneccessarily open. Before the plant modifica-
tions are implemented, TVO must ensure, through 
administrative measures, that the plant units are 
not operated, without a particular reason and in 
addition to short durations during start-ups and 
shutdowns, with the isolation valves open at power 
levels where a sudden opening of the turbine by-
pass valve would increase the risk of water rising 
up into the steam lines.
During the current operating licence period, 
TVO has initiated the work for improving the 
Safety Analysis Report so that it would comply 
with the requirements of Guide yVl 2.0. The work 
has also began in this context for further specifying 
the descriptions of safety functions, starting with 
the reactor protection system. The further defini-
tion of safety functions and design bases is also an 
important part of the preliminary planning work 
aimed at upgrading the reactor and protection au-
tomation (see section 2.3 on ageing management). 
The purpose of this work is the gradual moderni-
sation of protection automation. The project is ex-
pected to begin during 2015–2016.
The requirement set out in section 19 of 
Government Decree 733/2008 is not met with re-
gard to the emergency control post. The application 
of section 19 to nuclear power plants already in 
operation is stipulated in section 32, which states 
“The following shall not be applicable to a nuclear 
power plant for which an operating licence was is-
sued	prior	to	the	entry	into	force	of	this	Decree:	[...]	
and section 19(3), unless their application is justified 
with respect to the technical solutions of the nuclear 
power plant in question, under the principle laid 
down in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.”
In December 2007, TVO submitted a prelimi-
nary plan regarding the implementation of an 
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emergency control room to STUK in keeping with 
the implementation decision of Guide yVl 5.5. In 
conjunction with the periodic safety review, STUK 
required TVO to revise and assess its action plans 
so that it would be possible to implement a limited 
emergency control room function during the cur-
rent operating licence period. It may not necessar-
ily be possible to implement the functionality of 
such an emergency control room in its full extent 
to respond to all required threats. however, achiev-
ing a preliminary functionality will improve the 
current implementation of emergency control by 
concentrating functions to one location. It may 
also be possible to implement structural modifica-
tions early in the schedule. These monitoring and 
control functions can be later transferred to the 
final emergency control room, and at that time, the 
level of protection and functionality will also have 
to be brought to the current level requirements for 
emergency control rooms to the extent possible at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units.
In its response, TVO submitted that the emer-
gency control room would be implemented in two 
stages. In the first stage, the functions available in 
the current emergency control room are to be im-
plemented in the new, separate emergency control 
room. The preliminary planning for the implemen-
tation will be completed during 2009, and the re-
quirements will be specified and the principal plan 
produced during 2010. Modification of the facilities 
for emergency control room use and the equipment 
installations required for the functions would be 
completed during 2011–2014. The second stage 
of implementation of the emergency control room 
will be related to the upgrade of reactor operation 
and protection automation. In conjunction with 
this upgrading work, the implementation of addi-
tional functions enabled by the new equipment will 
be planned for the emergency control room. This 
would take place during 2016–2019.
The conclusion is that the supervision and 
control functions of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP 
units can be deemed to comply with the require-
ments set out in section 19 of Government Decree 
733/2008 when section 32 of the decree, applica-
ble to plants in operation, is taken into account. 
STUK will monitor the emergency control room 
implementation project and the diversification of 
reactor water level measurements in the course of 
its regulatory oversight. TVO must also implement 
the plant modifications for improving the safety 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 NPP units in a situation 
where the turbine bypass valves suddenly and un-
necessarily open.
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5 Operation of the nuclear power plant 
(Government Decree 733/2008)
According to section 7 f of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
safety shall take priority during the construction 
and operation of a nuclear facility. The holder of a 
construction	licence	[…]	shall	be	responsible	for	the	
nuclear	 facility’s	 construction	 in	 accordance	 with	
safety requirements. Moreover, the condition and 
operating experiences of any nuclear facility shall 
be systematically monitored and assessed.
5.1 Section 23, Operating
The control room of the nuclear power plant shall 
be constantly manned by a sufficient number of op-
erators aware of the state of the plant, systems and 
components. Further, the control and supervision 
of a nuclear power plant shall utilise written in-
structions that correspond to the current structure 
and state of the plant. Written orders and related 
instructions shall be provided for the maintenance 
and repair of components.
For operational occurrences and accidents, in-
structions suitable for the identification and control 
of incidents shall be available.
Operational measures concerning the nuclear 
power plant, as well as events having an impact 
on safety, shall be documented so that they can be 
analysed afterwards.
TVO has specified the minimum staffing of the 
control room in the Technical Specifications (Tech 
Spec). The shift supervisor carries the respon-
sibility for following the regulations. The Guide 
yVl 1.6 refers to the qualifications of nuclear 
power plant operators. The Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) participates in oral hear-
ings of operators arranged in compliance with the 
guide. The tasks of shift personnel are specified in 
the operating manual.
The shift personnel monitor the control room’s 
incoming information on the operating state of 
systems and equipment as well as the conditions 
of rooms and any deviations in them. Furthermore, 
the shift personnel regularly perform inspection 
rounds of the plant. The plant’s surveillance cam-
era system is used in monitoring facilities which 
cannot be accessed during load operation or to 
which access is restricted. Such facilities include, 
for example, the containment and turbine build-
ings.
The Tech Spec specify the conditions pertain-
ing to the operability of structures, equipment and 
systems important to safety, the highest allowed 
limit values and periodic tests. Any deviations ob-
served will be handled in the manner specified in 
the Tech Spec and required by the operating and 
emergency procedures. Reports on failures and 
corrective measures are included in the work order 
system. STUK monitors the functionality of the 
work order system and supervises compliance with 
the Tech Spec by using local inspectors, performing 
inspections of the plant and supervising reports 
submitted to STUK.
The procedures used in operations are based on 
written guidelines as well as in operation orders 
and operating instructions drawn up when neces-
sary. The Tech Spec are dealt with in more detail 
in chapter 5.3. TVO has compiled the guides into 
manuals, such as operating manuals and mainte-
nance manuals. Updating and inspection methods 
and responsibilities for the guides have been de-
fined. Manuals and updates significant for nuclear 
and radiation safety are also submitted to STUK. 
STUK reviews the manuals to ensure that they are 
up-to-date and sufficient in connection with docu-
ment updates and during inspections complying 
with the periodic inspection programme. An opera-
tion order is prepared when, for example, changing 
the operating state or power level of the plant are 
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necessary, or when actions relating to the reactor 
and nuclear fuel are performed. An operation in-
struction is prepared for deviating procedures that 
will not become permanent procedures.
There is an emergency operating procedure for 
identifying and managing transient operating con-
ditions and accidents. TVO has drawn up three new 
emergency operating procedures after the moderni-
sation of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units modernisation project (MODE) implemented 
in the late 1990s. Furthermore, an emergency op-
erating procedure for partial scram and its recov-
ery is being prepared. No new emergency operating 
procedures have been drawn up during the current 
operating license period because there has been no 
need for such new procedures.
Since the power upgrades of the plants, TVO 
has not implemented any systematic procedure 
validation. STUK is of the opinion that the current 
best practices require procedure-specific justifica-
tion documentation for emergency operating proce-
dures that include the procedure strategy, assump-
tions used when drawing up the technical features 
of procedure, references to analyses made when 
drawing up the procedure and other background 
information related to the procedure. Procedure 
verification and validation must be implemented 
in a systematic and comprehensive manner. The 
validation must be documented and assessed to 
ensure that the procedures are functional. TVO 
must take action in order to correct the status of 
the procedures.
Operations and events with safety implications 
must be documented in compliance with the oper-
ating manual in the control room operating manu-
al, the reactor manual and shift reports. TVO has 
been using an electronic control room record since 
2009. The control room personnel collect all data 
related to transients in the operational transient 
report form and submit the data to the operational 
section’s manager, who will draw up an operational 
transient report. Guide yVl 1.5 includes instruc-
tions on event reporting. The requirements of this 
guide are included in the TVO operating manual. 
STUK’ resident inspector supervises the opera-
tions of plant units. Furthermore, STUK reviews 
operations in periodic inspections, for example. 
TVO submits regular and transient-specific reports 
to STUK.
The conclusion to the above is that the opera-
tions of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units have been implemented in the manner re-
ferred to in section 733 of the Government Decree 
733/2008. however, STUK requires the justifica-
tion documentation for emergency operating pro-
cedures and an assessment of the sufficiency of the 
validation of procedures.
5.2 Section 24 Operational experience 
feedback and safety research
Nuclear power plant operational experience feed-
back shall be collected and safety research results 
monitored, and both assessed for the purpose of 
enhancing safety. Safety-significant operational 
events shall be investigated for the purpose of iden-
tifying the root causes as well as defining and im-
plementing the corrective measures. Improvements 
in technical safety, resulting from safety research, 
shall be taken into account to the extent justified on 
the basis of the principles laid down in Section 7 a 
of the Nuclear Energy Act.
According to section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the safety of nuclear energy use shall be main-
tained at as high a level as practically possible. For 
the further development of safety, measures shall be 
implemented that can be considered justified con-
sidering operating experience and safety research 
and advances in science and technology.
5.2.1 Operating experience from the 
current operating licence period
In accordance with Guide yVl 1.5, a licensee must 
provide a special report for any events, failures, 
deficiencies or problems that will essentially influ-
ence the nuclear power plant’s safety, the safety of 
the plant’s staff or radiation safety in the plant en-
vironment. Other event reports to be submitted to 
STUK include operational transient reports, event 
reports and root cause reports. TVO has taken into 
account the requirements of Guide yVl 1.5 by 
drawing up operating manual procedures on re-
ports to be submitted during the operation of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. During 1999–2008, 
a total of 49 events requiring special reports took 
place in the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units.
TVO enters all events in an operating experi-
ence database (Opex). The reports pertaining to an 
event include, for example, the cause of the event 
and the corrective measures. TVO monitors the im-
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plementation of corrective measures with a man-
agement and reporting system (Kelpo). STUK as-
sesses the correctness of corrective measures based 
on reports submitted by TVO and supervises the 
progress of such measures in operations-related 
inspections complying with the periodic inspection 
programme. 
The safety implications of nuclear power plant 
events are illustrated using the International 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The scale includes 
seven levels, the lowermost of which (1–3) describe 
events that have deteriorated safety and the upper-
most (4–7) describe accidents. In addition, level 0 is 
used for indicating that the event has no nuclear or 
radiation safety significance. The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units did not experience any 
events exceeding INES level 1 during 1999–2008 
(23 events). Figure 1 includes the number of INES 
level 1 events, and Figure 2 includes the annual 
number of events requiring special reports during 
the current operating licence period.
Based on the number of events, the years 2003 
and 2008 stand out from the current operating 
licence period. The significant issues in 2003 were 
the common issues influencing the events, such as 
failures to comply with procedures, errors in man-
agement of periodic testing, errors in monitoring of 
the plant facility and errors in identifying the re-
quirements of the Technical Specifications. In 2008, 
embrittlement by ageing was detected in some 
emergency diesel seals. If allowed to continue, this 
could have prevented the simultaneous start-up 
of several diesel generators. The seals in question 
were not included in the regular maintenance 
programme;	 instead,	 the	problem	was	detected	 in	
connection with periodic start-up testing. A power 
failure also occurred at Olkiluoto, proving that 
changes carried out during the latest reactor power 
increase did not result in the desired reliability of 
electrical systems. TVO ordered an evaluation by 
outside experts on the company decision-making 
process, the causes of the events and the safety 
culture for both of these years. The evaluators gave 
recommendations on measures to improve the 
situation, and TVO took these recommendations in 
account in its activities. Some of the measures are 
still being implemented.
The status of several factors affecting safety, op-
erability and quality of operations are monitored at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant using indicators. 
The load factors of the plant units have been good 
in international comparison. From 1999 to 2008 
the load factor was 93.7–98.3% for the Olkiluoto 1 
nuclear power plant unit and 93.7–96.9% for the 
Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant unit. Relatively 
few	reactor	fast	closures	have	occurred;	during	the	
current operating licence period, there have been 
a total of twelve fast closures due to different rea-
sons (six for each plant unit).
On the basis of the indicators describing the 
inoperability of safety systems, the operation of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has been controlled 
and safe. Safety systems have not been inoperable 
to any significant extent due to faults, mainte-
nance or other similar reasons. The indicators also 
provide follow-up data on occupational safety, fires 
and common cause failures, among other things.
In summary, it can be stated that none of the 
operational events at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant has essentially impaired plant safety or 
caused significant radioactive releases out of the 
ordinary into the environment. TVO has initiated 
measures to develop the safety culture due to the 
events in 2007 and 2008.
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Figure 1. Annual number of INES level 1 events in the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units during the 
current operating licence period.
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Figure 2. The annual number of special reports submit-
ted for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
during the current operating licence period.
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5.2.2 Operatingl experience feedback
Guide yVl 1.11 includes requirements on the 
utilisation of operating experience feedback from 
nuclear power plants. TVO has taken these re-
quirements into account by drawing up operat-
ing manual procedures on handling operational 
experience feedback at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant. STUK verifies the compliance with these 
requirements in periodic inspection programme in-
spections of operation and international operating 
experience feedback. Furthermore, STUK assesses 
TVO’s operational experience feedback activities 
when inspecting event reports. STUK has required 
that TVO pays more attention in specifying the 
schedules for corrective measures and responsibili-
ties as well as more systematic monitoring of event 
recurrence. 
The general objective of operating experience 
feedback is to create and maintain procedures that 
enable learning from experience obtained. TVO’s 
operating experience feedback activities cover ex-
periences obtained at TVO’s own plants and other 
plants, as well as systematic utilisation of the les-
sons learned. TVO has an operating experience 
feedback team (KÄKRy) which collects information 
on events and observations from several sources 
and assesses their significance for different techni-
cal sectors. The team meets every two weeks. 
The most important sources of information 
for events of other plants are the owners group 
for Nordic BWR operators ERFATOM, which 
screens, analyses and provides to its members 
operating experience feedback data as well as 
the reports of WANO (the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators), KSU (Kärnkraftsäkerhet och 
Utbildning AB) and the loviisa nuclear power 
plant.
The conclusion to the above is that the operat-
ing experience feedback activities of the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units has been imple-
mented in the manner referred to in section 24 of 
the Government Decree 733/2008. 
5.2.3 Safety research
TVO monitors safety research results by means of 
participating in the activities of support groups for 
different research areas of the national SAFIR2010 
research programme on nuclear power plant safety. 
TVO also uses the SAFIR2010 research programme 
to monitor the results of international research 
programmes. Cooperation between Nordic nuclear 
power plant operators is organised through the 
Nordic Owners Group (NOG). The plant supplier 
(Westinghouse Electric Sweden Ab) is strongly in-
volved in this cooperation, which aims to find solu-
tions especially for problems or defects connected 
with the boiling water reactors designed by ASEA. 
TVO has funded research activities also through 
Nordic reactor safety research (Nordisk kärnsäk-
erhetsforskning, NKS).
Research and participation in research 
projects is coordinated by the research and de-
velopment office of the TVO Nuclear Technology 
Unit. Furthermore, the safety office of the Nuclear 
Technology Unit, which keeps the design bases of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
up-to-date, monitors R&D and assesses the results 
achieved in the TVO plant units.
The conclusion to the above is that the safety 
research result monitoring of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units has been implemented in 
the manner referred to in section 24 of Government 
Decree 733/2008.
5.3 Section 25, Technical Specifications
The Technical Specifications of a nuclear power 
plant shall include the technical and administra-
tive	requirements	for	ensuring	the	plant’s	operation	
in compliance with design bases and safety analy-
ses. The requirements for ensuring the operability 
of systems, structures and components important to 
safety, as well as the limitations that are to be ob-
served in the event of equipment failure, shall also 
be presented in the Technical Specifications. The 
plant shall be operated in compliance with these 
requirements and restrictions, and compliance with 
them shall be monitored and any deviations re-
ported.
Taken together, the Technical Specifications and 
plant procedures define the limits and operating 
procedures for the safe operation of the nuclear 
power plant in different operational conditions.
TVO has Technical Specifications (Tech Spec) 
for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
as well as the interim storage for spent fuel (KPA 
storage). These documents are maintained to com-
ply with any changes occurring at the plants, in 
the organisation or based on operating experience. 
The Tech Spec specify limits for different operat-
ing states by means of process parameters, provide 
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operation restrictions for a variety of failures and 
include the requirements for periodic testing in 
compliance with the Tech Spec. The compliance 
with the Tech Spec is monitored, and deviations 
are reported in compliance with Guide yVl 1.5.
TVO systematically maintains the Tech Spec. 
Furthermore, the requirements included in the 
Tech Spec have been assessed using a probabilis-
tic risk analysis. TVO has submitted more than 
70 change proposals to STUK for approval during 
the current operating licence period. STUK has 
approved most of the change proposals, although 
it has required specifications or posed further re-
quirements in the proposed Tech Spec changes in 
some cases.
Based on its inspections and observations, 
STUK has stated that the Tech Spec need to be 
developed in order to ensure the document justifi-
cation, clarity and unambiguousness. In connection 
with its periodic safety review, TVO submitted a 
Tech Spec development plan to STUK (memoran-
dum 130845, “Development of Ol1/Ol2 Technical 
Specifications – status review and further plan-
ning”). In accordance with the development plan, 
TVO will review, supplement and harmonise all 
the Tech Spec requirement and justification chap-
ters by the end of 2009. The plan is to have the 
Tech Spec draft version assessed by the operation-
al shifts and finalised by the persons in charge and 
the development team by the end of 2010. The plan 
is to initiate official processing of the Tech Spec at 
the beginning of 2011. STUK will monitor planned 
progress of the development work in connection 
with, for example, its inspection programme.
The conclusion to the above is that the Technical 
Specifications of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units and the interim storage for 
spent fuel have been implemented in the manner 
referred to in section 25 of Government Decree 
733/2008. Based on its assessment, STUK states 
that the Technical Specifications are up-to-date, 
and the Tech Spec contents are acceptable from 
a safety viewpoint. STUK has approved the Tech 
Spec development plan and will monitor imple-
mentation of the plan.
5.4 Section 26, Condition monitoring 
and maintenance
The nuclear power plant shall have a condition 
monitoring and maintenance programme for ensur-
ing the integrity and reliable operation of systems, 
structures and components. This programme shall 
define inspections, testing, maintenance, replace-
ments and other procedures for controlling oper-
ability and the impacts of the operating environ-
ment.
5.4.1 Maintenance
The maintenance of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units covers preventive and corrective 
maintenance as well as the planning and imple-
mentation of modifications, spare part maintenance, 
shutdown activities and related quality control. 
Preventive maintenance aims at promoting the 
safety of the plant units, preventing any compo-
nent malfunctions threatening availability, improv-
ing operating reliability of the components and 
scheduling the necessary maintenance measures. 
Corrective maintenance restores components into 
operational condition after a fault.
Guides yVl 1.8, yVl 2.0, yVl 5.2 and yVl 5.5 
include the requirements for modifications, repairs 
and preventive maintenance which TVO has in-
cluded, for example, in its maintenance and modi-
fication manuals. In addition to the procedures, 
TVO uses IT systems to manage and control main-
tenance. Such IT systems include, for example, the 
preventive maintenance data system, the modifica-
tion management system and the work order sys-
tem. The Technical Specifications define conditions 
and limitations for safety-critical systems, devices 
and structures as well as their periodic testing 
schedule.
In addition to the measures included in the 
preventive maintenance programme, TVO moni-
tors systems, components and facilities during 
regular operation and daily inspections. Some of 
the most critical components, such as reactor cool-
ant pumps and the turbine, are equipped with 
continuously operating condition monitoring sys-
tems. Inspections concerning the operability and 
condition of components are also carried out as 
required on the basis of the accumulated operat-
ing experience and advancement of technological 
knowledge. The most important sources of operat-
ing experience in this respect are Swedish boiling 
water plants and global communication systems.
Maintenance activities are prioritised using, 
among other things, the maintenance classification 
of equipment units and modifications. For example, 
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equipment units are divided into four maintenance 
categories on the basis of the significance of faults 
in the components. Category 1 units are retained 
in operational order at all times, category 2 units 
are allowed some limited unavailability, category 3 
units are allowed financially justifiable preventive 
maintenance activities, and category 4 units are 
not included within the scope of planned preven-
tive maintenance. TVO has specified unit respon-
sibility areas and persons in charge for each area. 
These persons collect operational experience data 
on the units and assess the necessary development 
measures. Annual unit responsibility reports are 
compiled, and a summary report of these is submit-
ted to STUK.
During the current operating licence period, 
TVO has assessed and developed its maintenance. 
The equipment units were divided into the above-
mentioned four maintenance categories during 
1990–2000. A maintenance development project 
(KUTEVA) was implemented during 2002–2004. 
The project consisted of analysing and document-
ing the preventive maintenance tasks and pro-
grammes for the category 1, 2 and 3 units in a 
maintenance analysis IT system created for this 
purpose. An additional project implemented in 
2005 consisted of specifying the analysis of mainte-
nance category 3 units.
STUK supervises condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as modifications and repairs in 
regular inspections. The inspections aim at ensuring 
that the power company has sufficient resources, 
such as competent personnel, instructions, a spare 
part and material storage and tools, required for 
sufficiently effective implementation of condition 
monitoring and maintenance measures.
In 2001, STUK performed a study of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units re-
garding measures connected with the lP steam 
turbine control and shut-off valves. The STUK 
study report gave TVO several recommendations 
on improving the management system, such as 
procedures in place for modifications. In 2008, TVO 
performed a safety culture survey, and the survey 
team gave additional proposals regarding the mod-
ification procedures. The assessment team stated 
that the significance of plant design bases must be 
stressed in modifications, and that ensuring oper-
ability and the scope of test programmes in the 
case of plant modifications require more attention. 
Furthermore, the team stated that there are no up-
to-date high-quality maintenance procedures for 
some components, and thus the team recommend-
ed that TVO should study the scope and currency 
of maintenance procedures, particularly those for 
equipment critical to plant safety.
IEC standards on automation design that en-
tered into force at the beginning of the decade and 
Guide yVl 5.5 require a staged design model with 
stage-by-stage verification and validation of differ-
ent requirement levels. It has been observed that 
the reconciliation of the design process traditional-
ly used for power plant modifications and the more 
recent automation requirements still requires de-
velopment. In its periodic inspection programme 
review, STUK required that TVO submits a plan 
for updating the automation design and automa-
tion modification management procedure by the 
end of 2009.
The measurement accuracy maintenance sys-
tems of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units that are included in the scope of the periodic 
preventive maintenance procedure include sepa-
rate measuring instruments, most of the process 
measuring instruments as well as other measur-
ing systems, such as mechanical, chemical and 
radiation parameter measuring systems. The pro-
cedures in place for comprehensive management 
of the measuring accuracy maintenance system 
still require development. In its inspection pro-
gramme review, STUK required that TVO include 
procedures to ensure and maintain the accuracy of 
measuring instruments in its operations manual. 
STUK has requested TVO to implement the change 
by the end of 2009.
Defects in modification planning and imple-
mentation as well as the management of design 
bases were observed in connection with the op-
erational events that occurred in the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 nuclear power plant units in 2007 and 
2008. Examples of such defects include defects 
observed in the sealing of pipework penetrations 
in the emergency injection system’s pump rooms in 
2008, nitrogen leaks due to damage to the sealing 
material of the fast closure system valves in 2007, 
and recurrence of such leaks in 2009, unqualified 
rectifier fuses installed during a director upgrad-
ing project connected to the DC power systems in 
the new millennium, and problems with the appli-
cability of lED indicator lamps that were used to 
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replace glow lamps in the 2008 preventive mainte-
nance package.
The conclusion to the above is that the main-
tenance of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units has been implemented in the manner 
referred to in section 26 of Government Decree 
733/2008. Several areas requiring development 
have been observed during the current operating 
licence period. STUK supervises the implemen-
tation of TVO’s measures in connection with its 
oversight.
5.4.2 In-service inspections
The condition of the pressure-bearing compo-
nents of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units is ensured by means of in-service inspec-
tions. Primary circuit components are subjected to 
in-service inspections performed during outages 
at regular intervals using non-destructive testing 
methods in accordance with Guide yVl 3.8. The 
results of the in-service inspections are compared 
with the results of earlier inspections and pre-serv-
ice inspections performed prior to commissioning.
The in-service inspection programmes are sub-
mitted to STUK for approval prior to each round of 
inspections. The programmes and the related in-
spection procedures are modified when necessary, 
taking into account the development of industry 
requirements and standards, the development of 
inspection techniques, inspection experience, and 
operating experience from nuclear power plants in 
Finland and elsewhere.
Attempts have been made to focus the inspec-
tions on areas where faults are most likely to 
emerge. These include, for example, items suscep-
tible to fatigue due to temperature variations or 
items susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. The 
selection of inspection items is under continuous 
development. For this purpose, a risk-informed in-
service inspection procedure is being developed for 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
Inspections and inspection schedules will be opti-
mised on the basis of risk-informed methods when 
the next inspection period programmes are drawn 
up.
The frequency of the non-destructive examina-
tions performed at regular intervals is usually 
ten years. The inspection frequency for items sus-
ceptible to thermal fatigue is three years, and the 
inspection frequency for items susceptible to stress 
corrosion cracking is three or five years.
Guide yVl 3.8 and the latest edition of the 
ASME Code, Section xI are used as the accept-
ance criteria for in-service inspection programmes 
and procedures. A qualification system complying 
with European practice has been developed for 
in-service inspections. All ultrasound and eddy 
current inspection systems to be used in in-service 
inspections complying with Guide yVl 3.8 will be 
qualified. Most of the qualifications have already 
been performed and approved by STUK.
In addition to the aforementioned inspections, 
physical inspections that concern the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are performed 
at regular intervals in accordance with Finnish 
pressure equipment legislation. These inspections 
are the full inspection, internal inspection and 
operational inspection, and they include non-de-
structive testing as well as pressure and leak 
tests. Inspections concerning pipelines have been 
defined in the system-specific condition monitor-
ing programmes. These in-service inspections are 
discussed in Guides yVl 3.0, yVl 3.3, yVl 5.3, 
yVl 5.4 and yVl 5.7. The in-service inspection 
programmes of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units fulfil the requirements specified 
in the yVl guides with regard to the number of 
inspections and inspection technique.
The reliability of the non-destructive exami-
nation methods for primary circuit pipelines and 
components has been essentially improved since 
the commissioning of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nu-
clear power plant units. The implementation of the 
qualification system for in-service inspections and 
the introduction of the risk-informed in-service 
inspection programme are significant development 
targets for operations.
The in-service inspection procedure for safety-
critical electrical equipment and systems is based 
on statutory regulations and guidelines, recom-
mendations of the plant supplier and equipment 
manufacturers as well as operational experiences 
from the equipment and systems. The in-service 
inspection procedure is controlled by means of the 
plant’s administrative procedures and IT systems 
(such as the work order system). The tasks to be 
performed on each item and the applicable work, 
procedures and approval criteria are specified in 
the maintenance procedures. The procedures are 
updated every four years or whenever required. 
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The in-service inspection of safety-important items, 
as well as the frequency of these inspections, is de-
fined in the Technical Specifications, which TVO 
inspects every four years.
A considerable part of the safety-critical in-
service inspections of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units is performed in connection with 
annual maintenance outages, at which point STUK 
oversees the tests by inspecting the testing proto-
cols, the comprehensiveness of the tests and the 
appropriateness of the testing procedures. STUK 
also oversees the status of the test procedures in 
connection with inspections complying with the 
periodic inspection programme.
The conclusion to the above is that the in-serv-
ice inspections of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
have been implemented in the manner referred to 
in section 26 of Government Decree 733/2008.
5.5 Section 27, Radiation monitoring 
and control of releases of 
radioactive materials
The radiation levels of nuclear power plant rooms 
and the activity concentrations of indoor air and 
the gases and liquids in the systems shall be meas-
ured, releases of radioactive materials from the 
plant monitored, and concentrations in the environ-
ment controlled.
Detailed requirements relating to section 27 
of the Government decree are set out in Guides 
yVl 5.5, yVl 7.6, yVl 7.7 and yVl 7.11.
The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
have in place systems for collecting and storing the 
majority of radioactive materials released into and 
residing in the plant’s process systems. Only a mi-
nor part of the radioactive materials are released 
into the environment. The radioactive releases oc-
cur in gaseous or particulate form through the vent 
stack into the atmosphere, as well as in the form of 
particles dissolved or mixed in water entering the 
seawater tunnel and further into the sea environ-
ment.
The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant includes 
continuously operating radiation monitoring sys-
tems for external radiation of the rooms as well 
as for processes, releases and the environment. In 
addition to fixed installed radiation and radioactiv-
ity measuring systems, there is a large number of 
portable radiation monitoring devices. Sampling 
and laboratory measurements are also used as 
control measures.
Projects in which the radiation monitoring sys-
tems are modernised have been and will be im-
plemented at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units. The largest project that was started 
in 2006 consists of the modernisation of the plant 
units’ fixed installed 550 radiation monitoring sys-
tem. As part of the project, the radiation monitoring 
systems are also assessed and modernised into a 
digital I&C system, if necessary. This will improve 
the reactor scram function and the containment 
isolation function in the case of significant nuclear 
fuel damage. The project has been implemented 
more slowly than planned because supplements to 
the reports pertaining to the equipment functions 
have been necessary.
When the continuously operated radioactivity 
monitors are replaced, the release measuring sys-
tem will be made redundant to prepare for a severe 
accident. In accordance with new requirements 
from STUK, stack iodine and particle monitoring 
will be implemented, after the upgrade, by using 
continuously operated radiation monitoring in ad-
dition to sampling and laboratory analyses.
There are efficient modern gate monitors and 
double limit arrangements at the staff exit.
STUK has inspected the procedures regard-
ing radiation monitoring, sampling and laboratory 
analyses, and it regularly supervises these func-
tions.
An extensive environmental radiation monitor-
ing programme, approved by STUK, is being im-
plemented in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. According to this programme, the po-
tential migration of radioactive materials is being 
continuously monitored by analysing the radionu-
clide concentrations in foodstuffs produced in the 
area surrounding the plant and in other samples 
indicating the migration of releases. The results 
obtained from the monitoring of the environment 
corroborate the monitoring of radioactive releases 
carried out at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
The monitoring programme has been updated for 
2008–2011.
The monitoring programme comprises approxi-
mately 300 samples per year. Samples include 
milk, meat, fish, crops and vegetables, as well as 
water and airborne aerosols. Samples are also 
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taken from the land and water from such indicator 
organisms that very effectively accumulate ra-
dioactive materials from their living environment. 
The nuclides that are most important in terms 
of human radiation exposure are analysed when 
studying the samples: gamma emitters, such as 
60Co, 131I and 137Cs, beta emitters ³h and 90Sr and 
alpha emitters, such as 238Pu, 239Pu and 240Pu.
The radioactive releases from the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant have been clearly below the 
release limits set out (Chapter 3.2). For airborne 
releases, the predominant releases, expressed in 
terms of activity, are those of noble gases, 14C and 
tritium, and tritium for marine releases. The re-
leased nuclides observed in the environment have 
been activated corrosion products (such as 60Co) 
and tritium. Radioactive materials originating 
from the nuclear power plant have been observed 
in the soil environment mainly during annual out-
ages in air, fallout and rainwater samples as well 
as regularly in indicator samples taken from the 
water environment. The contents are very low and 
insignificant in terms of the surrounding popula-
tion or the environment. Radioactive materials 
originating from the Chernobyl accident have also 
been predominant in the environmental samples 
of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Although the 
radioactivity concentrations in the environmental 
samples are small, the measurement results for 
the marine environment indicator organisms and 
sinking matter show a decreasing trend of 60Co 
concentrations.
An automatic monitoring system for external 
radiation in the environment is located in the area 
surrounding the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, the 
purpose of which is to rapidly provide information 
about the possible changes in the environment oc-
curring in a potential abnormal condition. The sys-
tem equipment and data communication system 
were completely upgraded in 2008. Furthermore, 
three external radiation dose rate meters will be 
implemented in the power plant area before com-
missioning of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant 
unit. The instrumentation of the weather measure-
ment system located near the plant and used for 
assessing the spread of a radioactive release in the 
atmosphere was upgraded in 2008.
Radioactive release monitoring results and the 
results of the environmental radiation monitoring 
programme are reported to STUK in the quar-
terly and annual reports in compliance with Guide 
yVl 7.8.
The conclusion on the above is that the releases 
of radioactive materials and their concentrations 
within the plant and in the environment are ef-
fectively monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant in the manner referred to in section 27 of 
Government Decree 733/2008.
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6 Organisation and personnel 
(Government Decree 733/2008)
6.1 Section 28, Safety culture
When designing, constructing, operating and de-
commissioning a nuclear power plant, a good 
safety culture shall be maintained. The decisions 
and activities of the management of all organisa-
tions participating in the abovementioned activi-
ties shall reflect its commitment to safety-promoting 
operating methods and solutions. Personnel shall 
be motivated to perform responsible work and an 
open working atmosphere shall be promoted in the 
working community to encourage the identification, 
reporting and elimination of factors endangering 
safety. Personnel shall be given the opportunity to 
contribute to the continuous enhancement of safety.
The significance of a safety culture as an im-
portant factor affecting safety has been widely ac-
knowledged since the 1990s. The concept of safety 
culture was introduced shortly after the Chernobyl 
accident by the IAEA International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group (INSAG). The development of a 
safety culture is a continuous learning process. The 
safety culture prevailing in organisations does not 
remain unchanged but is constantly changing for 
internal and external reasons. Thus, proper proce-
dures for continuous assessment and development 
of the safety culture must be used. In compliance 
with the safety culture principles, it is important 
that all organisations which influence safety suffi-
ciently stress all factors influencing safety in all of 
their activities. An advanced safety culture shares 
many goals with quality assurance programmes, 
management practices and development of the at-
mosphere at work.
TVO defines safety culture in compliance with 
the INSAG 4 document of the IAEA:
”Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics 
and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, 
nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance.”
TVO has documented its high level of commit-
ment to safety culture in the general section of its 
management system.
TVO plans to retain the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nu-
clear power plant units in operation for a minimum 
of 60 years. In order to achieve this objective, the 
plants must be retained in good condition, which 
requires staff alertness in reacting to signs of age-
ing and any risks observed as well as in preventing 
such risks.
During the current operating licence period, 
TVO has assessed its safety culture through sever-
al methods. The safety culture has been regularly 
discussed in safety group meetings. Furthermore, 
personnel surveys and the Peer Review method 
and Early Warning survey of the World Association 
of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have been utilised. 
After these measures were implemented, TVO 
developed, in cooperation with the IAEA, a safety 
culture self-assessment procedure and tool.
TVO implemented a safety culture self-assess-
ment in compliance with the IAEA model in 2004 
and 2007. The self-assessment results show that 
TVO’s safety culture is of a good level based on the 
IAEA scale. At present, TVO has two focus areas in 
safety culture development: learning organisation 
and	 zero	 tolerance,	 meaning	 that	 no	 deviations	
from safety-related requirements are allowed. A 
learning organisation is at the third and most ad-
vanced level of the IAEA safety culture assessment 
scale.
Another safety culture survey was implemented 
in the autumn of 2008 on the basis of a STUK ini-
tiative. In this survey, external experts were used. 
Based on the survey results, TVO states that the 
status of most of the safety culture aspects is as 
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required from a nuclear power company. The most 
important aspects requiring development are en-
suring competence, developing the handling proc-
ess of safety-related issues, and encouragement 
of safety reporting. Furthermore, the survey team 
stated that the internal and external resources for 
abnormal conditions are insufficient in some plac-
es. The survey team also stated in its recommen-
dations that project management of modifications 
requires extensive competence and TVO should 
study the sufficiency of its available competence, 
particularly in terms of the design bases, as well 
as take action to ensure competence in these areas. 
STUK already addressed the same issue when 
the operating licence was renewed in 1998. STUK 
supervises the implementation of the measures in 
the periodic inspection programme inspections, for 
example. The results of the safety culture surveys 
are also discussed in chapters 2.5, 5.2.1, 5.4.1 and 
6.3.
TVO also regularly implements job satisfaction 
surveys. According to the results of these surveys, 
the atmosphere at TVO is good when compared 
with the national comparison data collected by the 
party that performed the survey.
During the operational licence period, TVO has 
arranged several safety culture events and train-
ing sessions for its staff, and the safety culture 
is addressed in introductory training provided to 
all persons who receive an access permit and also 
later during the induction process. Training for 
contractors’ supervisors relating to annual outages 
also addresses safety culture issues.
TVO uses an application called Kelpo which 
personnel can use anonymously to report close call 
situations. Deviation reports are submitted using 
the application, and it is also used to monitor the 
implementation of repairs and corrective measures. 
An event report is drawn up for all safety-critical 
events or events significant for the operation. The 
report is used internally to observe any procedures 
that need to be revised. TVO studies the potential 
impact of human and organisational factors on op-
erational events. Several procedural and organisa-
tional changes have been implemented on the basis 
of defects observed during the study of operational 
events.
TVO utilises a performance-based bonus scheme 
in which part of the bonus is specified on the basis 
of how well safety culture development measures 
have been implemented. In a safety management 
inspection in 2009, STUK imposed a requirement 
pertaining to the TVO bonus scheme which stated 
that TVO must continue the development of the 
bonus scheme to make the importance of safety 
more clearly visible to personnel. STUK will study 
the implementation of the measures based on this 
requirement in the next safety management in-
spection.
TVO regularly assesses, maintains and devel-
ops safety culture. TVO plans to implement the 
next safety culture self-assessments in compliance 
with the IAEA model in 2010 and 2013, and imple-
ment the necessary development measures based 
on the assessment results.
TVO addresses safety culture in surveys per-
taining to the periodic safety review mainly as an 
internal organisation issue. One interpretation of 
section 28 of the Government decree is that the 
suppliers of a nuclear power plant have a central 
role in the development of safety culture. The most 
recent STUK guide, yVl 1.4, also promotes the sig-
nificance of the supplier safety culture level. In the 
implementation decision of Guide yVl 1.4, STUK 
imposes requirements for the supervision of out-
sourced processes and functions as well as acquisi-
tion procedures. STUK supervises the development 
of the TVO management system in compliance 
with Guide yVl 1.4 utilising the implementation 
decision process.
The conclusion to the above is that TVO has 
implemented systematic procedures through which 
personnel are motivated in responsible working 
and that the safety culture development of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 power plant units has been im-
plemented in the manner referred to in section 
28 of Government Decree 733/2008. TVO is com-
mitted to continuous development of its safety cul-
ture and STUK supervises the implementation of 
these measures in the scope of its periodic inspec-
tion programme and in its continuous oversight.
6.2 Section 29, Safety and 
quality management
Organisations participating in the design, construc-
tion, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear 
power plant shall employ a management system for 
ensuring the management of safety and quality. The 
objective of such a management system is to ensure 
that safety is prioritised without exception, and that 
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quality management requirements correspond to 
the safety significance of the function. The manage-
ment system shall be systematically assessed and 
further developed.
Safety and quality management shall cover all 
functions influencing nuclear power plant safety. 
For each function, requirements significant in safe-
ty terms shall be identified, and the planned meas-
ures described in order to ensure compliance with 
requirements. The processes and operating methods 
shall be systematic and based on instructions.
Systematic procedures shall be in place for 
identifying and correcting deviations significant in 
terms of safety.
The licensee shall commit and oblige its employ-
ees and suppliers, sub-suppliers and other partners 
participating in functions affecting safety, to adhere 
to the systematic management of safety and qual-
ity.
Furthermore, as specified in section 7 j of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, the management system of a 
nuclear facility shall pay particular attention to the 
impact of safety related opinions and the attitudes 
of the management and personnel towards the 
maintenance and development of safety, alongside 
systematic operating methods and their regular as-
sessment and development.
The TVO quality management system is de-
scribed in the TVO management system. TVO has 
developed its quality management system during 
the operational licence term. During 1998–2001, 
the TVO quality assurance procedures were de-
scribed in an operating quality assurance manual. 
After STUK’s approval, TVO started using a com-
prehensive management system in 2001.
The purpose of the TVO management system 
is to provide every TVO employee with procedures 
to be used to ensure safe, competitive, high-quality 
and environmentally friendly electrical production. 
TVO has specified values and related ethical prin-
ciples, and strict adherence to these is required in 
order to ensure the safety of production activities. 
In its management system, TVO requires person-
nel to follow the management system procedures 
and supervisors to ensure that their organisation 
follows the given procedures and regulations.
There are requirements for products and ac-
tivities based on their safety implications. Tasks, 
responsibilities and authorisations important for 
nuclear and radiation safety are included in the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units’ ad-
ministrative rules.
TVO’s management system consists of a gen-
eral part and an activity part. In the general part 
of the management system, TVO describes the 
company policies, general business principles and 
requirements for safety and quality management. 
The activity part includes descriptions of activ-
ity processes as well as manuals and procedures 
guiding activities. The management system covers 
all issues influencing safety as specified in Guide 
yVl 1.9.
The quality assurance requirements and pro-
cedures to be adhered to when procuring nuclear 
fuel and planning its use at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant are defined in a nuclear fuel 
procurement quality manual approved by STUK. 
According to STUK’s assessment, most of the re-
quirements included in Guide yVl 6.7 are met 
but TVO has failed to implement the audits of the 
quality management system of most important 
fuel suppliers’ subcontractors as specified in the 
guide. The realisation of some of the requirements 
of Guide yVl 6.7, particularly those related to 
procurement included in Section 3 of the guide, has 
not been systematically verified. This is due, first 
of all, to document safety issues, which the guide 
does not directly oblige the licensee to take action 
on to verify these issues. Secondly, this is due to the 
fact that the entire issue is not clearly covered in 
STUK’s periodic inspection programme. In the fu-
ture, STUK will pay more attention to verification 
of these issues, and it will address this issue in its 
inspections. TVO submitted to STUK for approval 
the most recent update to the nuclear fuel procure-
ment quality manual in October 2008. The decision 
regarding the update will also address the fulfil-
ment of the yVl 6.7 requirements.
The TVO operational quality management sys-
tem and its implementation are regularly moni-
tored by TVO and STUK. TVO’s assessment meth-
ods include TVO’s internal audits, management 
reviews and safety culture self-assessments (see 
Chapter 6.1). The internal audits are implemented 
annually in accordance with a planned schedule. 
Approximately fifteen audits per year have been 
implemented during the current operational li-
cence period.
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TVO also uses external assessments, such as 
the Peer Review method of the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators (WANO) and third party assess-
ments of its management system, which are based 
on international standards such as ISO 9001:2000 
and ISO 14001:2004. TVO has several quality man-
agement certificates. In 2008, the following were in 
force: ISO 9001:2000, ISO 14001:2004 and OhSAS 
18001:2007, among others.
WANO has assessed TVO’s activities in 1999, 
2001, 2006 and 2009. Based on the 1999 assess-
ment, strengths (such as a monthly internal bul-
letin, a wireless telephone network, short annual 
outages as well as high availability and reliability 
levels) and a total of 20 issues requiring develop-
ment (such as effectiveness of management and 
employees’ behaviour related to safety at work, 
chemistry and radiation protection) were identi-
fied. The WANO follow-up report of 2001 stated 
that 69% of the development areas specified by 
WANO had been improved. The assessment in 
2006 identified several good practices and a total 
of 29 development areas (such as risk management 
related to the health of individuals, addressing at-
titudes and promoting good practices in the field). 
Measures to develop the areas requiring develop-
ment have been initiated, and according to TVO’s 
own assessment, approximately 80% of these is-
sues have been improved. The WANO follow-up 
report in 2009 stated that 53% of the development 
areas specified by WANO had been improved.
Since the operating licence was granted, TVO 
has implemented a system of management re-
views. The reviews are conducted twice per year. 
In compliance with international standards, the 
management reviews deal with the status and ap-
plicability of the management system, focusing on 
quality management, environmental management, 
management of occupational health and safety as 
well as nuclear safety.
The general section of the TVO operations man-
ual includes procedural guidelines for handling de-
viations. TVO utilises the Kelpo application in han-
dling deviations. Deviation reports are submitted 
using the application, and it is also used to monitor 
the implementation of repairs and corrective meas-
ures. The status of measures correcting deviations 
is monitored in the management reviews. During 
the operational licence period, the time it takes to 
correct deviations has decreased.
TVO aims to control the commitment of its 
cooperation partners to a high safety and quality 
culture by means of an agreement and supplier as-
sessment procedure. however, STUK imposed new 
requirements in this area in the implementation 
decision of the new Guide yVl 1.4.
The TVO management system is mostly con-
sistent with the requirements of the new Guide 
yVl 1.4, except for some issues. STUK has imposed 
requirements regarding these issues in the imple-
mentation decision for the new Guide yVl 1.4. 
TVO submitted a development plan for the devia-
tion handling process to STUK in February 2009. 
STUK approved the development plan with some 
remarks.
STUK has regularly inspected the quality man-
agement of TVO’s Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units. During the current operating licence 
period, no such deficiencies relating to the funda-
mentals or structures of quality management that 
would have an essential significance to safety or 
operations affecting quality have been observed. 
TVO has appropriately processed and rectified the 
single deficiencies observed in the implementation 
of quality management.
In 2008, TVO included an organisation-specific 
self-assessment in the activity planning process. 
TVO will further develop the organisation-specific 
self-assessment procedures. TVO has annually im-
plemented assessments of the functionality and 
scope of the quality assurance activities in compli-
ance with Guide yVl 1.9, except for the years 1999, 
2006 and 2007. TVO has requested the approval of 
STUK for development of the quality assurance 
functionality and scope assessment procedure. 
STUK approved the TVO application with some 
remarks and required TVO to submit the specified 
procedure description for information. For the time 
being, TVO will implement the quality assurance 
functionality and scope assessments at least three 
times per year so that the assessments will cover 
all the aspects of the system important for nuclear 
and radiation safety. TVO will implement the first 
assessment of the functionality and scope of its 
management system in compliance with the new 
procedure by the end of 2009. STUK supervises the 
development utilising the implementation decision 
process of Guide yVl 1.4, inspections included in 
the periodic inspection programme and document 
inspection activities. Furthermore, STUK will su-
64
STUK-B 111
pervise TVO’s measures related to the recommen-
dations of the safety culture survey team imple-
mented in 2008 regarding modification practices, 
for example.
The conclusion to the above is that the safety 
and quality management of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units has been implemented in 
the manner referred to in section 29 of Government 
Decree 733/2008. TVO has presented a plan for 
developing safety and quality management, and 
STUK will supervise the implementation of the 
measures using its periodic inspection programme 
and in connection with its continuous oversight.
6.3 Section 30, Lines of management, 
responsibilities and expertise
The lines of management in the organisation of a 
nuclear power plant, alongside the positions and re-
lated responsibilities of employees, shall be defined 
and documented. Furthermore, the operations of the 
organisation shall be monitored and continuously 
developed.
Significant functions with respect to safety shall 
be designated. Training programmes shall be pre-
pared for the development and maintenance of the 
professional qualifications of the persons working 
in these positions, and an adequate command of the 
functions in question must be verified.
The organisation shall have access to profes-
sional expertise and technical knowledge required 
for the safe operation of the plant, the maintenance 
of equipment important to safety, and the manage-
ment of accidents.
The licensee shall have a group of experts, in-
dependent of the other parts of the organisation, 
working as support for the responsible manager, 
said group convening on a regular basis to handle 
safety-related issues and issue recommendations 
thereon if necessary.
Furthermore, in compliance with section 7 i of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, the holder of the licence 
granting the right to use nuclear energy (licensee) 
shall have a sufficient number of qualified person-
nel suitable for the related tasks. Only a person 
approved by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) for the position in question may 
act as a nuclear facility operator in the control room 
of the facility. The licensee shall appoint persons 
responsible for ensuring emergency response ar-
rangements, security and the control of nuclear ma-
terial. Only persons approved by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) specifically for 
each position can be appointed. The licensee shall 
ensure that the persons referred to above occupy the 
positions required for the task, while possessing ad-
equate authority and the genuine prerequisites for 
bearing the responsibility vested in them.
According to section 7 k of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licensee shall appoint a responsible man-
ager and his or her deputy:
[…]	2)	for	the	operation	of	a	nuclear	facility;	[…]
It	 is	 the	 responsible	 manager’s	 task	 to	 ensure	
that the provisions, licence conditions and regula-
tions issued by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) concerning the safe use of nucle-
ar energy, the arrangements for security and emer-
gencies, and the control of nuclear materials are 
complied with. The licensee shall ensure that the 
responsible manager occupies the position required 
by the task and possesses adequate authority and 
the actual prerequisites required for bearing the 
responsibility	vested	in	him	or	her.[…]
According to section 119 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) sees to it that the organisation available to 
the licensee is adequate and serves its purpose, that 
the persons participating in the use of nuclear en-
ergy meet the qualification requirements set, and 
that proper training has been arranged for them.
Detailed requirements regarding the organi-
sation and expertise related to section 30 of the 
Government Decree are included in Guide yVl 1.7, 
and procedures related to the approval of operators 
are included in Guide yVl 1.6.
The TVO management system specifies lines 
of management, responsibilities and important 
issues related to expertise in the administrative 
rules, the organisation manual and the training 
manual. The administrative rules specify tasks, 
responsibilities and authorisations important for 
nuclear and radiation safety. The rest of the organi-
sation and its tasks are specified in the organisa-
tion manual. These documents have been drawn 
up in compliance with the requirements of Guide 
yVl 1.7. Organisational issues pertaining to emer-
gency planning and preparedness are discussed in 
Chapter 8.
Representatives of TVO’s shareholders partici-
pate in the management of the company in the 
meeting of shareholders as well as through the 
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board of directors and committees named by the 
board. TVO’s business is managed by the President 
and CEO who is responsible for the business and 
profit of the company and who reports to the board. 
Persons working directly under the President and 
CEO include the Executive Vice President, the 
directors of the Production, Engineering, Nuclear 
Safety, Corporate Resources, Finance, Corporate 
Relations and Ol3 project departments, corporate 
advisers and the manager of the Ol4 project. The 
President and CEO is assisted by the steering com-
mittee, whose members are the department direc-
tors and a personnel representative. In addition to 
the steering committee, TVO has an operative com-
mittee which only includes the directors.
The responsible director is the director of the 
Production department. TVO has named two depu-
ties for the responsible director from the Production 
department. The Production department direc-
tor and the Production department the director 
manages are responsible for all activities at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units.
The TVO organisation aims to arrange per-
sonnel in such a manner that the set objectives 
are reached. The departments are divided into 
activities and offices whose tasks and responsi-
bilities are described in the organisation manual. 
Furthermore, auxiliary staff units consisting of the 
corporate advisers work under the management of 
the directors. In addition to the standard organisa-
tion, TVO utilises a variety of project teams and 
other working groups.
There are committees for handling tasks in-
volving several organisational units. These com-
mittees include representatives of the different 
units. Examples of these are the safety team, 
plant meeting, information security team, an-
nual outage team, operational experience feed-
back team and ageing management team. The 
assemblages and tasks of the working groups are 
described in the organisation manual, except for 
the safety team, whose rules are specified in the 
administrative rules of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nu-
clear power plant units. Most of the safety team 
members are representatives from units other 
than the operational and project unit. The safety 
team may also include external experts. When 
handling the operational licence application in 
1998, STUK stated in its assessment: ”Since 
the role of the safety team has changed after the 
establishment of the plant meeting more into a 
body monitoring principles and procedures, the re-
quirements	for	improving	the	team’s	objectiveness	
should be reassessed. Expertise could be obtained 
from the Swedish sister plants, for example. This 
issue should be studied in more detail as a coop-
eration issue between similar plants, for example.” 
At present, the TVO safety team has a professor of 
the helsinki University of Technology as a mem-
ber from outside TVO. A representative of Fortum 
also has the right to participate in the safety team 
meetings. In practice, the safety team still mainly 
convenes as a TVO internal body, and thus the re-
mark included in the operating licence statement 
is still valid. The safety team is a body providing 
recommendations and statements concerning nu-
clear safety and quality management issues. The 
chairperson of the safety team is the director of 
the Nuclear Safety department who also draws 
up an annual review of safety issues and safety 
culture for the TVO board of directors. The safety 
team convenes at least every three months.
The plant meeting is an advisory body for the 
Production department director. The plant meeting 
convenes once per month, with the aim of ensuring 
communication between the units. When conven-
ing to discuss an operating transient, the plant 
meeting is also a steering committee in charge of 
troubleshooting.
TVO has specified plant unit-specific main con-
trol room and plant area minimum staffing as well 
as shift personnel working hour regulations in the 
Technical Specifications. There are six shifts for 
each of the plants and a shared shift that rotates 
between the plant units.
TVO has an operating staff training team that 
has worked in 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007 (four to 
eight people per team). The members of the team 
can be licensed as operators after approximately 
two years of training. The current practice is that 
a new training team is recruited approximately 
every two years. TVO follows Guide yVl 1.6 in 
operating staff recruitment, training and operator 
licensing. Operational experience feedback from 
the TVO plants and other plants is continuously 
used in operator training. Operators are trained 
for approximately fifteen days per year. There is a 
training simulator for operator training, and it is 
used to train plant engineering staff and also con-
trol room communication staff, for example.
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The company has approximately 710 perma-
nent employees of whom approximately 75% have 
a technical educational background or a natural 
sciences background, and approximately 20% have 
a Master-level degree. TVO’s employee turnover 
rate is low, and most employees leave the company 
when they retire. TVO is currently undergoing a 
generational change. The employment contracts of 
approximately 250 employees have been in force 
for less than five years and the employment con-
tracts of approximately 230 employees for more 
than 25 years. In 2008, TVO prepared procedures 
on strategic human resource planning that was 
submitted to STUK for information. The number of 
permanent TVO employees increased by 224 peo-
ple between 1998 and 2008. The main increase oc-
curred after 2004, mainly because of the Olkiluoto 
3 project. The number of personnel employed by 
the Production department (called the Department 
of Operation between 2003 and 2007) for the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units has 
remained fairly stable during the entire current 
operating licence period. The number of people 
employed by auxiliary maintenance and operation 
functions has increased by approximately 20%, 
mainly because of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power 
plant unit project and the increased number of 
activities occurring at different parts of Olkiluoto 
(such as Posiva Oy).
In the TVO safety culture survey final report of 
2008, the survey team provided its observations re-
garding human resources. The survey team stated 
that the internal and external resources for abnor-
mal conditions are insufficient in some places, and 
that TVO should study the sufficiency of its availa-
ble competence, particularly in terms of the design 
bases, as well as take action to ensure competence 
in these areas. Attention must still be paid to stra-
tegic hR planning and the sufficiency of personnel. 
STUK reviews the strategic hR planning guideline 
records and implementation of the guidelines in 
connection with its inspection programme.
TVO is preparing for the change of generation 
by maintaining comprehensive documentation in 
manuals, by recruiting replacements for all em-
ployees about to retire, two to three years before 
the retirement time, and by continuously develop-
ing the competence of personnel. hR development 
is guided by key competencies derived on the basis 
of the company strategy and competence require-
ments specified for employees. TVO utilises an 
IT system for monitoring these activities. The 
TVO training manual specifies procedures used to 
maintain and develop personnel competence. Each 
employee attends approximately ten training days 
each year. The events of the past few years, and 
particularly the events during annual outages at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units, 
suggest that TVO needs to invest more in the de-
velopment of personnel competence and in ensur-
ing the competence of the personnel. In September 
2009, STUK focused in a periodic inspection pro-
gramme inspection on TVO hR planning and allo-
cation, maintenance and development of personnel 
competence as well as supervisory work. STUK 
included in the inspection record a requirement 
that TVO must assess the competence assurance 
activities as a whole and draw up a development 
plan to make the activities more systematic and to 
improve quality. STUK requested TVO to submit 
the development plan, including a schedule and 
persons in charge, by 30 April 2010.
TVO also utilises external expertise whenever 
necessary. TVO aims to sign long-term cooperation 
agreements as long-term cooperation provides bet-
ter preconditions for ensuring sufficient supplier 
competence. Supplier competence is studied in 
regular assessments, and external personnel are 
provided with introductory training and also other 
training if necessary.
The activities of the organisation are monitored 
by means of the TVO activity indicators (balanced 
scorecard and benchmarks) as well as a variety 
of assessments – for example, a job satisfaction 
and atmosphere survey performed by an outside 
expert. If necessary, the organisation is revised. In 
such cases, the safety implication assessment for 
the organisational change is carried out in compli-
ance with the procedures included in the general 
part of the TVO operations manual.
TVO finds that the current procedures and 
their development will ensure clarity of the lines 
of management and the competence of the per-
sonnel during the remaining operating licence 
period.Furthermore, STUK will supervise TVO’s 
measures related to the recommendations of the 
safety culture survey team implemented in 2008 
regarding sufficiency of hR resources under ab-
normal conditions and in modification projects, for 
example.
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The conclusion to the above is that the lines of 
management, responsibilities and expertise of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units have 
been defined, described and implemented in the 
manner referred to in section 30 of Government 
Decree 733/2008. TVO is committed to continu-
ous development of its management activities and 
organisation. As a result of the challenges imposed 
by the change of generation and the plant events in 
the past few years, ensuring personnel competence 
needs to be stressed more than before, in addition 
to the development of personnel competence. STUK 
will supervise the implementation of the measures 
using its periodic inspection programme and in 
connection with its continuous oversight.
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7 Physical protection 
(Government Decree 734/2008)
7.1 Regulations and the 
related requirements
According to section 7 l of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
arrangements for security during the use of nuclear 
energy shall be based on threat scenarios involved, 
and analyses of the need for protection. A nuclear 
facility shall have security personnel trained for the 
planning and implementation of arrangements for 
security (security organisation). Security personnel 
shall also be employed for securing the transport 
and storage of nuclear material and nuclear waste. 
The tasks and qualification requirements of the se-
curity organisation and security personnel shall be 
defined and they shall have monitoring equipment, 
communication equipment, protective equipment 
and forcible means equipment available as required 
for their tasks. This forcible means equipment shall 
be proportioned to the threat scenarios and protec-
tion needs involved, so that they are suitable for the 
purpose. Measures belonging to the regular security 
control of a nuclear facility shall be appropriately 
communicated to the employees of the nuclear facil-
ity and other people transacting business within the 
nuclear facility site.
According to section 7 n of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, more detailed provisions on the preparation of 
the security organisation for the prevention of un-
lawful action are laid down in the security stand-
ing order of a nuclear facility, as approved by the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) 
subsequent to consultation with the Ministry of the 
Interior	and	the	Advisory	Committee	as	referred	to	
in Section 56(3). The security standing order shall 
contain at least the following provisions:
1) on how the security organisation is managed 
and its operations organised;
2) on the equipment and forcible means equipment 
in	the	organisation’s	possession;	and
3) on when the police should be called and how 
responsibility should be transferred from the 
security organisation to the police once they have 
arrived on the scene.
The basic qualification requirements for security 
personnel are provided by Government decree. 
Security standing order contains provisions for spe-
cial training, paying particular attention to the skill 
level required for using the equipment and forcible 
means equipment, and demonstrating it.
The regulations for physical protection are defined 
in the Nuclear Energy Act, Nuclear Energy Decree, 
and Government Decree 734/2008. Detailed appli-
cation procedures for the requirements and STUK’s 
oversight are described in the classified Guide 
yVl 6.11, “Physical protection at nuclear power 
plants”, and yVl 6.21, “Physical protection of nu-
clear fuel transports”. Moreover, some yVl guides, 
such as yVl 1.0, yVl 2.0, yVl 5.5 and yVl 5.6, 
contain requirements where the need to consider 
unlawful actions against the nuclear power plant 
shall be taken into account.
Relating to new plant projects and signifi-
cant modification projects concerning the existing 
plants, it has been observed that requirements 
concerning physical protection should be further 
specified in certain respects. These specifications 
have been presented to licensees in STUK’s classi-
fied decisions in 2002. The events of 11 September 
2001 in the United States were taken into account 
in the preparation of these decisions. New require-
ments concerning the specification decisions are 
mainly related to so-called external threats. In this 
context, external threats refer to such intentional 
or negligent external actions against a nuclear 
power plant which, without provisions against 
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such actions, could endanger nuclear power plant 
safety. The requirements aim to take into account 
the long operating life of the plant units as well as 
the difficulties related to predicting the future as 
regards, for example, various disorders and crises 
in society. however, actual military operations 
have not been taken into account in the design ba-
sis. International agreements concerning military 
operations prohibit attacks on targets containing 
large amounts of energy, such as power plants.
7.2 Responsibility and control
According to law, the licensee is unambiguously re-
sponsible for the safety of the nuclear power plant. 
however, the licensee’s means and authorisations 
are not adequate as such in, for example, a situa-
tion resulting from terrorism. Even then it must 
be possible to dimension the applicable counter-
measures, both as regards the extent and timing of 
the verified threat. In addition to the licensee, the 
police and other authorities providing executive as-
sistance to the licensee as required also have legal 
obligations to secure safety in the event of various 
unlawful circumstances. Therefore, the significance 
of cooperation between the safety authorities and 
the various parties should be emphasised in cases 
relating to threat situations and the provisions 
made for them at nuclear power plants. No acts 
classified as serious aimed at damaging nuclear 
power plants have occurred in Finland.
STUK also acts as the regulatory authority for 
physical protection in cases relating to the use 
of nuclear energy. The Council of State has sum-
moned a separate expert team to provide safety 
precautions against unlawful action, and whose 
task is to regularly follow and assess threat sce-
narios and any changes to them, to develop opera-
tional preparedness and communication, to define 
guidelines pertaining to nuclear sector physical 
protection and to submit initiatives concerning 
them. In addition to STUK and experts from power 
companies, the team includes representatives from 
the main Finnish police and safety authorities. The 
member organisations of the team have an exten-
sive international cooperation network through 
which information and opinions concerning inter-
national developments are forwarded to the team.
7.3 Physical protection arrangements 
and the assessment
STUK has assessed the currency and sufficiency 
of the physical protection of the Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant on the basis of the requirements 
laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act, Government 
Decree 734/2008 and Guides yVl 6.11 and 
yVl 6.21, as well as on the basis of the specifica-
tion decision concerning the guides, focusing on the 
changes in the national and international security 
situation during the past ten years and the impact 
of these factors on physical protection at nuclear 
power plants. In compliance with section 37 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK has requested a 
statement from the Ministry of the Interior Police 
Department regarding TVO’s physical protection. 
The issues included in the statement have been 
taken into account when preparing the decision on 
the periodic safety review and the safety assess-
ment.
The safety plan of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant describes the procedures used to prevent 
unlawful actions against the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nu-
clear power plant units. The plan covers the struc-
tural and technical protection of the plant as well 
as administrative procedures. The plan and certain 
other documents concerning physical protection 
are handled as confidential documents. This is due 
to the fact that should they come into the posses-
sion of those planning unlawful actions, it could 
compromise the achievement of the objective of 
the security arrangements (Act on the Openness 
of Government Activities 621/1999, section 24, sub-
section 7).
According to STUK’s assessment, the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant safety plan should be further 
developed. The safety plan must show by which 
means the licensee will implement the nuclear 
power plant’s physical protection. The plan must 
be more comprehensive and detailed. A detailed 
example of the issues that must be included in the 
safety plan, pointed out in connection with a state-
ment requested by STUK from the Ministry of the 
Interior, are TVO’s procedures pertaining to pro-
tecting confidential information and the disposal of 
materials containing such confidential information. 
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TVO must submit the plan on the development of 
the safety plan to STUK for information.
The safety instruction rules submitted by TVO 
to STUK in August 2009 must also be supple-
mented. According to section 7 n of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the licensee is obliged to document 
the operative main issues of the prevention of un-
lawful activities in the form of safety instruction 
rules. Issues to be included in the safety instruc-
tion rules include, for example, management of 
the safety organisation and arrangement of its 
operations, which in practice means definition 
of the basic activities of the safety organisation, 
such as safety organisation management and lines 
of management, staffing, on-call staffing, deputy 
arrangements, monitoring and supervision tasks 
and operational tactics. Furthermore, the safety 
instruction rules must also include the outfitting 
of the safety organisation: monitoring tools and 
technology, communication tools as well as other 
tools and accessories, also including the uniforms 
of those included in the safety organisation, and 
its protective equipment and forcible means equip-
ment available as required for the tasks. TVO must 
submit the supplemented safety instruction plan to 
STUK for approval.
TVO has announced that it will periodically 
– every three years – arrange a comprehensive 
review of physical protection in compliance with 
Guide yVl 6.11, performed by a separately con-
vened team in order to “ensure the correct level of 
physical protection”. In the opinion of STUK, such 
reviews have not been performed. The most recent 
review was scheduled for 2009 but TVO failed to 
submit to STUK a plan regarding the review. The 
plan must be drawn up and submitted to STUK for 
approval.
A decision of STUK regarding physical protec-
tion, issued in 2002, included requirements that 
are currently also included in the Government 
Decree 734/2008. TVO submitted a report in con-
nection with the periodic safety review including 
a statement of position regarding the implementa-
tion of the design bases presented in the above-
mentioned specification decision. STUK considers 
the submitted report insufficient. TVO must sub-
mit a plan on the development of these issues to 
STUK for approval.
TVO must assess the so-called plant area limi-
tation of the Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 nuclear power 
plant units and the related plans. The assessment 
must be drawn up and submitted to STUK for ap-
proval.
The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (TEM) has ordered an IPPAS assess-
ment (International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service) from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) pertaining to physical protection in 
Finland. The objective was to obtain an independ-
ent assessment of the planning, implementation 
and statutory supervision of the physical protec-
tion of nuclear power plants and radioactive sourc-
es by comparing them with Finnish regulations, 
international treaties, the IAEA recommendations 
and good practices.
The assessment team observed several good 
practices in Finland and compiled several recom-
mendations and proposals based on its observa-
tions to further improve physical protection and 
its supervision. Positive observations included, for 
example, functional cooperation between nuclear 
power plants, the police and the Finnish Border 
Guard as well as a specific nuclear source regis-
tration system. The recommendations included, 
for example, supplementing regulatory guidelines 
based on the reformed legislation and increasing 
the number of regulatory inspections, including 
unplanned inspections.
The assessment was performed by a global 
team consisting of seven experts. The assessment 
was carried out by studying documentation, in-
terviewing involved experts and observing the 
implementation of physical protection in helsinki 
and at the nuclear power plant sites in loviisa and 
Olkiluoto from 22 June to 3 July 2009. The results 
will be used when planning and implementing the 
Finnish physical protection infrastructure and the 
planning of physical protection for new nuclear 
power plants in particular. The IAEA final report 
on the assessment was completed in September 
2009. TVO must submit to STUK a response per-
taining to the IPPAS report recommendations and 
proposals on Olkiluoto.
Implementation of requirements by virtue of 
reformed legislation and the construction of the 
Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit will require 
additional physical protection resources. TVO must 
ensure the sufficiency of its physical protection 
staff and maintain their competence.
According to STUK’s view, the arrangements for 
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physical protection of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant have been planned and implemented in a 
manner that makes it possible to prevent unlaw-
ful actions against the plant. According to STUK’s 
assessment, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is 
not fully in compliance with the requirements of 
Government Decree 734/2008, which came into 
force in December 2008. STUK requires that TVO 
updates the safety plan and safety instruction plan 
as well as submits plans on the development of the 
above-mentioned issues. Furthermore, attention 
must be paid to the sufficiency of physical protec-
tion staff resources.
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8 Emergency response arrangements 
(Government Decree 735/2008)
8.1 Regulations and the 
related requirements
According to section 7 p of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the planning of emergency response arrangements 
for the use of nuclear energy shall be based on anal-
yses of operational occurrence and accident condi-
tions, and the consequences assessed on the basis 
of these analyses. In planning emergency response 
arrangements for a nuclear facility, preparations 
shall be made for the release of a significant quan-
tity of radioactive materials from the facility.
The nuclear facility shall have persons trained 
in the planning of emergency response arrange-
ments and emergencies (emergency response or-
ganisation), whose duties shall be specified and 
who shall have access to the facilities, equipment 
and communication systems required for their du-
ties. Emergency response arrangements shall be 
consistent with the rescue and preparedness plans 
drawn up by the authorities, considering the provi-
sions laid down in Section 9(2) of the Rescue Act 
(468/2003).
Emergency response arrangement regula-
tions are included in the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and the Government 
Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants (735/2008). Detailed appli-
cation instructions for the requirements and the 
monitoring procedures of STUK are included in 
Guide yVl 7.4. Other yVl guides also include re-
quirements pertaining to emergency response ar-
rangements, including assessment of the environ-
mental radiation condition, radiation and release 
monitoring as well as meteorological monitoring.
8.2 Planning emergency response 
arrangements and the emergency 
response organisation
TVO has analysed accident and safety-impairing 
events, and these are specified in the safety analy-
sis reports for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units and the interim storage for spent fuel 
(see Chapter 2.1.1 of the safety assessment). These 
analyses have been used as the basis for planning 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant emergency re-
sponse arrangements. Emergencies are classified 
and described in the plant’s emergency plan. The 
notifications and alarms to plant personnel and 
authorities required by different classes of emer-
gencies, as well as the scope of operations of the 
emergency response organisation pertaining to the 
type of emergency, are described in the emergency 
procedures. A more specific description of the emer-
gency response plan and its contents is included in 
Chapter 9 of Appendix 2.
Emergency response arrangements and proce-
dures ensure the safety of personnel by planning 
on how they will be warned and extra personnel 
will be evacuated from the power plant area, in-
cluding the Olkiluoto 3 power plant unit construc-
tion site.
The emergency response arrangements of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant have been coordi-
nated with the management of operation and the 
arrangements for physical protection. The emer-
gency response plan includes separate guidelines 
for the fire brigade as well as descriptions on the 
activities and authority in the case of a fire and 
separately in the case of an emergency including a 
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fire and in the case of an emergency not including 
a fire. The emergency response plan and the pro-
cedures have been reconciled with the rescue plan 
and procedures of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power 
plant unit that is currently under construction. 
The changes resulting from the regional restruc-
turing of rescue operations and the initiation of 
emergency response centre operations have been 
updated into the emergency response plan.
A person responsible for emergency response 
arrangements and his deputy have been appointed 
for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The emer-
gency response organisation has been described in 
the emergency plan and procedures, updated with 
regard to personnel changes and contact informa-
tion approximately once a year. The more limited 
staffing of the emergency response organisation 
required for emergency standby state is defined 
in the shift supervisor guide for the emergency 
response plan.
8.3 Preparedness
Provisions have been made at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant for performing the measures required 
in an emergency and for analysing its effects and 
assessing its development. There are procedures on 
the activities of the emergency response organisa-
tion in the emergency response plan. The facili-
ties of the emergency response organisation at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant include procedures 
for operating transients and emergencies as well 
as a large amount of plant process and radiation 
status data in the process computer, some of which 
is automatically transmitted to the STUK emer-
gency response centre. The data communication 
connections of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units will also be upgraded in connection 
with the commissioning of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear 
power plant unit.
Preparations have been made at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant for assessing the radiation 
condition and dispersion of radioactive materials 
in accidents. Systems were developed by upgrad-
ing the external radiation dose rate monitoring 
network in the power plant area and at a five-kil-
ometre range around the power plant area in the 
summer of 2008. Furthermore, three new radiation 
dose rate meters will be implemented in the power 
plant area in connection with the commission-
ing of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit. 
Instrumentation of the weather mast monitoring 
system was upgraded in the autumn of 2008. The 
ROSA application is used in calculating the disper-
sion of releases and environmental radiation expo-
sure in the emergency response area.
The management of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant emergency response organisation has facili-
ties in both plant units in the nuclear power plant 
area. A backup facility is located in the plant’s air 
raid shelter in premises renovated in 2005. All the 
facilities are equipped with a filtered emergency 
ventilation system. The facilities contain the equip-
ment and software required for analysing the plant 
and radiation condition and for maintaining an 
overall picture of an accident, as well as the re-
quired software and background materials. There 
are assembly points for personnel in the power 
plant, protective equipment readily available for 
emergencies and facilities for personnel contami-
nation monitoring and decontamination. TVO has 
stocked iodine tablets for personnel in the power 
plant area and in the new accommodation village.
The plant communications and alarm systems 
were developed during the current operating li-
cence period by replacing the dedicated DigiPower 
dial connection with other redundant phone con-
nections and by deploying a computer-based alarm 
system for alerting the emergency response organi-
sation. This is also used for testing the availability 
of the emergency response organisation at regular 
intervals. Personnel will be alerted using a high 
power alarm, acoustic and light alarms indoors as 
well as speaker and telephone systems. Accident 
procedures for the residents of the accommodation 
village were reviewed in the spring of 2009.
Written procedures have been planned and 
drawn up for informing the media and the public, 
and these are regularly tested in emergency exer-
cises.
8.4 Maintenance of preparedness
Emergency response training and exercises are an-
nually arranged for the emergency response or-
ganisation of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
TVO has submitted the annual plans for emergen-
cy response training to STUK, as well as reports 
on their implementation. Further, STUK has also 
been provided with a longer-term plan for emer-
gency response training and exercises. The emer-
gency response training has included classroom 
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and action group-specific practical training as well 
as special training, such as first aid, fire and ra-
diation protection training. In addition to severe 
accidents, the emergencies covered by the emer-
gency response exercises also included conditions 
classified as emergency standby. The content and 
scope of the training as well as feedback obtained 
for the training are assessed in the inspections of 
the STUK operational inspection programme. For 
several years, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
has used double staffing in emergency response 
training, meaning that a more senior emergency 
response team guides a junior employee with the 
same tasks.
In addition to emergency response organisation 
training, attention has been paid to the emergency 
response training of others working at the plant 
site. Special attention has been paid to introduc-
tory training for the personnel of the Olkiluoto 3 
nuclear power plant unit and the related activities 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
in the event of an accident occurring when person-
nel are working in the power plant area.
The emergency response facilities and systems 
are maintained in operational order by utilising 
the preventive maintenance system. The emergen-
cy response plan is updated whenever necessary 
but at least once per year.
8.5 Action in an emergency situation
The control rooms of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant are in constant readiness to initiate emer-
gency operations. The shift supervisor serves as the 
emergency manager until the emergency manager 
appointed from within the emergency response 
organisation assumes responsibility for manag-
ing the situation. The emergency response plan 
contains a description of the emergency response 
organisation at the initial stage of its operation, as 
well as of the actual emergency organisation along 
with the related job descriptions. The procedures 
concerning notifications and alarms to the authori-
ties have been updated with regard to emergency 
response centre operations. The means of commu-
nicating the overall picture of the situation have 
been developed by introducing procedures on com-
municating release data to STUK during an emer-
gency situation.
The plant emergency manager’s command re-
sponsibilities in an emergency situation have been 
revised due to amendments implemented in rescue 
legislation, and the related updates have been 
made in the emergency response plan and proce-
dures. The plant emergency manager’s procedures 
include procedures on providing recommendations 
on rescue measures to the rescue activity man-
ager until STUK assumes responsibility for this. 
During the past few years, attention has been paid 
to the termination of emergency situations and 
debriefing measures. This has been instructed in 
the emergency manager’s emergency procedures, 
and the activities concerning it have been tested in 
emergency exercises where the further measures 
required by the situation have been briefly as-
sessed at the end of the exercise.
8.6 Measures relating to 
rescue operations
Section 9 of the Rescue Act includes planning ob-
ligations required for catastrophes for both nu-
clear power plants and their surroundings. The 
regional rescue authorities have procedures in 
place for accidents, and the environmental rescue 
plan for a Teollisuuden Voima Oy nuclear power 
plant radiation accident was updated on 25 July 
2007. TVO has taken care of cooperation with the 
Satakunta Fire and Rescue Services for emergen-
cies in joint meetings and when updating the res-
cue plan drawn up by the rescue services. On 25 
April 2006, the Provincial State Office of Western 
Finland appointed an external safety coopera-
tion committee for the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant, including representatives of TVO, STUK, the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute, the Provincial 
Police Command and the Rescue Department of 
the Provincial State Office of Western Finland, the 
Rauma Unit of the Satakunta Fire and Rescue 
Services, the Satakunta Emergency Response 
Centre and the Emergency Services College. The 
committee periodically prepares emergency re-
sponse exercises implemented under the manage-
ment of the Provincial State Office, monitors the 
implementation of development areas observed in 
the exercises in different organisations as well as 
prepares and implements joint training events. An 
emergency response exercise arranged in the au-
tumn of 2008 tested the functionality of the pro-
cedures and the practical cooperation between the 
power company and the authorities. If necessary, 
TVO will participate in warning residents in the 
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neighbouring areas using the high power alarm 
located in the nuclear power plant area.
Emergency operating procedures have been dis-
tributed to the population in the emergency plan-
ning	 zone,	 and	 iodine	 tablets	were	 distributed	 to	
the	population	in	the	protective	zone	in	2009.
8.7 Summary
According to STUK’s assessment, the emergency 
response arrangements of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are up-to-date and sufficient, and TVO 
is further developing preparedness for emergen-
cies. The most important change in the next few 
years will be commissioning of the Olkiluoto 3 
nuclear power plant unit that is currently under 
construction. The commissioning will require up-
dating of the emergency response plan and other 
background materials as well as a review of the 
emergency response organisation assembly. The 
emergency response organisation facilities must be 
properly equipped, personnel must be trained and 
an emergency exercise must be arranged.
STUK has requested a statement of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant emergency re-
sponse arrangements from the Rescue Services 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior in 
compliance with section 37 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree in connection with a periodic safety review 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units. 
In the statement, the Rescue Services Department 
of the Ministry of the Interior finds that the TVO 
report has been appropriately drawn up, and the 
Rescue Services Department of the Ministry of the 
Interior does not have anything to comment on in 
the scope of its sector. 
The conclusion to the above is that the emergen-
cy response arrangements of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been implemented in the manner 
referred to in Government Decree 735/2008.
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9 Nuclear waste management
According to section 20, paragraph 1, point 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, a prerequisite for granting a 
construction permit for a nuclear facility is that 
the methods available to the applicant for arrang-
ing nuclear waste management, including the final 
disposal of nuclear waste and the decommissioning 
of the facility, are sufficient and appropriate.
According to section 7 h of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the nuclear facility shall have the facilities, 
equipment and other arrangements required to en-
sure the safe handling and storage of nuclear mate-
rial required by the plant and any nuclear waste 
generated during operation. Nuclear waste shall 
be managed so that after disposal of the waste no 
radiation exposure is caused, which would exceed 
the level considered acceptable at the time the final 
disposal is implemented. The disposal of nuclear 
waste in a manner intended as permanent shall be 
planned giving priority to safety and so that ensur-
ing long-term safety does not require the surveil-
lance of the final disposal site. Nuclear waste man-
agement plans shall be kept up to date as provided 
in Section 28.
9.1 Handling, storage and disposal 
of radioactive waste
According to section 16 of Government Decree 
733/2008, waste generated during the operation of 
a nuclear power plant, the activity concentration of 
which exceeds the limits set by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), shall be treated 
as radioactive waste. Waste shall be sorted, catego-
rised and handled in an appropriate manner in 
terms of its storage and final disposal, and stored 
safely. Furthermore, Government Decree 736/2008 
includes more detailed requirements for the safety 
of final disposal of radioactive waste.
The starting point of the management of reac-
tor waste by TVO is that the waste is taken care of 
at the Olkiluoto plant site, including its final dis-
posal. No significant safety-related problems have 
emerged in the management of intermediate and 
low-level waste generated during the operation of 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant during the cur-
rent operating licence period.
At the end of 2008, there was approximately 
6,240 m³ of intermediate and low-level waste. 
Approximately 80% of the waste has been finally 
disposed of. The total activity, excluding activated 
metal waste, was approximately 73 TBq. The accu-
mulated waste volumes and activities were below 
average in international comparison when not 
taking into account the large equipment removed 
when modernising the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units.
Processing of low-level and intermediate level 
waste has been developed at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant during the current operational 
licence period. The most important projects were 
an upgrade of bituminisation equipment used in 
the solidification of intermediate level waste, an 
expansion of the interim storage capacity to retain 
the large equipment removed during the moderni-
sation of the plant units and the acquisition of a 
waste shredder for the intermediate level waste 
storage.
TVO is studying alternative methods of process-
ing currently stored scrap metal and large equip-
ment. Available alternatives include delivery to be 
melted, in which case some of the metal may pos-
sibly be released from the monitoring scope for re-
cycling, or cutting up, packaging and final disposal 
of the scrap metal and equipment.
The final repository for radioactive waste was 
commissioned in 1992, and it has a separate op-
erating licence that is valid until the end of 2055. 
A periodic safety review took place in 2006 in 
compliance with the operating licence condition. 
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STUK submitted a statement of the review to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy. A peri-
odic safety review of the final repository will take 
place every fifteen years.
According to STUK’s view, the methods for 
managing radioactive waste employed by TVO are 
appropriate and sufficient for managing the waste 
in a safe manner. The conclusion to the above is 
that the handling, storage and disposal of radioac-
tive waste have been implemented in the manner 
referred to in section 16 of Government Decree 
733/2008.
9.2 Processing, storage and 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel
According to section 15 of Government Decree 
733/2008, in the handling and storing of nuclear 
fuel, adequate cooling and radiation protection shall 
be ensured. Damage to fuel cladding during han-
dling and storage must be prevented with a high 
degree of certainty. The possibility of a criticality 
accident shall be extremely low. Fuel storage condi-
tions shall be maintained such that the leaktightness 
or mechanical endurance of a fuel assembly is not 
substantially degraded during the planned storage 
period. Furthermore, Government Decree 736/2008 
includes more detailed requirements for the safety 
of final disposal of radioactive waste.
Spent fuel from the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units is retained in water pools in the 
interim storage for spent fuel in the plant area 
until it can be disposed of in the disposal facility 
constructed by Posiva Oy. No significant problems 
have emerged in the storage of spent fuel during 
the current operating licence period.
At the end of 2008, there was approximately 
1,225 tU of spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. This amount does not include 
the fuel inside the nuclear power plant units’ reac-
tors. The interim storage contained approximately 
995 tU of spent fuel. The interim storage is dimen-
sioned for the amount of spent fuel the plant units 
will generate during thirty years of operation. 
According to TVO’s estimate, the interim storage 
will have to be expanded by 2014. The currently 
valid operating licence allows expansion of the 
interim storage up to 1,800 tonnes of uranium by 
virtue of a plant change to be approved by STUK 
as specified in section 112 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree.
TVO assessed the safety of the spent nuclear 
fuel interim storage in 2002. The assessment in-
cluded observations and recommendations which 
TVO has taken into account in its operation. The 
most important of these included preparing a con-
dition monitoring programme for the roof girders 
of the interim storage for spent fuel, a revision of 
the spent fuel transport cask handling procedures 
and improving the flood prevention system. Some 
improvements in the fuel transfer machine’s op-
eration have been implemented but according to 
the plan, the actual modernisation of the machine 
will take place at the end of the current operating 
licence period.
During this operating licence period, cracks 
were observed at the bottom surface of the rein-
forced concrete roof girders of the interim storage 
for spent fuel during TVO’s in-service inspections. 
In order to ensure the durability of the roof struc-
tures, TVO performed a structural analysis that 
verified that the roof structures meet the durabil-
ity requirements set for them. Nevertheless, TVO 
decided to support the roof by installing steel 
trusses above it in 2004. The steel trusses were 
installed in order to ensure that concrete will not 
fall from the cracks of the reinforced concrete roof 
girders into the spent fuel storage pools when the 
foundation of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant 
unit is quarried.
There are also spent fuel condition monitoring 
programmes for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. 
The purpose of these programmes is to ensure safe 
storage and processing as well as the fuel’s suffi-
ciently good condition for final disposal. In its cur-
rent form, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant spent 
fuel condition monitoring programme has been in 
force since 1988. According to the programme, the 
three selected fuel assemblies are visually inspect-
ed and two assemblies are inspected by means of 
oxide layer thickness measuring every ten years. 
During the current operating licence period, STUK 
approved updates of the condition monitoring pro-
grammes with its decisions C634/120, dated 24 
May 2004, and C634/131, dated 20 January 2005.
The spent nuclear fuel disposal plan for the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is based on the final 
disposal project of Posiva Oy, for which the related 
Government decision-in-principle was ratified by 
Parliament in 2001. STUK performed a prelimi-
nary safety assessment of the disposal project 
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in 2000 based on Government Decree 478/1999. 
According to the present schedule, Posiva Oy will 
apply for a construction licence for the encapsula-
tion and disposal facility in 2012 and an operating 
licence in 2018. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
could thus be commenced in 2020.
STUK oversees the spent nuclear fuel disposal 
project prepared by Posiva Oy in accordance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act. Monitoring of the un-
derground research facility to be constructed in 
Olkiluoto is based on the principles outlined in 
STUK’s letter y819/22, dated 26 October 2001. 
By virtue of the decision issued by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (KTM) in 2002, Posiva Oy pub-
lished an extensive report on the status of the final 
disposal project and the related research, develop-
ment and design at the end of 2006. STUK has 
performed an expert review of the report, which 
was also submitted to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry for information in late June 2007.
According to STUK’s assessment, the methods 
for managing spent nuclear fuel employed by TVO, 
as well as the plans for their future improvement, 
are appropriate and sufficient for managing spent 
nuclear fuel in a safe manner. For more informa-
tion on compliance of nuclear fuel processing and 
storage with the requirements of section 15 of 
Government Decree 733/2008, see Chapter 4.5.
9.3 Decommissioning of plant units
According to section 7 g of the Nuclear Energy Act, 
the design of a nuclear facility shall provide for the 
facility’s	 decommissioning,	 the	 related	 decommis-
sioning plan being kept up to date as provided in 
section 28 herein. When the operation of a nuclear 
facility has been terminated, the facility shall be de-
commissioned in accordance with a plan approved 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK). Dismantling the facility and other meas-
ures taken for the decommissioning of the facility 
may not be postponed without due cause.
According to section 20 of Government Decree 
733/2008, the design of a nuclear power plant shall 
take account of decommissioning of the facility so 
as to limit the volume of waste destined for final 
disposal, accumulating during the dismantling of 
the plant, and the radiation exposure of workers 
due to the dismantling of the plant, and to prevent 
radioactive materials from spreading into the envi-
ronment.
According to a decision issued by the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (7/815/91, KTM 19 March 
1991), the plan concerning the decommissioning 
of a nuclear power plant must be updated every 
five years. TVO last updated the decommissioning 
plan for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2008. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy has 
requested a statement from STUK regarding this 
update (4363/815/2008, 9 January 2009).
The starting point of the decommissioning plan 
for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant decommis-
sioning plan is the decommissioning of the plant 
approximately 30 years after the termination of 
the monitored storage. According to the plan, all 
structures and components exceeding the limits for 
the removal of regulatory control will be disassem-
bled from the plant and packed for disposal. The 
waste packages will be disposed of in facilities con-
structed in the close vicinity of the disposal facility. 
Reactor pressure vessels will be disposed of as such 
in separate shafts. The interim storage for spent 
fuel will not be disassembled until the disposal of 
spent fuel is implemented.
According to a STUK statement pertaining 
to the decommissioning plan (C822/287, 30 June 
2009), the decommissioning plan for the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant is sufficiently comprehensive 
and detailed at this point. The decommissioning of 
the power plant and preparation for decommission-
ing can be implemented as specified in the plan. 
The conclusion to the above is that the decom-
missioning preparations of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been implemented in the manner 
referred to in section 20 of Government Decree 
733/2008.
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10 Nuclear material safeguards
According to section 118 of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) maintains a control system of nuclear ma-
terials with the purpose of carrying out the safe-
guards control of the use of nuclear energy that 
is necessary for the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons as well as the safeguards control that is 
related to the international agreements on nuclear 
energy to which Finland is a party. STUK sees to 
it that the licensee has the necessary expertise and 
preparedness to arrange the supervision and that 
the licensee for his own part implements the above-
mentioned supervision in accordance with the per-
tinent regulations.
According to section 118 b of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, the planning, construction and operation of 
a nuclear facility shall be implemented so that the 
obligations concerning the control of nuclear mate-
rial, as provided and defined in the Nuclear Energy 
Act and provisions issued thereunder, and in the 
Euratom Treaty and provisions issued thereunder, 
are met. The facility shall not contain premises, 
materials or functions, relevant to the control of 
nuclear materials, which are not included in the 
design information. The licensee shall have an ac-
counting and reporting system for nuclear material 
and other nuclear commodity which ensures the 
correctness, scope and consistency of information 
in order to implement the supervision necessary for 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear safeguards are based on the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the subsequent 
Safeguards Agreement signed by the IAEA, the EU 
Commission and the non-nuclear weapon states 
of the EU (INFCIRC/193), in addition to the na-
tional Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. The EU 
Commission also has its own safeguards system 
that is based on the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) Treaty. As regards safe-
guards arrangements, the relevant changes during 
the current operating licence period include the 
EU regulation concerning the control of dual-use 
items (Council Regulation EC No 1334/2000), the 
Commission Regulation on the application of safe-
guards (302/2005, 28 February 2005), and the addi-
tional protocol (INFCIRC/193a8, 30 April 2004) re-
lating to the Safeguards Agreement signed by the 
non-nuclear weapon states of the EU, Euratom and 
the IAEA. Finland started implementing the im-
proved safeguarding on 15 October 2008. Improved 
safeguarding refers to reconciling the Safeguards 
Agreement and the monitoring methods specified 
in its additional protocol, which means that the 
total number of IAEA inspections in Finland will 
somewhat reduce.
As regards the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, 
TVO is obliged to comply with the nuclear material 
accounting and control manual approved by STUK 
and the applicable EU regulations. Furthermore, 
TVO is obliged to follow the accounting and moni-
toring manual for international nuclear material 
transfers, as approved by STUK.
STUK approved the most recent update of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant nuclear material 
manual on 7 April 2009. In its decision, STUK re-
quired TVO to specify some parts of the manual, 
and TVO submitted the revised chapters to STUK 
on 1 July 2009. STUK approved TVO’s accounting 
and monitoring manual for international nuclear 
material transfers on 4 May 2006. 
TVO has submitted all reports and announce-
ments required by the EU Council Regulation for 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant on time. The 
reports relating to the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant required by the additional protocol have 
been submitted to the IAEA and partly to the EU 
Commission within the time limits specified in the 
agreement.
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STUK has supervised nuclear material activi-
ties at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. No 
major defects have been observed in the inspec-
tions, and TVO has properly corrected all defects 
observed. Furthermore, it has been observed in 
the inspections that TVO’s own nuclear material 
monitoring system has been properly implemented 
and complies with the regulations. No remarks 
pertaining to the Olkiluoto nuclear power plants 
have been submitted in inspections performed by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) or the annual conclusions drafted on 
the basis of the monitoring of IAEA and Euratom. 
however, safeguarding nuclear materials has be-
come more comprehensive with improved safe-
guarding after monitoring activities by virtue of the 
Safeguards Agreement and its additional protocol 
were combined. Improved safeguarding includes 
not only traditional monitoring activities but also 
other activities related to nuclear materials in 
the entire power plant area as well as inspections 
and inspection visits at short notice. This requires 
continuous readiness of the plant’s own monitor-
ing arrangements. The TVO organisation handling 
nuclear material safeguarding at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant is not extensive enough for this 
purpose. Even if the person in charge of nuclear 
material safeguarding is absent, the plant must 
be able to completely handle its nuclear material 
safeguarding obligations.
In summary, it can be stated that the nec-
essary controls to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons have been arranged in compli-
ance with sections 118 and 118 b of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant. however, more attention must be paid to the 
sufficiency of the organisation handling nuclear 
material safeguarding due to the more extensive 
safeguarding practices.
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11 Other requirements
In addition to the safety requirements specified 
in the Government decrees, a few other require-
ments relating to the safety of a nuclear facility are 
laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act. This chap-
ter discusses the applicant’s financial and other 
prerequisites to engage in safe operations and in 
accordance with Finland’s international treaty ob-
ligations (section 20, subsection 1, paragraph 4 
of the Nuclear Energy Act) to the extent falling 
within STUK’s mandate. Furthermore, compliance 
with the conditions of the current operating licence 
of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
is assessed.
11.1 The licensee’s financial 
prerequisites to engage in operations
A licence to operate a nuclear facility may be grant-
ed if the applicant is otherwise considered to have 
the financial and other prerequisites to engage in 
operations	safely… (section 20, subsection 1, item 4 
of the Nuclear Energy Act). The financial precondi-
tions are primarily assessed by authorities other 
than STUK (mainly the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy). The licensee has financial ob-
ligations to, for example, make provisions for the 
costs of nuclear waste management (for the related 
technical aspects, see Chapter 9) and to cover the 
nuclear liability (see Chapter 11.2). The financial 
position and business environment of the licensee 
also affect the safety of plants, and STUK therefore 
keeps track of the trends in investments made in 
Finnish nuclear power plants to improve safety, as 
well as organisational reforms, the number of em-
ployees and the competence of personnel.
As the Finnish electricity market was deregu-
lated more than ten years ago, there is relatively 
long practical experience of the operations of nu-
clear power companies in the deregulated market 
in Finland. TVO has adhered to a policy whereby 
the financial performance of operations is ensured 
by maintaining a high utilisation rate at the plant, 
meaning that even minor disturbances are to be 
avoided, which, in turn, requires that the plant 
units be kept in good condition. This requires in-
vestments that, for their part, contribute to the 
improvement	 of	 safety;	 proactive	 prevention	 of	
disturbances is always the primary goal in safety 
planning.
In the reports submitted to STUK in connection 
with the periodic safety review, TVO undertakes to 
continuously improve the safety of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant in the future.
11.2 International treaties
The international treaties concerning nuclear ma-
terial safeguards and matters pertaining to nu-
clear liability, nuclear safety and nuclear waste 
fall within STUK’s mandate. In addition, Finland 
is bound by the treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) as well as 
by the obligations of the regulations and directives 
issued by virtue of it. These treaties have been in-
corporated into Finnish national legislation.
Nuclear liability – that is, the liabilities and 
obligations arising from nuclear damage – is pre-
scribed by the Nuclear liability Act (484/1972). 
The Nuclear liability Act takes into account inter-
national treaties concerning Finland, which mainly 
set the minimum limits on the liabilities for nu-
clear damage. Raised liabilities can be enacted 
nationally, as is done in some countries.
The Nuclear liability Act was last amended by 
legislation (493/2005) in which the amendments 
concerning, for example, the extent of liability of 
the operator of a nuclear facility, provided in sec-
tion 18, required by the Protocol amending the 
Paris Convention and the Protocol supplement-
ing the Brussels Supplementary Convention were 
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incorporated into the Nuclear liability Act. In the 
amendment, the extent of the licensee’s liability to 
be covered by insurance is substantially increased 
to EUR 700 million (the present requirement is 
EUR 175 million Special Drawing Rights, which 
translates into approximately EUR 200 million). In 
addition, the revised agreements provide EUR 500 
million from the host country and EUR 300 million 
from the states participating in an international 
convention to be used for compensation, which 
amounts to EUR 1.5 billion being available for 
compensating for the consequences of an accident 
in the new contractual arrangement. Finland’s 
amended Nuclear liability Act also imposes un-
limited liability on the licensee to compensate 
for damage arising from an accident occurring in 
Finland.
The Nuclear liability Act amended by legisla-
tion (493/2005) will enter into force by virtue of a 
Government decree to be issued at a later date. The 
entry into force of the new Nuclear liability Act is 
connected with the entry into force of international 
treaties. As the progress of the national ratification 
of the treaties has been slow, the revised legislation 
is not yet in force.
TVO’s liability insurance covers the separate 
nuclear power plants at the plant site, i.e. the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units as well 
as their nuclear waste management structures 
and the separate final repository for operating 
waste. The amounts insured currently fulfil the re-
quirements laid down in section 18 of the Nuclear 
liability Act. The Insurance Supervision Authority 
has assessed the liability insurance policies taken 
out by TVO and stated, by virtue of decision 
22/499/2003, dated 30 December 2003, that they 
are acceptable. According to section 20, subsec-
tion 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the operation of 
a nuclear facility is subject to the licensee of the 
nuclear facility having arranged indemnification 
regarding liability in the case of nuclear damage 
as prescribed.
STUK assesses the liability insurance policies 
relating to transports in connection with each 
transport. The insurance has been appropriately 
arranged. In the case of TVO, the insurance cover 
has been provided by TVO agreeing with the nec-
essary insurance on a case-by-case basis with the 
sending party.
The International Nuclear Safety Convention, 
Treaty Series 74/1996 (INFCIRC/449), a collection 
of top-level nuclear safety principles legally bind-
ing the states that have joined the Convention, was 
signed in 1994. Finland joined the Convention from 
the beginning, and it has been in force since 1996.
Furthermore, the Joint Convention on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the so-
called Nuclear Waste Convention, Treaty Series 
36/2001, INFCIRC/546) was signed in 1997. It is 
a collection of nuclear waste management princi-
ples legally binding the states that have joined the 
Convention. Finland joined the Convention from 
the beginning, and it has been in force since 2001.
The matters regulated by the International 
Nuclear Safety Convention and the International 
Nuclear Waste Convention are covered by Finnish 
legislation, Government decrees and regulations. 
The implementation of the conventions is reviewed 
at the meetings organised by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) every three years, 
for the purpose of which each Member State 
must submit a report on its actions. The previous 
international review meeting in which the imple-
mentation of the International Nuclear Safety 
Convention was assessed was held in April 2008, 
and the latest review meeting of the Nuclear Waste 
Convention took place in May 2009.
International treaties relating to nuclear mate-
rial safeguards were discussed in section 10 above.
11.3 Compliance with the conditions of 
the plant’s current operating licence
The Council of State granted Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy (from 1 January 2008, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj) 
an operating licence concerning the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant by virtue of resolution 31/812/96 
on 20 August 1998. The operating licence for the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units and 
related buildings required for nuclear fuel and nu-
clear waste management is valid until 31 December 
2018. The following licence conditions are present-
ed in the operating licence.
By virtue of the licence issued with this decision, 
the licensee is allowed to possess, fabricate, handle, 
use and store nuclear waste and nuclear material 
as well as other nuclear substances as follows:
•	 Spent	nuclear	fuel	produced	in	connection	with	
the operation of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant in plant unit Olkiluoto 1 a total of 280 
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tons of uranium, and in plant unit Olkiluoto 2 
a total of 450 tons of uranium as well as a total 
of 1,800 tons of uranium in the interim storage 
for spent fuel. Increase of the capacity of the 
interim storage for spent fuel to 1,800 tons of 
uranium requires the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority's approval of the storage capac-
ity increase in compliance with Section 112 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree.
•	 Spent	nuclear	fuel	produced	in	connection	with	
the operation of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant 400 m³ at both the Olkiluoto 1 and the 
Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant units, a total of 
5,000 m³ at the interim storage for intermediate-
level waste as well as a total of 3,000 m³ at the 
interim storage for low level waste. Increase 
of the capacity of the interim storage for inter-
mediate-level and low level waste the amounts 
mentioned above requires the Radiation and 
Nuclear	Safety	Authority’s	approval	of	the	stor-
age capacity increase in compliance with Section 
112 of the Nuclear Energy Decree.
•	 New	 nuclear	 fuel	 needed	 for	 the	 operation	 of	
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant for which the 
regulations provided by the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Nuclear Energy Decree have been complied 
with.
•	 Other	 nuclear	 materials	 required	 in	 the	 op-
eration of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant as 
follows: nuclear material already existing at 
the plant site, as well as other substances, com-
ponents and equipment mentioned in Section 2, 
Subsection 1, Point 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act 
in the import of which the regulations provided 
by the Nuclear Energy Act and Nuclear Energy 
Decree have been complied with.
The licensee must carry out an intermediate safety 
assessment covering the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant by the end of 2008. The Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority will issue a separate deci-
sion including specific regulations on the scope of 
the assessment.
Only the spent fuel produced in connection 
with the operation of the plant itself is owned, 
handled, used and stored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. All spent fuel produced at the plant 
during the operating licence period is retained at 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units or 
stored in the spent fuel storage facility. The amount 
of spent fuel at the plant site has remained below 
the limit values specified in the operating licence 
conditions throughout the entire operating licence 
period. At the end of 2008, the Olkiluoto 1 nuclear 
power plant unit contained 192 tons of uranium, 
the Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant unit 191 tons 
of uranium and the interim storage for spent fuel 
contained 995 tons of uranium.
TVO has assessed the current maximum stor-
age capacity of the interim storage for spent fuel 
as approximately 1,200 tons of uranium. TVO is 
planning to expand the storage within the next 
few years in compliance with the operating licence 
conditions of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units as well as the construction licence for 
the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit. STUK 
has established a separate project for the oversight 
of the expansion project.
Only the radioactive waste produced in con-
nection with the operation of the plant itself is 
being possessed, handled, used and stored at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The amount of 
radioactive waste in the plant units and the in-
termediate storage has remained below the limit 
values specified in the operating licence conditions 
throughout the entire operating licence period. 
Since 1998, the maximum amounts of waste in 
storage at the Olkiluoto 1 nuclear power plant unit 
has been 161 m³, at the Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power 
plant unit 207 m³, at the intermediate level waste 
storage 96 m³ and at the low-level waste storage 
1,040 m³. Part of the waste produced at the plant 
is disposed of in the radioactive waste repository, 
at which point it falls within the operating licence 
conditions of the repository. The operating licence 
for the repository is valid until 31 December 2051.
Only the new fuel needed for the operation of 
the plant itself is owned, handled, used and stored 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The regula-
tions laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree have been complied with in the import of 
all nuclear materials, components and equipment 
present on the plant site.
In summary, it can be stated that the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant has fulfilled the licence condi-
tions defined in the current operating licence.
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12 Summary
Sections 5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) 
contain the following provisions on the safe use of 
nuclear energy:
5§, the use of nuclear energy, taking into account 
its various effects, shall be in line with the overall 
good of society;
6 §, the use of nuclear energy must be safe; it 
shall not cause injury to people, or damage to the 
environment or property;
section 6a, nuclear waste generated in connec-
tion with or as a result of use of nuclear energy in 
Finland shall be handled, stored and permanently 
disposed of in Finland […];	and
7§, sufficient physical protection and emergency 
planning as well as other arrangements for limiting 
nuclear damage and for protecting nuclear energy 
against illegal activities shall be a prerequisite for 
the use of nuclear energy.
A licence is required for the use of nuclear ener-
gy (section 8 of the Nuclear Energy Act). According 
to section 20 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the licence 
to operate a nuclear facility may be granted if:
1. the operation of the nuclear facility has been 
arranged so that the protection of workers, the 
population’s	 safety	 and	 environmental	 protec-
tion have been taken into account appropriately 
(sections	4	and	4.6	of	the	safety	assessment);
2. the methods available to the applicant for ar-
ranging nuclear waste management, including 
the final disposal of nuclear waste and the de-
commissioning of the facility, are sufficient and 
appropriate	(section	10);
3. the applicant has sufficient expertise available 
and, in particular, the competence of the operat-
ing staff and the operating organisation of the 
nuclear facility are appropriate	(section	6.3.2);
4. the applicant is otherwise considered to have 
the financial and other prerequisites to engage 
in operations safely and in accordance with 
Finland’s	 international	 contractual	 obligations 
(sections	12	and	13);	and
the nuclear facility and its operation otherwise ful-
fil the principles laid down in Sections 5–7.
Operation of the nuclear facility shall not be 
started on the basis of a licence granted:
1. until the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Author-
ity (STUK) has ascertained that the nuclear fa-
cility meets the safety requirements set, that the 
physical protection and emergency planning are 
sufficient, that the necessary control to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been 
arranged appropriately, and that the licensee of 
the nuclear facility has, as provided, arranged 
indemnification regarding liability in case of 
nuclear damage (sections 3–13); and
2. until the Ministry of Trade and Industry has 
ascertained that provision for the cost of nuclear 
waste management has been arranged in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 7.
In this safety assessment, STUK has evaluated the 
realisation of those points that fall within its man-
date as part of its periodic safety review.
With regard to section 20, subsection 1, para-
graphs 1–3 of the Nuclear Energy Act, the arrange-
ments for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units, and the related buildings and storage 
facilities required for nuclear fuel and nuclear 
waste management are sufficient and adequate in 
respect of safety.
With regard to section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK states that the Finnish electricity mar-
ket has already been open to competition for ten 
years with no adverse effects in respect of the 
investments relating to the safety of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant having been observed. The 
Finnish legislation and the practices of the licen-
see concerning it are, to the extent falling within 
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STUK’s mandate, in accordance with international 
treaties.
No such factors on the basis of which the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant could be deemed not 
to comply with the principles laid down in sections 
5–7 of the Nuclear Energy Act have arisen in the 
course of regulatory oversight carried out by STUK.
Relating to section 20, subsection 2, paragraph 
1 of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK states that the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant meets the safety 
requirements for operational nuclear power plants, 
the emergency preparedness arrangements are 
sufficient and the necessary control to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons has been appro-
priately arranged, with the reservations presented 
below. STUK also notes that the licensee of the 
nuclear facility has, as provided, arranged indem-
nification regarding liability in the case of nuclear 
damage. The physical protection of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant is not yet completely in compli-
ance with the requirements of Government Decree 
734/2008, which came into force in December 2008. 
Further requirements concerning this issue are 
included in the decision relating to the periodic 
safety review.
12.1 Development areas relating to the 
safety of the nuclear power plant
The safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has 
been assessed in compliance with the Government 
Decree on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(733/2008), which came into force in 2008. The 
decree notes that existing nuclear power plants 
need not meet all the requirements set out for new 
plants (section 32 of Government Decree 733/2008). 
According to the principles set out in section 7 a of 
the Nuclear Energy Act, the safety of nuclear en-
ergy use shall be maintained at as high a level as 
practically possible. For the further development of 
safety, measures shall be implemented that can be 
considered justified considering operating experi-
ence and safety research and advances in science 
and technology.
Most of the design bases pertaining to the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were 
set in the 1970s. The objective during the operation 
of the plant units has been to continuously improve 
plant safety. Substantial modernisations have been 
carried out at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power 
plant units since their commissioning, and exten-
sive modifications have been implemented in sev-
eral systems in order to improve safety. The safety 
of the plant will be further improved during the 
current operating licence period. Based on the pe-
riodic safety review, TVO has submitted to STUK 
action plans for the observed points requiring im-
provement. These will be discussed next.
Risk factors have been systematically identified 
and eliminated using probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA) during the current operating licence period. 
Examples of such plant changes at the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 nuclear power plant units include adding the 
possibility to eliminate possible spurious protec-
tion functions arising, as a result of an earthquake, 
in the main control room, reinforcing the lower 
access opening of the containment building’s lower 
drywell and constructing a gas turbine plant at 
the plant site. however, it will be necessary to fur-
ther continue the development of the PRA and the 
safety improvement measures at the plant units 
during the current operating licence period.
In order to ensure the electricity supply, a gas 
turbine plant was constructed at the Olkiluoto 
plant site in connection with the Olkiluoto 3 
construction project. The turbine plant will also 
ensure the electricity supply for the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 power plant units. Nevertheless, the loss 
of off-site power is the most important initiating 
event in terms of core melt frequency. The core 
melt frequency and the most important initiating 
events are discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2.1.3. In connection with the periodic safety review, 
STUK required TVO to submit a report on the pos-
sibilities to reduce the risk arising from the loss of 
off-site power and a plan on the measures needed 
to reduce the risk. In its reply, TVO listed the most 
important risk factors but not a plan for reducing 
the risks. In its decision C30-7/106, dated 30 April 
2009, STUK required TVO to submit a plan on the 
diversification of systems important in a loss of 
power event. TVO submitted such a plan to STUK 
in September 2009. STUK will review the adequa-
cy of the measures proposed by TVO to reduce the 
risk from common cause failures.
TVO has not submitted quantitative reviews 
on the basis of which it would be possible to assess 
the risk caused by oil leaking into the sea and the 
adequacy of the preparedness for oil releases. TVO 
shall submit a plan on supplementing the PRA 
with a risk assessment for oil releases.
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The share of initiating events occurring during 
planned outages of the core damage frequency is 
significant. TVO has proposed to update the out-
age analysis by the end of 2010. After the update, 
possible changes required to reduce the risk will 
be assessed. Furthermore, TVO shall continue to 
develop the fire risk analysis in compliance with 
the update plan. STUK will oversee the implemen-
tation of the plans.
Analyses pertaining to the adequacy of the 
emergency cooling system capacity were last up-
dated when the operating licence was renewed. 
At that time, the analyses showed that the safety 
margins of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 power plant units 
in case of a primary circuit leak are large. These 
parts of the analyses were not updated in connec-
tion with the periodic safety review. When the oper-
ating licence was renewed, the analyses pertaining 
to loss of coolant accidents were performed on the 
presumption that the volume of water in the reac-
tor under all conditions will be secured by a mini-
mum of two subsystems of the emergency cooling 
systems. When reviewing the analyses that were 
updated in connection with the periodic safety re-
view, STUK observed that the above-mentioned 
presumption does not comply with Guide yVl 2.2 
under all conditions. As a result, TVO submitted 
a plan to update the analyses pertaining to the 
loss of coolant accidents in compliance with Guide 
yVl 2.2 by 31 December 2009. STUK will review 
the analyses when they are completed.
Nuclear power plants must maintain systemat-
ic procedures for the qualification of safety-critical 
equipment and structures, and to maintain docu-
mentation proving qualification. The qualification 
is to ensure that equipment and structures are ca-
pable of performing their functions in design basis 
operating conditions and accidents with sufficient 
margin while taking into account the loads and 
environmental conditions arising during them. In 
connection with the handling of the periodic safety 
review, STUK required TVO to submit a plan on 
developing the qualification follow-up system. TVO 
has established a working group to develop the 
lifecycle management of electronic and I&C equip-
ment qualified for demanding conditions (such as a 
coolant loss accident).
With the development measures proposed by 
TVO, the qualification procedures of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant are sufficient from the view-
point of the periodic safety review. In addition to 
actual electronic and I&C equipment, there are 
other pieces of equipment (such as pneumatic ac-
tuators) for which operational requirements are 
imposed in case of special conditions arising due 
to an operating transient or an accident or after 
them. In the reports referred to in the action plan, 
TVO shall also establish how such components are 
listed and handled for the purposes of follow-up of 
qualification. The reports specified in the plan of 
action must be submitted to STUK for information 
in compliance with the planned completion sched-
ule. Furthermore, the Westinghouse survey speci-
fied in the plan of action must also be submitted in 
connection with the first delivery. STUK will over-
see the development of the qualification procedures 
as part of its periodic inspection programme and by 
reviewing the reports submitted to STUK.
The residual heat removal systems of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units have 
not been designed in compliance with the diversity 
principle. As a result, there are no diverse systems 
in case of a loss of ultimate heat sink or a com-
mon cause failure in the systems used to remove 
residual heat. TVO has assessed the possibili-
ties to construct a residual heat removal method 
independent on seawater. however, in its report 
submitted for the periodic safety review, TVO notes 
that implementing the studied system as such is 
not technically feasible. Nevertheless, STUK con-
siders it important to systematically assess the 
application of the diversity principle at the plant 
and to develop it in compliance with the principles 
laid down in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy 
Act. Instead of concentrating into separate safety 
functions, TVO must consider the plant as a whole. 
TVO shall submit to STUK for approval a compre-
hensive survey on the sufficiency of diversification 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
and a plan on measures to develop diversification 
by the end of 2010.
The reactor level measurement system of the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units con-
sists of four separate subsystems, two of which are 
sufficient for implementing the protection function. 
Both subsystems are based on differential pressure 
measuring. STUK has required application of the 
diversity principle in compliance with the princi-
ples set out in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy 
Act in the design of the reactor level measurement 
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system. The requirement set out in section 19 of 
Government Decree 733/2008 can be considered 
met when section 32 pertaining to operational 
plants has been taken into account. During the 
current operating licence period, TVO has present-
ed in reports submitted to STUK the possibilities 
to supplement the currently used level measure-
ment system with another system based on a dif-
ferent measuring principle. Based on these reports, 
STUK required in its decision C259/94, dated 13 
October 2008, implementation of the main alter-
native proposed by TVO starting at the annual 
outages in 2012. Furthermore, STUK required 
TVO to study the reactor level measurement diver-
sification needs pertaining to water level swelling 
by the end of 2010. STUK will oversee the imple-
mentation of the water level measurement system 
diversification.
In connection with the periodic safety review, 
STUK required TVO to submit reports on the risks 
inherent to the currently used shutdown and start-
up method due to swelling of the reactor water level 
and the access of water into the steam pipes. If wa-
ter were able to rise into the steam pipes, it could 
endanger the integrity of the primary circuit and 
the containment building. The access of water into 
the steam pipes is currently prevented by a system 
that automatically closes the steam pipe when the 
reactor pressure vessel water level is high with 
an isolation valve in order to stop the water level 
from rising. however, the swelling phenomena of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
does not comply with the safety level required for 
new reactors in section 14 of Government Decree 
733/2008 because the system used to secure the 
primary circuit and containment integrity does 
not comply with the diversity principle in the case 
of the fast closure and isolation signal in case of a 
high reactor water level. Based on the continuous 
improvement principle laid down in section 7 a 
of the Nuclear Energy Act, TVO shall implement 
plant modifications that will improve the safety of 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units in 
cases where the turbine by-pass valves suddenly 
open without cause. Prior to implementing the 
plant modifications, TVO must ensure by adminis-
trative means that the plant units will not be op-
erated without a special reason with the isolation 
valves open at a power level where sudden opening 
of the turbine by-pass valves would cause the risk 
of water accessing the steam pipes due to the in-
creased water level, except for a short time during 
shutdown or start-up.
In 2008, a significant event relating to the elec-
trical systems occurred at the Olkiluoto 1 nuclear 
power plant unit. After the event, the trip condi-
tions of the over-voltage protection relays and the 
opening conditions of the incoming feeders at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units were 
modified in order to protect the main coolant pump 
drives from surges. The modifications lowered the 
risk of the main coolant pump drives triggering 
due to a surge but the repair measures are not suf-
ficient from a deterministic viewpoint. In its deci-
sions C542/35, dated 8 June 2008, and C30-7/106, 
dated 30 April 2009, STUK required TVO to draw 
up a plan on modification needs in the long-term in 
order to improve the surge protection of the main 
coolant pump drives. TVO submitted a plan to 
STUK in September 2009 and STUK has initiated 
the document review process.
In December 2007, TVO submitted to STUK 
a preliminary plan for the implementation of an 
emergency control room in compliance with the 
implementation decision of Guide yVl 5.5. In 
connection with the periodic safety review, STUK 
required TVO to assess its action plans so that the 
limited emergency control room function can be 
implemented during the current operating licence 
period. TVO proposed to implement the emergency 
control room in two stages. The first stage will 
consist of implementing the functions of the cur-
rent emergency control post in a new separate 
emergency control room. The preliminary planning 
related to the implementation will be finished by 
the end of 2009, with a conceptual design plan by 
the end of 2010. According to the plan, the modifi-
cation of the facilities for emergency control room 
use and installation of the equipment required will 
take place in 2011–2014. The second stage of the 
emergency control room implementation process 
will be related to the planned modernisation of 
the reactor operational and protection I&C. The 
implementation of additional functions provided 
by the new equipment in the emergency control 
room will be assessed and planned in connection 
with the modernisation. According to the plan, this 
will be done in 2016–2019. STUK will oversee the 
progress of the emergency control room implemen-
tation project.
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In connection with its periodic safety review, 
STUK required clarification and updating of the 
procedures pertaining to the control room modifi-
cation planning and implementation. TVO submit-
ted a plan on improving the procedures to STUK. 
STUK will oversee the implementation of the 
plan.
STUK is of the opinion that the current best 
practices require procedure-specific justifying doc-
umentation for emergency operating procedures 
that include the procedure strategy, assumptions 
used when drawing up the technical features 
of procedure, references to analyses made when 
drawing up the procedure and other background 
information related to the procedure. Procedure 
verification and validation must be implemented in 
a systematic and comprehensive manner. The vali-
dation must be documented and assessed to ensure 
that the procedures are functional.
TVO shall submit to STUK for information by 
30 November 2009 the comparison of the guides 
for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant 
units and the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit 
included in TVO’s memorandum 130694, “Action 
plan for developing emergency operating proce-
dures”. According to the action plan submitted to 
STUK, TVO has decided to divide the isolation 
procedures A, I, M and y into operator-specific 
procedures. TVO shall prepare guide-specific strat-
egy/justification documentation for the isolation 
procedures A, I, M and y as well as assess the ad-
equacy of the validation of the procedures and, if 
necessary, systematically validate the procedures 
before their implementation. The strategy/justifi-
cation documentation for the procedures, a report 
on adequacy of validation and any plan on validat-
ing the procedures shall be submitted to STUK for 
information by 31 October 2010. Validation reports 
shall be submitted to STUK for information when 
they are completed. Procedure validation must be 
performed separately from the regular refresher 
training done with a simulator.
Based on the work specified above, TVO shall 
assess the need to develop other emergency operat-
ing procedures (including design extension condi-
tions, severe accidents and shutdown states) as 
well as draw up further plans for developing the 
procedures by the end of 2011. This summary and 
the further measures specified on the basis of the 
summary shall be submitted to STUK for informa-
tion. TVO shall continue the work with the proce-
dures in compliance with the plan in such a man-
ner, however, that the general emergency operating 
procedure, the related procedures, the strategy/
justification documentation for outage procedures 
and validation of the procedures will be finished by 
the end of 2012. STUK will oversee the compliance 
with the requirements.
Based on its inspections and observations, STUK 
has stated that the Tech Spec need to be developed 
in order to ensure the document justification, clar-
ity and unambiguousness. In connection with its 
periodic safety review, TVO submitted to STUK 
a plan on the development of the Tech Spec, ac-
cording to which TVO plans to review, supplement 
and harmonise all the Tech Spec requirement and 
justification chapters by the end of 2009. The plan 
is to have the Tech Spec draft version assessed by 
the operational shifts and finalised by the persons 
in charge and the development team by the end of 
2010. The plan is to initiate the regulatory review 
of the Tech Spec at the beginning of 2011. STUK 
has approved the Tech Spec development plan and 
will oversee the implementation of the plan.
TVO is preparing for the change of generation 
of workers by maintaining comprehensive docu-
mentation in manuals, by recruiting replacements 
for all employees about to retire, two to three 
years before the retirement time, and by continu-
ously developing the competence of personnel. As 
a result of the challenges posed by the change of 
generation and the events that have occurred in 
the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units 
in the past few years, ensuring the competence of 
personnel needs to be stressed more than before 
in addition to the development of personnel com-
petence. In September 2009, STUK focused in a 
periodic inspection programme inspection on TVO 
hR planning and allocation, maintenance and 
development of personnel competence as well as 
supervisory work. STUK included in the inspection 
memorandum a requirement that TVO shall assess 
the competence assurance activities as a whole and 
draw up a development plan to make the activities 
more systematic and to improve quality. STUK 
requested TVO to submit the development plan, 
including a schedule and the persons in charge, by 
30 April 2010.
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On the basis of the Safeguards Agreement and 
its additional protocol drawn up on the basis of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, safeguarding 
nuclear materials has become more comprehensive 
that includes not only traditional monitoring ac-
tivities but also other activities related to nuclear 
materials in the entire power plant area as well as 
inspections and inspection visits at short notice. 
This requires the continuous readiness on the 
plant’s own safeguards arrangements. The TVO or-
ganisation handling nuclear material safeguarding 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is not exten-
sive enough for this purpose. Even if the person in 
charge of nuclear material safeguarding is absent, 
the plant must be able to completely handle its 
nuclear material safeguarding obligations. More 
attention shall be paid to the sufficiency of the or-
ganisation handling nuclear material safeguarding 
due to the more extensive safeguarding.
12.2 Compliance with physical 
protection requirements
Physical protection issues included in the periodic 
safety review are handled using separate documen-
tation and STUK’s decisions. In compliance with 
section 37 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK 
has requested a statement from the Ministry of the 
Interior Police Department regarding TVO’s physi-
cal protection arrangements. The issues included 
in the statement have been taken into account 
when preparing the decision on the periodic safety 
review and the safety assessment.
According to STUK’s view, the arrangements for 
physical protection of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant have been planned and implemented in a 
manner that makes it possible to prevent unlaw-
ful actions against the plant. According to STUK’s 
assessment, the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is 
not fully in compliance with the requirements of 
Government Decree 734/2008, which came into 
force in December 2008. Furthermore, develop-
ment needs in physical protection arrangements 
have been recognised in connection with the peri-
odic safety review regarding continuous improve-
ment of safety in compliance with the principles 
laid down in section 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
TVO’s current physical protection plan shall be 
updated. The physical protection plan must show 
by which means the licensee will implement the 
nuclear power plant’s physical protection. The plan 
must be more comprehensive and detailed. A de-
tailed example of the issues that must be included 
in the physical protection plan, pointed out in con-
nection with a statement requested by STUK from 
the Ministry of the Interior, are TVO’s procedures 
pertaining to protecting confidential information 
and the disposal of materials containing such confi-
dential information. TVO must submit the plan on 
the development of the physical protection plan to 
STUK for information by 30 November 2009.
The security standing order submitted by TVO 
to STUK in August 2009 must be supplemented. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee 
is obliged to document the operative main issues 
of the prevention of unlawful activities in the form 
of security standing order. Issues to be included in 
the security standing order include, for example, 
management of the physical protection organisa-
tion and the arrangement of its operations, which 
in practice means definition of the basic activi-
ties of the physical protection organisation, such 
as physical protection organisation management 
and lines of management, staffing, on-call staffing, 
deputy arrangements, monitoring and supervi-
sion tasks and operational tactics. Furthermore, 
the security standing order must also include the 
outfitting of the physical protection organisation 
– monitoring tools and technology, communication 
tools as well as other tools and accessories, also 
including the uniforms of those included in the 
safety organisation – and its protective equipment 
and use-of-force equipment. TVO shall submit the 
supplemented security standing order to STUK for 
approval by 31 January 2010.
TVO has notified that it will periodically – eve-
ry three years – arrange a comprehensive review 
of physical protection arrangements in compliance 
with Guide yVl 6.11, performed by a separately 
convened team in order to “ensure the correct level 
of physical protection”. In the opinion of STUK, 
such reviews have not been performed. The most 
recent review was scheduled for 2009 but TVO 
failed to submit a plan regarding the review to 
STUK. The plan must be drawn up and submitted 
to STUK for approval by 30 November 2009.
A decision of STUK regarding physical protec-
tion, issued in 2002, included requirements that 
are currently also included in Government Decree 
734/2008. TVO submitted a report in connection 
with the periodic safety review, including a state-
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ment of position regarding the implementation of 
the design bases presented in the above-mentioned 
decision. STUK does not consider the provided 
report sufficient, and TVO shall supplement its as-
sessment on the compliance with the requirements 
of Government Decree 734/2008. TVO shall submit 
a plan on development of these issues to STUK for 
approval.
TVO shall assess the so-called plant area de-
limitation of the Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 nuclear power 
plant units and the related plans. The assessment 
shall be drawn up and submitted to STUK for ap-
proval by 31 December 2009. Changes pertaining 
to area delimitations cannot be implemented be-
fore STUK’s approval.
The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (TEM) has ordered an IPPAS assess-
ment (International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service) from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) pertaining to physical protection 
arrangements in Finland. The assessment was 
carried out by studying documentation, interview-
ing the experts involved and observing the imple-
mentation of physical protection in helsinki and 
at the nuclear power plant sites in loviisa and 
Olkiluoto from 22 June to 3 July 2009. The as-
sessment team observed several good practices in 
Finland and compiled several recommendations 
and suggestions on the basis of its observations to 
further improve the physical protection and its su-
pervision. The results will be used when planning 
and implementing the Finnish physical protection 
infrastructure and the planning of physical protec-
tion for new nuclear power plants in particular. 
TVO shall submit to STUK a response pertaining 
to the IPPAS report recommendations and sugges-
tions on Olkiluoto NPP by 31 December 2009.
Implementation of requirements by virtue of 
reformed legislation and the construction of the 
Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit will require 
additional resources for physical protection ar-
rangements. TVO shall take care of the sufficiency 
of its physical protection personnel and maintain 
their competence.
12.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, STUK’s overall evaluation is that, 
with regard to matters falling within its mandate, 
the prerequisites of section 5–7 and section 20, 
subsection 1 of the Nuclear Energy Act for grant-
ing an operating licence for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
nuclear power plant units and the related build-
ings and storage facilities required for nuclear fuel 
and nuclear waste management are still met. In 
connection with the preparation of this safety as-
sessment, STUK has noted that the issues and 
arrangements referred to in section 20, subsection 
2, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Energy Act are in 
order.
Based on its review, STUK imposes require-
ments related to compliance with the requirements 
of the Government decrees that were revised in 
2008 on nuclear plant safety and physical protec-
tion. STUK provides a reasonable time to take into 
account the requirements on physical protection in 
the operation of the plant and in the operations of 
TVO because the requirements did not enter into 
force until at the end of 2008. In the case of compli-
ance with the decree on nuclear plant safety, STUK 
is of the opinion that the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant complies with the requirements set out for 
already existing plants and that the requirements 
specified above are given in order to ensure the 
continuous improvement of safety by virtue of sec-
tion 7 a of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
As a summary of the review of the issues and 
documentation pertaining to the periodic safety 
review and the continuous oversight results, STUK 
notes that the safety of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nucle-
ar power plant units is sufficient and the licensee 
utilises the necessary arrangements to continue 
the safe operation of the plants.
TVO has prepared its own periodic safety re-
view on the status of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear 
power plant units as well as the interim storage for 
spent fuel, intermediate level waste and low-level 
waste, possible development areas and the mainte-
nance of safety in compliance with Guide yVl 1.1.
